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Arctic Nuclear-Free Zone CP
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- Text: the United States federal government should propose an Arctic Nuclear-Free Zone treaty to the Arctic Council
- The counterplan solves the aff – it’s effective and forces compliance – independently it helps curb global proliferation
- Global proliferation causes extinction
- Uranium Mining Net Benefit
- The counterplan is a prerequisite to legitimate cooperation and resolves the nuclear crisis
- The counterplan checks nuclear conflict in the Arctic and allows cooperation
- The counterplan is possible and the US has pushed non-proliferation before – proves it solves the link to politics
- AT: Doesn’t Solve Cooperation
- Yes proliferation – North Korea, Pakistan, and key Middle Eastern states are developing – new treaties are key
Arctic Nuclear-Free Zone CPFYIhere’s what the cp would doAxwrothy ’10 – served as Principal Secretary and Chief Speechwriter to Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, currently the President and CEO of the Walter and Duncan Gordan Foundation and Secretary General of the Inter Action Council, senior fellow at both the Munk School of Global Affairs and Massey College at the University of Toronto (Thomas S., “A Proposal for an Arctic Nuclear-Free Zone”, http://interactioncouncil.org/proposal-arctic-nuclear-weapon-free-zone) //J.N.E The Framework for a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in the Arctic 1. The Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone should cover all adjacent seas, sea beds, continental shelves, disputed territories, international waters and airspace of Canada, Finland, Greenland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Northern Russia and Alaska (USA) should also be covered by the Treaty. 2. Along the edges of the zone, there should be a gradual “thinning out” of nuclear weapons. 3. All zonal states and NATO should subscribe to a policy of non-First Use of nuclear weapons both during peacetime and wartime in the Arctic. 4. Non-nuclear weapon states in the region should renounce the nuclear umbrella. 5. “Nuclear Weapon Free” should mean all nuclear weapons and armaments, as well as the targeting of nuclear facilities and nuclear testing. 6. The peaceful use of nuclear technology for civilian purposes should continue. 7. Verification procedures need to ensure that civilian nuclear technology is not being deferred towards weapon building capabilities. 8. All nuclear weapons must be removed from the zone. 9. There should be no new deployment of weapons. 10. Transiting the zone with nuclear weapons should not be permitted. 11. A permanent organization should be established to ensure verification of the rules and this organization should have the resources that it needs to operate fully. 12. Joint aerial patrols of the region should be carried out. 13. States should prioritize aerial reconnaissance of the proposed ANWFZ with their OST quota of flights. 14. The ANWFZ should incorporate the PSI into its framework. 15. An advanced underwater listening system built by and accessed to by all zonal states should be created. 16. Information-sharing of relevant information should be commonplace. 17. The place of nuclear weapons within the military strategy of the zonal states should not be replaced with another equally (or more) destructive Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) 18. Measures that do not build confidence (i.e. flag planting, whiskey burying and fly-bys) should be avoided. 19. Arctic Council member states should resource their Arctic SAR capabilities to honour their SAR Treaty commitments. This process should be monitored by the Arctic Council’s new Secretariat. 20. INCSEA should be ‘multilateralized’ to include all of the Arctic States. 21. Both the United States and Russia should take their nuclear arsenals off high alert status. 22. Nuclear Weapon States should unfix the guidance systems of their weapons from targets within the zone immediately. 23. An Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs from each state should be appointed to handle negotiations. 24. Consular services and support should be increased within the region and researchers and Indigenous Peoples should have simplified access to visas. 25. The United States should ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to facilitate a peaceful resolution to the existing sovereignty disputes in the region. 26. A common code for ship design should be agreed upon in order to mitigate the chances of environmental damage. 27. Financial and technical support for programs such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program that aims to safely dispose of nuclear waste in the Russian North should be forthcoming from all zonal states. 28. The security of nuclear fuel storage facilities should be bolstered. 29. Common training programs for nuclear officials should be initiated in order to create the people with the required expertise to carry out the other recommendations. 30. Economic integration should be encouraged. One possible method would be for an Arctic Chamber of Commerce to be established or through the Barents Euro-Arctic Council Secretariat. Getting to “Yes” 31. The rules of the Arctic Council should be amended to allow for debates concerning peace and security issues such as arms control. 32. If the Arctic Council is unable to address these peace and security concerns, than another forum must be created which can discuss peace and security issues such as Arctic arms control. 33. If it is not possible to get all Arctic states to ratify the NWFZ Treaty then those states which support the initiative should sign on to the treaty and continue to lobby non-signatories to sign on.
