The Qum Protests and the Coming of the Iranian Revolution
311
during refrains shook their fists at the police and city officials ( Javidan bad
khatirah 1978: 3–4).
These events, preceding the Qum protests of January 1978 by mere
weeks, signal a mobilization of the Islamist opposition that differs consider-
ably from the leftist and moderate opposition’s less frequent activities in win-
ter 1977–78. This distinction, I suggest, was the result of a perception on the
part of the Islamist revolutionaries that victory was at hand. In December
1977, activists in Qum had gained an optimistic ‘‘spirit’’ and felt that ‘‘some-
thing could be done,’’ one of their leaders recalled.
86
According to a merchant
activist, they asked one another: ‘‘What will be our next excuse to arouse
the people against the regime?’’
87
Khomeini, who called the Qum protests of
June 1975 a ‘‘hopeful’’ development, responded to the Qum protests of Janu-
ary 1978 in an entirely different key: ‘‘To the noble nation of Iran, I bring
tidings that the despotic regime of the shah is drawing its last breaths.’’
88
I must thank the nation of Iran. The nation is awakened, the nation is
conscious and resisting; at the very moment it sees all this oppression and
gives all these people to be killed, it is resisting against oppression. It is
standing up, and standing will achieve its goal. Once the nation has awak-
ened, and even the women are protesting against the state and against
the oppressors, it is not difficult for such a nation to become victorious.
89
We have only circumstantial evidence linking the Islamists’ decision to
mobilize their forces and the protest activity that followed the Qum event
of early January 1978.
90
We know that Khomeini and his followers called for
such activity in a way that they had not done in 1975, replacing generalized
outrage with plans for specific protests.
91
One group of ‘‘crusading Muslim
university students,’’ for example, urged ‘‘all classes of people,’’ in particu-
lar bazaaris, to strike ‘‘in protest against this brutal crime of the shah’s anti-
Islamic regime’’ (Dar-barah-yi qiyam 1978, 1:126). We also know that many
of the protestors who took up this call made direct reference to the activism
of the Islamist leaders, as for example in a statement of Tehran bazaaris in
solidarity with ‘‘the crusading clerics’’ (ibid.: 137).
However, the main point in documenting the shift in Islamist opposition
in late 1977 is—in keeping with the comparative method—to present evi-
dence of correlation between cause and outcome rather than evidence (not
currently available) of the direct mechanism linking cause and outcome. The
Islamist mobilization of late 1977 and early 1978, and the sense of efficacy
312
Social Science History
associated with this mobilization, appear to constitute the only major change
between the Qum protests of 1975 and 1978 that can plausibly be associated
with the emergence of widespread protest of January 1978, as contrasted with
the lack of widespread protest in June 1975.
Concluding Remarks
Repression has long been viewed as a double-edged sword: it can either
squelch protest or incite it. Two incidents of repression in Qum, Iran, in
June 1975 and January 1978 exemplify this truism. In the first case, the secu-
rity forces’ assault on a seminary-student protest deterred further opposi-
tional activities. In the second case, the security forces’ assault on a seminary-
student protest aroused a storm of further protests around the country. This
article took this matched pair of events, 31 months apart, in order to explore
a change model of causal explanation. The primary question is this: What
changed in the meantime that might have generated such different public
responses to these events? Three explanations of theoretical interest were
examined: an economic change explanation that emphasizes the importance
of a short-term downturn in the fortunes of the nation; a political change
explanation that highlights the effects of President Carter’s election in 1976;
and an organizational change explanation that considers the pronouncements
and activities of the primary opposition groups.
The available evidence points to significant change only in the self-
understandings and activities of the Islamist opposition. Economic condi-
tions were largely similar throughout the period, and the economic downturn
of 1977—to which the timing of the Iranian Revolution is often attributed—
appears to have been no deeper, by many measures, than the earlier downturn
in 1974–75. Political conditions also were largely unchanged, and the partial
liberalization of 1976–77—another commonly cited reason for the timing of
the revolution—was followed by a crackdown in November 1977 that echoed
the crackdown of March 1975. Among opposition groups, the revolutionary
left and moderate opposition responded very little to either Qum protest, and
the moderate opposition’s mobilization of 1977—frequently referred to as the
opening act of the revolution—went into hiatus with the shah’s crackdown
in the autumn of that year.
Of the causes identified in the literature on the Iranian Revolution, a sig-
nificant shift is to be found only in the Islamist opposition. The statements of
The Qum Protests and the Coming of the Iranian Revolution
313
Khomeini and his followers have a markedly different tone before and after
early November 1977, in particular on the theme of the perceived ‘‘awaken-
ing’’ of the Iranian people and their readiness for revolution. This theme of
the awakening of the Iranian people appears to have been reflected in the
mobilization of the Islamist opposition in a handful of confrontational pro-
tests in the fall of 1977, even as the limited political opportunities associated
with the Carter administration’s human rights campaign dissipated after the
shah’s meeting with Carter in November 1977. The thematic shift cannot be
conclusively linked with the acceleration of protest, however, due to the lack
of evidence of the inner workings of the Islamist opposition, so the argument
rests on a correlation. In keeping with the method of difference, the changed
outcome is attributed to the changed precondition. This is not to say that
longer-term causes were absent, only that such longer-term causes were not
in themselves sufficient to trigger this reaction. Had they been sufficient, we
would expect them to have triggered a similar outcome in mid-1975.
Notes
The author wishes to thank Hamid Algar, Said Amir Arjomand, Ahmad Ashraf, Shaul
Bakhash, and Mahmoud Sadri for their assistance in the preparation of this essay.
1
Khomeini was at this time one of a half dozen senior religious scholars with the title
ayatullah al- uzma.
2
Documentation for the 1975 event comes from three primary sources. First is a con-
temporaneous account, apparently written by an anonymous participant (Guzarish-i
kamil 1976). Second, selected secret police documents have been published in Iran
(SAVAK va ruhaniyat 1992). Third, a recently published book contains the oral his-
tories of 19 students involved in the protest (Shirkhani 1998a).
3
Husayn Ghaffari, interviewed in Shirkhani 1998a: 115; SAVAK reports of 9 June and
23 September 1975 (SAVAK va ruhaniyat 1992: 328, 126).
4
SAVAK report of 9 June 1975 (ibid.: 329).
5
Husayn Musavi-Tabrizi, interviewed in Shirkhani 1998a: 211.
6
Mujtaba Qa id-Amini, interviewed in ibid.: 125.
7
SAVAK lists of arrestees, undated, in ibid.: 256–66; SAVAK reports of 9 June and
23 September 1975 (SAVAK va ruhaniyat 1992: 328, 126).
8
Shirkhani’s exhaustive study of the event failed to document any fatalities (Shirkhani
1998a: 19). Of four open letters written in the week after the incident by religious
leaders of Qum, protesting the beatings and arrests, only one mentioned the possi-
bility of fatalities (Asnad-i inqilab 1990–96, 1:392–93, 5:161–63; Dahnavi 1981: 254–
58; Guzarish-i kamil 1976: 20–22; Shirkhani 1998a: 225–29). In addition, no fatalities
are mentioned in a 1979 summary of the incident written by the Seminary Students
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