Counterplans General Stuff

Arctic War

1nc FL

The Coast Guard’s non-military status means it couldn’t stop conflict

Holmes, 13 – professor of strategy at the Naval War College (James, “America Needs a Coast Guard That Can Fight” Foreign Policy, 3/15, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/15/america_needs_a_coast_guard_that_can_fight)//DH

So how's that going to work? Polar ventures may require the Coast Guard to square off against a serious military competitor, not just against lawbreakers and the elements. But pummeling enemy fleets, projecting power onto foreign shores, warding off ballistic missiles -- business as usual for the Navy/Marine Corps team -- are pursuits remote from the Coast Guard's everyday duties. It may even behoove the service to restore antisubmarine and surface-warfare capabilities dismantled at the Cold War's end. The Coast Guard fleet need not be a U.S. Navy in miniature, built to rule the waves. But the long arm of U.S. strategy needs battle capacity -- not just the light gunnery that now festoons American cutters.

Another task will be to remake the Coast Guard's organizational culture, rediscovering the half-forgotten tradition of fighting for control of the sea. Command of the sea means wresting control from rival fleets or deterring them through overwhelming firepower. Police duty is something nations do after winning command. Constabulary work like the Coast Guard's thus differs sharply from combat. Battle demands a different mindset from scouring the sea for drug or weapons traffickers, or from rescuing seafarers in distress following a nor'easter. For the Coast Guard, spearheading Arctic strategy means relearning combat skills last practiced during World War II, while retaining the service's unique capabilities.

As the Royal Navy's Fleet Admiral Andrew Browne Cunningham put it 70 years ago, "It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition." The material challenges -- designing ships and armaments, wringing funding out of lawmakers -- are the easiest. Revising habits of mind among the officer and enlisted corps is central to keeping the service's culture in tune with shifting realities.

It won't be easy: For the Coast Guard, high-end combat has been an afterthought for decades. The service was subsumed within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in 2003. Before that it was part of the Department of Transportation, not a natural bureaucratic home for a fighting service. By contrast, the Defense Department has been the Navy's master since 1947, when the National Security Act placed all of the armed services under the jurisdiction of the secretary of defense. These are different cultures despite their common seagoing heritage and missions.

No arctic war –

Trends skew toward cooperation

Ruby ’12 - John Gardner Fellow at the U.S. Department of State in the Office of Global Change working on adaptation measures to climate change (Byron, “Conflict or Cooperation? Arctic Geopolitics and Climate Change”, Berkeley Undergraduate Journal, 25(1), Peer Reviewed) //J.N.E