1ncText: the United States federal government should propose an Arctic Nuclear-Free Zone treaty to the Arctic CouncilThis is feasible and solves the link to politicsAxwrothy ’10 – served as Principal Secretary and Chief Speechwriter to Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, currently the President and CEO of the Walter and Duncan Gordan Foundation and Secretary General of the Inter Action Council, senior fellow at both the Munk School of Global Affairs and Massey College at the University of Toronto (Thomas S., “A Proposal for an Arctic Nuclear-Free Zone”, http://interactioncouncil.org/proposal-arctic-nuclear-weapon-free-zone) //J.N.E The task of “getting to ‘yes’”[193] is by no means an easy one. Hamel-Green, however, gives hope that this can be achieved when he writes that, “in all the existing zones, a number of factors, including skilful diplomats and visionary leaders, and, in some instances, vigorous grassroots campaigns from non-governmental academics, peace movements and indigenous communities, have, successfully won out against traditional arms race advocates of nuclear-based deterrence and ‘security’”[194]. While there are opponents to the idea of a NWFZ in the Arctic, on balance the support is with the idea. The major players, Indigenous communities and civil society are all on board. For this reason, a NWFZ in the Arctic is possible. 5.1 What Are States Looking For?
5.2 Achieving Government Buy-In Integral to “getting to yes” is achieving buy-in from the highest echelons of the leadership in all Arctic regional states. While opponents do exist, there is a coalition of supports in the Canada, the Nordic countries, and yes, even in the United States and Russia. One minute before midnight of the day of Barack Obama’s inauguration, the Bush Administration issued a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD 66), which outlined a United States Arctic Region Policy. NSPD 66 stated that the United States should develop “greater capabilities and capacity” in the Arctic in order to protect US borders and that military vessel and aircraft mobility and transport throughout the Arctic should be preserved. Furthermore, it urged the Senate to ratify UNCLOS to ensure military transportation and sovereignty over resource-rich areas[197]. This directive was important because it elevated the posture of the Arctic within American foreign policy priorities, which has the potential to expand even further when the United States assumes the chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2015[198]. This lends additional weight to the United States as an actor in Arctic cooperation and it is imperative that Washington shows leadership in moving towards an ANWFZ[199]. The initiative for an Arctic NWFZ was Mikhail Gorbachev’s 1987 speech in Murmansk. It is time that the current Russian leadership take up the “zone of peace” initiative once more. Given Russia’s ever-present fears regarding NATO expansion, its perceived self-isolation and its disadvantage in terms of conventional forces, the ANWFZ would be a chance for Russia to address many of its perceived security concerns.
This section will provide an introduction to the NWFZ concept by explaining its goals, outlining the principles that the United Nations has set for NWFZs, presenting the arguments for how NWFZs contribute to non-proliferation, introducing the existing NWFZs, and providing a history of NWFZ proposals in the Arctic. What do NWFZ try to achieve? According to Weerakoon-Gonnewardene, “the aims of the proposal for a ... Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone ... are to raise the nuclear threshold and reduce the risk of escalation in a region where strategic, tactical and conventional weapons are located, and to lessen the danger of a surprise attack...”[25] It does so through mandating the non-possession, non-deployment and non-use of nuclear weapons within the zone[26]. This has the end goal, as so aptly put by Nobel Prize winning Mexican diplomat Alfonso Garcia Robles of gradually increasing the areas “from which nuclear weapons are prohibited to a point where the territories of the powers which possess these terrible weapons of mass destruction will be something like contaminated islets subject to quarantine”[27]. By isolating nuclear weapon states, NWFZs send the powerful message that there is a consensus against the presence of nuclear weapons and that this should be the norm of the entire world. Weerakoon-Gonnewardene concludes that a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone is “a confidence-building measure with political implications in addition to its military significance[28]”. Subsequently, a NWFZ can be seen as a building block towards a more comprehensive peace[29]. This momentum could then be used to create a world free of nuclear weapons[30].
