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![](/i/favi32.png) April 22nd-28th 2023 Ukraine’s game planThe EconomistWaiting for D-Day
“B
REAK THE
spine!” shouts the man in
Russian, chiding his colleague.
“What, you’ve never cut a head off before?”
The video shows what appears to be a
knifewielding Russian soldier beheading
a Ukrainian one, alive. “Put it in a fucking
bag,” demands another voice, “and send it
to his commander.” The footage, posted by
a popular Russian farright account on
Telegram, a socialmedia site, on April 11th,
provoked outrage in Ukraine. “Everyone
must react,” said Volodymyr Zelensky, the
country’s president. “We are not going to
forget anything.” Mr Zelensky’s army will
soon have a shot at revenge.
A Ukrainian counteroffensive is due in
the coming days or weeks. Almost no one
knows precisely where or when it will
come. Only five officials have all the de
tails, noted Oleksiy Danilov, Ukraine’s se
curity chief, on April 6th. But Russian
troops are braced. On April 12th British de
fence intelligence said that Russia had fin
ished building three layers of defensive
lines along 120km (75 miles) of the front
line in Zaporizhia province in anticipation
of a Ukrainian assault towards Melitopol,
including dragon’s teeth antitank obsta
cles stretching southeast along the
p
37
highway from Shyroke. Conquering Meli
topol would help Ukraine sever Russia’s
land bridge between the occupied regions
of Donbas and Crimea.
Ukraine’s offensive force consists of at
least a dozen brigades (some sources say
up to 18), nine of which have been armed
and supplied by Western allies (a brigade
tends to be several thousand men). Those
nine are due to have more than 200 tanks,
800 other armoured vehicles and 150 piec
es of field artillery in total, according to
American intelligence documents which
leaked onto the internet in early March and
widely circulated in April. It is a large force,
but with some glaring weaknesses.
The majority of its vehicles are unar
moured. The amount of artillery is rela
tively modest—the 21st brigade appears to
have just ten guns allocated to it. Notably,
the newest equipment is spread thinly
across units rather than concentrated in a
few. Ukraine might make changes to its or
der of battle in response to the leaks, but it
cannot dismantle and reconstitute bri
gades that might have been training and
preparing together for weeks or months.
One problem for Ukraine is how to
achieve surprise. If it masses its forces at a
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