This research sought to test the claims made by Borgerson and other realists who speculated a nascent Arctic resource race would erupt into outright conflict. The results of this research suggest that, instead, a clear trend of cooperation has begun to emerge. In only two of the quantitative simulations were the chances for militarized conflict above 10%, and one of those disputes—Russia and Norway in the Barents Sea—has been more or less resolved at the time of this writing, while the other dispute—the U.S. and Canada over the Northwest Passage—is situated within one of the strongest interstate dyads. Moreover, the dyadic analysis suggests that all of the dyads are relatively strong, especially with respect to open trade, levels of democracy, and normalized relations. It should be noted that at no point did any of these countries retract or withdraw diplomatic envoys—a sign of a severe or catastrophic breakdown in diplomacy— during the course of any of the studied territorial disputes. However, this research does reveal a slightly less reassuring trend regarding Canada and, to a lesser extent, Russia. Not only is Canada embroiled in three of the four current Arctic disputes, but it is also part of two of the weakest dyads identified in the dyadic analysis. Indeed, it appears that, when compared to the other Arctic nations, it is the most aggressive nation-state, even more so than the oft-distrusted Russian bear (whose most portentous indicator of conflict— the nearly 20% chance of armed conflict with Norway—has been muted by a recent treaty formally resolving the dispute). Should policymakers be concerned? Does Canada pose a threat to Arctic security and cooperation? I would conclude from this research that the answer is no. First, it is important to note the motives behind Canada’s bellicose rhetoric and aggressive diplomacy: domestic linkages stemming from notions of Canadian pride. As both historical examples and polling data have demonstrated, Canadians respond vociferously to encroachments on their northern territories, as they perceive the Arctic to be intrinsic to, and formative, of their national identity (EKOS 2011). This renders their direction of aggression towards a defensive posture, rather than an offensive one. If anything, Canada’s rugged and deliberate reinforcing of clear-cut borders and sovereignty in its Arctic territory may serve to further stabilize the region by upholding Westphalian conceptions of interstate interactions, thereby directly answering Borgerson’s fears of a semi-anarchic polar region. Second, two of the current territorial disputes in which Canada is engaged are with the United States over a maritime border in the Beaufort Sea and control over the Northwest Passage. Given the strength of the U.S.-Canada dyad, it seems unlikely these disputes will be resolved through anything other than diplomacy. Moreover, as the domestic fervor with regards to Hans Island cools off, and with Norway and Russia already in agreement with their border, it appears that these territorial disputes—which could have at one time served as flashpoints for conflict— are quickly becoming artifacts in their respective countries’ diplomatic history. Critics may point out that there are minor discrepancies between the predictive probability scores and the dyads, in that one of the highest probability scores for conflict—e.g. the roughly 15% chance of conflict over the Northwest Passage—is associated with what this research identified to be the strongest dyad (e.g. the U.S. and Canada). Could this, then, suggest a flaw with either the findings or the methodology? Again, my answer is no. Such mild discrepancies are not inconsistent results because they operate at different levels; just because a dispute exists between a portentous dyad does not mean that that particular dispute has the requisite conditions to turn it into an explosive militarized conflict, and vice versa. Moreover, since all of the predicted probability scores are relatively low, and the dyadic analysis came to similar conclusions vis-à-vis the dyads (i.e. that each of the dyads are—by and large—stable in absolute terms), the findings of the two approaches are in fact quite harmonious. It is worth mentioning that this research should be understood as the next step, rather than the final one, in Arctic geopolitical research that seeks either to test claims made in the literature by other scholars or to make future projections on the course of Arctic geopolitics. As noted earlier in the methodology section, notable omissions like China have been made in this research, omissions which should be addressed in due time given the growing size and stature of East Asian economies and militaries—not to mention their relatively close geophysical proximity. Enhanced dyadic analysis of East Asian countries with respect to the Arctic states may prove invaluable, as the question shifts from the possibility of internal conflict among Arctic states to external conflict with outsiders. On a final note, I wish to situate this research in relation to the broad based literature on environmental-related conflicts. While the individual causes for particular conflicts in the Arctic could be myriad, the heart of this research—in terms of both why it is important and why the question of conflict has arisen in the first place—relates to the exogenous shock of climate change entering into the biophysical and geopolitical realm of the Arctic. In this respect, then, this research speaks to the issue of environment-driven conflict. While several theorists have argued that the presence of environmental goods and natural resources cause conflict, insofar as it provides the impetus and financial rationale to engage in costly acts of war, the case of the Arctic as it is so far—and how it is projected—suggests that one must qualify the "honey-pot" hypothesis that views resources as a curse rather than a blessing (see de Soysa 2002). Policymakers have demonstrated that they share the same anxieties towards the prospect of a new abundance of resources opening up in the Arctic in places like the Barents Sea, Beaufort Sea, and elsewhere. Indeed, as mentioned earlier in this paper, the Arctic states have essentially come to the table with steel fists hidden in velvet gloves. And yet, despite the media hype of the Russian flag stunt or the intrusion of U.S. naval vessels in alleged Canadian waters, the gloves have stayed on— cooperation, not conflict, has been the predominant modus operandi in Arctic geopolitics. And, with any luck, it will remain that way in the coming decades.

Cooperation solves Arctic war in the short term - conflict is only inevitable in the world of US-Arctic hard power

Misje ’12 – Geography Department, Fullerton (“RUSSIAN HEGEMONY IN THE ARCTIC SPACE? CONTESTING THE POPULAR GEOPOLITICAL DISCOURSES”, April 16th, Thesis Presented to the Faculty of California State University, Fullerton) //J.N.E

Russian Hegemony in the Arctic Space?