Most importantly, NWFZs contribute to non-proliferation by limiting the number of potential nuclear actors. NWFZs often require each party to declare any ability they have to manufacture or test nuclear explosives and destroy these facilities or covert them to peaceful purposes. With the accompanying verification procedures, this requirement of a NWFZ reduces the salience of the argument that while it may be a good idea to abolish nuclear weapons, it is impossible that they stay abolished, because the facilities and know-how continue to exist. Xia Liping rightfully asserts that “these measures will return nuclear threshold states or de facto nuclear weapon states to the status of non-nuclear weapon states, and prevent them from going nuclear again” and cites South Africa under the Pelindaba Treaty as a successful example[33]. Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones, therefore, contribute importantly towards non-proliferation efforts by reducing the nuclear-weapons related capacity of the participating states. In order to help regions achieve NWFZ status, the United Nations Disarmament Commission in its April 30, 1999 report put forth a set of four principles and guidelines for establishing Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones. The first principle is that the decision to create a NWFZ should be freely arrived at by the states that make up the region. The second principle is that the proposal to establish a NWFZ should emanate from within the region itself and not be the result of the coercive action of outside actors. Third, it is necessary to consult the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), so that they may sign and ratify the protocols of the treaty. This would mean that they have made a legally binding commitment to respect the zone and not deploy nuclear weapons against states that are party to the treaty. The fourth and final principle set out by the UN Disarmament Commission is that a NWFZ should not prevent the use of nuclear science and technology for civilian purposes, but should encourage cooperation to ensure that its use remains peaceful[34].
The concept of a NWFZ in the Arctic is not a new one. Proposals have been made as early as 1961 when Norway and Denmark decided not to deploy nuclear weapons on their territory during peacetime, the Swedish Foreign Minister proposed setting up a club of states, which would agree not to deploy nuclear weapons[41]. According to Hamel-Green, the first proposal for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone in the Arctic was put forward in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists in 1964[42]. It has subsequently been picked up by Inuit organizations (including the Inuit Circumpolar Council), regional and international peace organizations, academic researchers and Arctic region specialists[43]. This paper builds on this body of literature to develop a workable framework for a NWFZ in the Arctic, in the hope that this will contribute to making progress towards the end goal of a world without nuclear weapons[44]. Global proliferation causes extinctionMaass ‘10 - Department of political science at Notre Dame university (Richard, “Nuclear Proliferation and Declining U.S. Hegemony”, http://www.hamilton.edu/documents//levitt-center/Maass_article.pdf) //J.N.E Ultimately an assumption, rational deterrence theory lacks any empirically tested evidence. Nuclear proliferation exponentially increases the possibility of non-proliferation regime collapse and nuclear conflict, reducing all states’ relative power. Nuclear peace theory seems plausible, but like any mathematical model it may only marginally apply to world politics and the dynamics of nuclear proliferation, due to the fact that “international security is not reducible to the theory of mathematical games” (Bracken, 2002, pg. 403). Rather, the spread of nuclear weapons exponentially decreases the stability of regional and global politics by intensifying regional rivalries and political tensions, both of which may potentially catalyze a nuclear catastrophe. Frustrated with a lack of results through conventional conflict, desperate states may look to nuclear arsenals as a source of absolute resolution for any given conflict. The use of nuclear weapons, even in a limited theater, could plausibly trigger chain reactions rippling across the globe. With their interests and sovereignty threatened, other nuclear states will eventually use their own weapons in an effort to ensure national security. President Kennedy warned of the danger of nuclear proliferation in 1963: I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have nuclear weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countries…there would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security…there would only be the increased chance of accidental war, and an increased necessity for the great powers to involve themselves in what otherwise would be local conflicts (Cirincione, 2007, pg. 103). Proliferation decreases the relative security of all states not only through the possibility of direct conflict, but also by threatening foreign and domestic interests. As the sole international hegemon, the U.S. seeks to use its power to insure its security and influence international politics in a way that reflects its own interests and values (Huntington, 1993, pg. 70). In addition to creating a direct security threat, further proliferation jeopardizes the United States’ ability to project its primacy and promote its interests internationally. Uranium Mining Net Benefit*1nc evidence says the treaty would prevent uranium mining The counterplan solves uranium mining – that checks ecological destruction and biodiversity lossFOEE ’13 - largest grassroots environmental network in Europe, uniting more than 30 national organisations with thousands of local groups (“Uranium mining fears in arctic region”, May 3rd, https://www.foeeurope.org/uranium-mining-fears-arctic-region-030513) //J.N.E Over 50 groups, including Friends of the Earth Denmark, warned the Greenlandic and Danish governments today that they risk jeopardising the vulnerable arctic environment with their plans to allow uranium mining in the region [1]. Proposals to overturn a 25-year decision that prevents the extraction of uranium in the region coincide with several plans for mining uranium, along with rare earth minerals, in Greenland. These plans threaten to irreversibly damage the sensitive arctic environment and ecosystems, and include one open-pit mine in Kuannersuit, Southern Greenland, which alone would make Greenland the fifth largest uranium exporter in the world. Palle Bendsen, from NOAH Friends of the Earth Denmark, said: "Denmark rejected nuclear power in 1985, and in 1988, alongside Greenland, implemented a zero-tolerance policy towards uranium extraction. Now, Denmark and Greenland are u-turning on their stance towards nuclear, and risk sullying one of the last pristine environments on earth for a fuel they don't need."
