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The Economist
April 22nd 2023
Europe
ble network of Russian trenches and forti
fications (see map). “There is no military
endeavour that is more difficult to plan, or
chestrate and execute than combined
arms obstacle breaching,” says Mr Ryan.
In theory, precision artillery can quick
ly take out prepared defences, says Ben
Barry of
IISS
, a thinktank in London,
pointing to Britain’s use of such systems to
destroy bunkers in Afghanistan. But that
requires expert synchronisation of artil
lery, infantry and armour so that troops ad
vance neither too early, while the defences
are intact, nor too late, when Russia’s rear
echelon has reinforced a barrage’s site.
To date, Ukraine’s army has largely con
ducted sequential operations—first artil
lery fire, then a ground advance—rather
than these more demanding coordinated
ones, says FranzStefan Gady, a military
analyst. That is in part because of rigid So
vietstyle commanders and a lack of com
binedarms training at scale, he says. Im
proving Ukraine’s command and control
has been a priority for Western officials
helping to train and advise Ukrainian gen
erals in Germany over recent weeks.
The timing of an offensive is also un
certain. Weather is one factor. American
intelligence analysts reckon that the
ground in eastern Ukraine will remain
muddy until early May. Kit is another. A
third of the Westernsupplied brigades are
not due to be fully equipped and trained
until the end of April. Ukraine’s general
staff could launch a staged attack, with
some brigades thrown in later as they ar
rive, but might choose to “save it all up for a
big bang”, says Mr Barry. This could maxi
mise the pressure on Russian defences.
Waiting for too long could also let Russia
dig in further and replenish ammunition.
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