In the near future, will Russia become the hegemonic power in the Arctic space? Based on the examination of the UNCLOS articles, four arguments can be made that answer this question: (1) the analysis in Chapter Five supports the view that the cyclical power struggle perpetuated by the Arctic states will prolong the advancement of Russian power; (2) an assessment of the articles reveals how the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf can also delay the rise of Russian power by continually asking that Russia submit additional scientific evidence to prove that the seabed is in fact part of the Russian continental shelf; (3) the UNCLOS provides the Arctic states with enough 92 muscle to reduce and slow the advancement of Russian power, but they cannot completely stop Russia from gaining some economic and political influence in the region; (4) all of the Arctic states have the opportunity to extend their sovereign rights into the claimable zone and this subsequently increases their individual power in the region. However, Russia's claimable zone would be considerably greater with potentially vaster amounts of resources at the Kremlins' fingertips. Thus, it can be concluded that in the near future Russia will maintain its geopolitical clout in the Arctic, but not to the extent that it would be considered the hegemonic power in the region. Nevertheless, this maintains the idea that Russia is a distinct dominant power in the Arctic state triad.

The Potential for Hard Power?

Russia's position in the Arctic system could still change if or when the United States ratifies the UNCLOS. If the United States were to ratify the treaty, in ten years it could submit claims that conflict with Russia's submission. If this were to occur, the United States could potentially be the biggest obstacle to Russian power. What then would Russia do if the United States deliberately created an Arctic stalemate to block Russia from gaining sovereign rights? Here is where hard power could come into play.

The possibility of Borgerson's "armed mad dash for the Arctic's resources" cannot be disregarded (Borgerson 2008, 72). But, the Arctic states have shown that they are willing to invest a considerable amount of time in settling disputes through the UNCLOS. The US is equally capable of approaching the settlement of Arctic disputes within the same soft power mechanism. If the United States were desperate to access resources 93 beyond their EEZ, why would they not seek to quickly settle disputes with Russia in order to initiate development of such resources?

Some may argue that the United States will simply disregard the UNCLOS if the country is in urgent need of Arctic resources. This would then destabilize the very foundations of Arctic cooperation which has been established through international maritime law. However, the United States is undoubtedly aware that energy companies will want to feel reasonably sure of the legal status and jurisdictional boundaries of Arctic waters before they seek to invest. If access to and extraction of natural resources are the basis for Arctic claims, then the US will attempt to gain sovereign rights in a manner that maximizes investments. Therefore there is no real threat of hard power in the foreseeable future of the Arctic. The coastal states will independently ensure that territorial claims are recognized by both the CLCS and the other coastal states in order to access untapped resources. The likelihood of a militarized Arctic with physical clashes is minor; this scenario would only be conceivable if and when the world's oil and gas supplies diminish. This is an extreme situation because governments, as well as oil and gas companies are regularly investing in alternative energy sources to maintain a profit. Therefore, the odds of the abovementioned scenario are minimal.

Both countries are decreasing military presence and working to cooperate

Bailes 12-16-13 -- Visiting Professor at the University of Iceland (Alyson, “Arctic: new conflict theatre between Russia and the West, or model of peace?,” The European Leadership Network, http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/arctic-new-conflict-theatre-between-russia-and-