These pollutants risk leaching into the local environment, accumulating in the food chain and causing comprehensive radioactive contamination – with significant impacts on local communities, farming and fishing in Southern Greenland. In addition, there are currently no financial resources to cover potential accidents or to restore any ecological damage as a result of extraction – long-term economic costs of radioactive pollution in Greenland could exceed the short-term economic benefits of uranium mining, according to the organisation. There are no nuclear reactors, nor industries, that require uranium in the Danish realm. The groups called on the Greenlandic and Danish government to preserve the arctic region's unique ecosystems by keeping their zero-tolerance policy on uranium extraction. SolvencyThe counterplan is a prerequisite to legitimate cooperation and resolves the nuclear crisisStampe ’14 – member of the Danish parliament sitting on the defence committee “No nukes in the Arctic”, January 8th, http://arcticjournal.com/opinion/331/no-nukes-arctic) //J.N.E After the Second World War, many a Nordic politician dreamt of combining their militaries with other countries in the region to form a co-operative defence force. The vision never emerged, to the disappointment of Hans Hedtoft, who served as PM of Denmark twice in the 1940s and ‘50s, and who labelled the breakdown in negotiations “my generation’s greatest political defeat”. Hedtoft needn’t have been so hard on himself. Seen from today’s perspective, it’s clear that the time wasn’t right for grand international collaborations. What’s more, the various Nordic countries each had vastly different challenges and Cold War priorities. The Cold War is over, but the historic differences can still be seen in defence policies of the Nordic countries. Denmark, Norway and Iceland are all Nato members. Finland and Sweden take part in EU defence policy. Denmark and Norway purchase mostly American war materiel. Sweden has its own defence industry. Finland purchases Russian and Swedish equipment. In Denmark, we are, generally speaking, more likely to take part in international military coalitions than our Nordic neighbours are. Preventing, pollution, shipwrecks and nuclear war These are big differences, and they would likely make co-operating difficult. But, allowing them to prevent closer military co-operation in the region would be a serious political mistake. Unlike during Hedtoft’s day, the time is ripe. It also necessary, thanks in large part to the emergence of the Arctic as a geo-political hotspot. The need for combined Nordic environmental surveillance and search and rescue efforts in the Arctic has already been stated. Such a proposal was made in 2009, by Thorvald Stoltenberg, Norway’s defence and foreign minister at the time, who put the idea forward as part his recommendations for closer Nordic co-operation in defence and foreign policy. But pollution and the safety of cruise ship passengers are, unfortunately, the least of our worries right now. We need to wake to the Arctic’s new status as an area of significant economic and geo-political interest. It is an area that world powers are gradually taking note of. Their new-found interest opens up the potential for conflict, and leaves us with the possibility of nuclear-armed powers coming into conflict over the region. Avoiding this needs to be one of the most important security policy goals for the Nordic countries. Such a goal is so important that it will require us to set aside differences in military equipment and attitudes towards international intervention. What it requires is for us to come up with a common vision for Nordic security policy that calls for the Arctic to be made free of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are already banned from a number of areas, including Antarctica, Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, Central Asia and the South Pacific. Adding the Arctic to this list would only be natural. A Nobel idea Were such a ban to be put in place, countries would be prohibited from developing, producing, stationing, or using nuclear weapons in the Arctic. The ban, however, would not prevent countries from mining uranium or using atomic energy, meaning that Greenland’s plans to develop its mining industry would not come into conflict with an Atomic weapon-free zone. Atomic-powered submarines, ships and icebreakers would also be permitted – provided they weren’t armed with nuclear weapons. For Danes, the proposal would no doubt call to mind the 1980s and calls to ban nuclear weapons from the Nordic region. At that time, it was Nato that stood in the way. Today, however, it is official policy in America to work towards a world free of nuclear weapons. In 2007 Henry Kissinger caught the world off guard when he argued in favour of eliminating nuclear weapons and drew up a roadmap for how it could happen. In 2009, the US and Russia shook hands on the New START Treaty and agreed to reduce the number of operational nuclear weapons. When Barack Obama later that year was awarded the Nobel Peace Price, the awarding committee stated that they had done so because of Obama’s vision of a world without nuclear weapons. This is a positive development, but it isn’t a development we should take for granted. We must contribute to efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals. One way we can do that is to drive the process of banning nuclear weapons from the Arctic. SEE RELATED: The new cold war This is a realistic vision, but we must begin the fight now. Posturing among the great powers in order to claim the rights to oil and minerals in the Arctic already under way. If we wait, we will lose the chance to act We must also understand that the