the-west-or-model-of-peace_1099.html)BC

First, all Arctic states except Russia are cutting military expenditure generally and their Arctic plans are modest, involving mainly higher-tech replacements for old assets and a small growth in numbers. Russia's plans in the Arctic are not more grandiose than elsewhere and actual construction has made a slow start. New bases like Denmark's in East Greenland, and Russia's being built in the New Siberian Islands (far to the East), are designed mainly to get closer to the High Northern seas for purposes of patrolling and policing, climate monitoring, and response to accidents. A study in 2012 by the respected pro-peace institute SIPRI concluded: "Conventional military forces specially adapted to the harsh Arctic environment are projected to remain small scale, especially given the size of the Arctic region, and will remain in some cases considerably below cold war levels."[i] One must also remember that Russia and the West remain in a state of uneasy strategic balance overall, despite all the progress made since the Cold War. Russia's northern coast is now its only real major 'break-out' area, and its forces there are also supposed to offset US and Western power in general. But recalling this also highlights something many analysts miss. The nuclear and naval stand-off between the USA and the Soviet Union or Russia has always taken place over the North Pole. Albeit by a deadly and costly logic, it has kept the peace since the 1950s. Why should either side think they could use military force against the other, in this very area, without the terrible dangers of escalation? Can one really imagine Russia fighting any of the other countries around the Arctic, all full NATO members, without fear of NATO retaliation? So long as Moscow's own Arctic assets are secure and the key sea route firmly under its grip, why would it take that risk here more than anywhere else? Arguably, in fact, the Arctic interaction of Russia and the West is less tense, less subject to out-of-control incidents, than anywhere else their strategic peripheries touch. Since Cold-War times both sides have cooperated on Arctic exploration and environmental management. Since 1996 the Arctic Council has formalized and extended this cooperation, inter alia reaching two legally binding agreements (among the five Nordics, Russia, USA and Canada) on cooperation in Search and Rescue, and major oil-spill response, respectively. Under these agreements all sides have pledged to use their naval and air assets and other security expertise to help each other when something goes wrong. Add the way that Russia has opened up for Western investment in its own Arctic resource exploitation, and there seems rather less to worry about here than in the Caucasus or even the Eastern Baltic. Of course, governments are not the only potential conflict players, as seen in the recent clash between the Russian authorities and Greenpeace. But that example also suggested how high the odds are against other states getting drawn in by a non-state incident in this region. The Arctic does not have 'weak states' or civil conflicts, and the most violent non-state actors likely to surface there - smugglers and opportunistic terrorists - would be the enemies of all. The real threats of a changing Arctic are the non-military ones of violent nature, accidents, infrastructure failure, pollution, business miscalculations, destabilizing migration, other social disruption and new disease - all things that states can profit most from tackling together. And if some commentators are still worried about a random military clash, why are they not deluging us with proposals for arms control and confidence-building measures to help avert it? Interestingly, the only considered and specific ideas of that kind so far have come from a Russian think-tank…[ii]

Discourse is purely political – militarization is to protect economic-interests and sovereignty, not superpower confrontation

Valdai ’13 - leading Russian and international experts in the history, politics, economics and international relations, laureates of the Valdai Club Foundation Grant Program(this article was written by a research group funded by Valdai) (“New Russian Arctic Doctrine: From Idealism to Realism?” July 7^th, http://valdaiclub.com/russia_and_the_world/60220.html) //J.N.E

However, Russia’s “readiness for war” is an essential part of the political discourse. On February 27, 2013 (a week after the adoption of Strategy-2013) Vladimir Putin, while giving a speech on a summary meeting of the Defense Ministry Board, put the situation in the Arctic region on a par with some of the “classic” threats to Russia's national security. He said: “... methodical efforts to undermine the strategic balance are being made. The second phase of a global missile defense system by the United States has de facto been launched; the possibilities for the further expansion of NATO to the East are being explored; and there is a danger of the militarization of the Arctic” (A summary meeting of the Defense Ministry Board, http://www.kremlin.ru/news/17588).

From time to time, such statements are made by the political and military elite of the Arctic countries, thus becoming arguments in favor of a military build-up in the Arctic. This trend has found its way into both the Arctic Strategy of 2008 and Strategy-2013. One of the declared objectives is an effort “to avoid military pressure and aggression against Russia and its allies, to ensure the sovereign rights of Russia's Arctic zone and its ability to implement without hindrance all of its activities in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf "(Article 18-b of the Strategy-2013).

However, it should be noted that, in contrast with the Cold war era, the aim of the current military efforts being made by the Arctic countries is the protection of their economic interests and establishment of their national sovereignty over the maritime zones and trade routes rather than global confrontation between two superpowers or military blocs.

Thus, the question naturally arises “Why has this important document, as far as national security is concerned, attracted so little attention in the media”. The document’s analyses, as well as the prospects for the implementation of the ideas contained within it, will help to answer this question.

US-Russia war is fundamentally impossible

Peck ’14 – writer for forbes (Michael, “7 Reasons Why America Will Never Go To War Over Ukraine”, March 5^th, http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelpeck/2014/03/05/7-reasons-why-america-will-never-go-to-war-over-ukraine/) //J.N.E

America is the mightiest military power in the world. And that fact means absolutely nothing for the Ukraine crisis. Regardless of whether Russia continues to occupy the Crimea region of Ukraine, or decides to occupy all of Ukraine, the U.S. is not going to get into a shooting war with Russia. This has nothing to do with whether Obama is strong or weak. Jimmy Carter or Ronald Reagan would face the same constraints. The U.S. may threaten to impose economic sanctions, but here is why America will never smack Russia with a big stick: Russia is a nuclear superpower. Russia has an estimated 4,500 active nuclear warheads, according to the Federation of American Scientists. Unlike North Korea or perhaps Iran, whose nuclear arsenals couldn’t inflict substantial damage, Russia could totally devastate the U.S. as well as the rest of the planet. U.S. missile defenses, assuming they even work, are not designed to stop a massive Russian strike. For the 46 years of the Cold War, America and Russia were deadly rivals. But they never fought. Their proxies fought: Koreans, Vietnamese, Central Americans, Israelis and Arabs. The one time that U.S. and Soviet forces almost went to war was during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Neither Obama nor Putin is crazy enough to want to repeat that. U.S. Marine Corps vehicle during amphibious assault exercise. U.S. Marine Corps vehicle during amphibious assault exercise. Russia has a powerful army. While the Russian military is a shadow of its Soviet glory days, it is still a formidable force. The Russian army has about 300,000 men and 2,500 tanks (with another 18,000 tanks in storage), according to the “Military Balance 2014″ from the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Its air force has almost 1,400 aircraft, and its navy 171 ships, including 25 in the Black Sea Fleet off Ukraine’s coast. U.S. forces are more capable than Russian forces, which did not perform impressively during the 2008 Russo-Georgia War. American troops would enjoy better training, communications, drones, sensors and possibly better weapons (though the latest Russian fighter jets, such as the T-50, could be trouble for U.S. pilots). However, better is not good enough. The Russian military is not composed of lightly armed insurgents like the Taliban, or a hapless army like the Iraqis in 2003. With advanced weapons like T-80 tanks, supersonic AT-15 Springer anti-tank missiles, BM-30 Smerch multiple rocket launchers and S-400 Growler anti-aircraft missiles, Russian forces pack enough firepower to inflict significant American losses. Ukraine is closer to Russia. The distance between Kiev and Moscow is 500 miles. The distance between Kiev and New York is 5,000 miles. It’s much easier for Russia to send troops and supplies by land than for the U.S. to send them by sea or air. The U.S. military is tired. After nearly 13 years of war, America’s armed forces need a breather. Equipment is worn out from long service in Iraq and Afghanistan, personnel are worn out from repeated deployments overseas, and there are still about 40,000 troops still fighting in Afghanistan. The U.S. doesn’t have many troops to send. The U.S. could easily dispatch air power to Ukraine if its NATO allies allow use of their airbases, and the aircraft carrier George H. W. Bush and its hundred aircraft are patrolling the Mediterranean. But for a ground war to liberate Crimea or defend Ukraine, there is just the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Italy, the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit sailing off Spain, the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment in Germany and the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. While the paratroopers could drop into the combat zone, the Marines would have sail past Russian defenses in the Black Sea, and the Stryker brigade would probably have to travel overland through Poland into Ukraine. Otherwise, bringing in mechanized combat brigades from the U.S. would be logistically difficult, and more important, could take months to organize. The American people are tired. Pity the poor politician who tries to sell the American public on yet another war, especially some complex conflict in a distant Eastern Europe nation. Neville Chamberlain’s words during the 1938 Czechoslovakia crisis come to mind: “How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing.” America‘s allies are tired. NATO sent troops to support the American campaign in Afghanistan, and has little to show for it. Britain sent troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, and has little to show for it. It is almost inconceivable to imagine the Western European public marching in the streets to demand the liberation of Crimea, especially considering the region’s sputtering economy, which might be snuffed out should Russia stop exporting natural gas. As for military capabilities, the Europeans couldn’t evict Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi without American help. And Germans fighting Russians again?