countries of the Nordic region must be a part of the solution. The Arctic Council’s members include the Nordic countries, the US, Russia and Canada. No-one doubts that the Nordic countries lack the global influence the other members do, but together with Canada, which does not possess nuclear weapons, we can give our argument not just moral weight but we can also back it up with geo-political influence. Nuclear weapons do not belong in the Arctic. The Nordic countries have the chance to work towards a common goal. Some would call the opportunity historic. It would be more correct to say that history obliges us to do so. The counterplan checks nuclear conflict in the Arctic and allows cooperationWallace & Staples ‘10 – *Professor Emeritus at the University of British Columbia, **President of the Rideau Institute in Ottawa (Michael, Steven, “Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue,”) //J.N.E A Proposal to Neutralize Nuclear Threats in the Arctic: Establishing an Arctic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone The Canadian Pugwash Group issued a call in 2007 for an Arctic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (ANWFZ), which has been widely distributed and commented upon. 63 While nuclear weapons are not the only threat to peace in the region, they are the most potent. The proposal has served to spark the imagination of many people concerned about the militarization, or re-militarization, of the Arctic and increased U.S.-Russian tensions. But, as with all substantive and original arms control proposals, there are obstacles that will hinder the negotiation of an ANWFZ. We will proceed by outlining the requirements established by the UN for such a nuclear-weapon-free zone, discuss the major political and military barriers that might hinder its establishment, and then explore strategies that various nation parties might work around them to reach our goal of de-nuclearizing the Arctic littoral. We will begin with the guiding principles for creating a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. In 1975 the UN General Assembly recommended that the establishment of NWFZ’s be guided by the following principles: 64 1. Obligations relating to the establishment of such zones may be assumed either by groups of states, continents, or geographical regions, or by smaller groups of states or even individual countries (emphasis added); 2. NWFZ arrangements must ensure that the zone would be – and remain – effectively free of all nuclear weapons; 3. The initiative to establish a NWFZ must come from within the region, and participation must be voluntary; 4. If a zone is intended to be specifically regional, its effectiveness would be enhanced by the participation of all militarily significant states; 5. NWFZ agreements must include an effective system of verification; 6. Arrangements should provide for the peaceful economic and scientific development of state parties; 7. The treaty establishing the zone should be of unlimited duration. The Canadian Pugwash Group issued a call in 2007 for an Arctic Nuclear-Weapon- Free Zone (ANWFZ)... 10 Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue There are three major obstacles that make an Arctic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone extremely difficult to negotiate. The first we discussed at some length above: The Russian Federation (and perhaps other nuclear weapon states as well) routinely deploys a large proportion of its ballistic missile-firing submarines on patrol in Arctic waters. These patrols are the object of endless cat-and-mouse games involving the Russian SSBN’s and the fast-attack submarines of the U.S. Navy and other NATO navies, joined with other NATO anti-submarine forces: antisubmarine-capable surface ships, aircraft and helicopters. 65 In response, Russian fast-attack submarines 66 and aircraft enter the fray. The second major set of “facts” creating obstacles for a negotiated Arctic NWFZ directly follows from the first: virtually all of the largest and most important naval bases of the Russian Northern Fleet are located north of the Arctic Circle. The largest of these, Zapadnaya Litsa, is located on the Kola Peninsula at latitude 69° 27’, and its support bases are scattered throughout the area between Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. However, as we argue below, neither the presence of nuclear-capable submarines under Arctic waters nor the presence of nuclear weapons possessed by a nuclear weapon state need necessarily prevent the creation of a NWFZ in the Arctic littoral. 67 A third major obstacle is the position of the United States. Like the Russian Federation, it is both an Arctic State and a Nuclear Weapon State (NWS). Unlike the Russian Federation, the U.S. does not currently deploy nuclear weapons in its Arctic territory (Alaska), but it is almost unimaginable that the Americans would agree to declaring any portion of their territory free from nuclear weapons. 68 But this is not the only – and perhaps not the most important – obstacle presented by the United States. To begin with, all of the other Arctic States save the Russian Federation – Norway, Denmark, Canada and Iceland – are close military allies of the U.S. through their common membership in NATO. Historically, NATO member states have almost never undertaken a major security initiative without at least the tacit acquiescence of the United States. But membership in NATO has implications for an ANWFZ that go beyond the inevitable pressure that a militarily dominant state exerts over its lesser partners. Partners in the NATO alliance are committed to its core military doctrine, known as its “Strategic Concept,” which includes specific reliance upon nuclear weapons. 69 According to NATO doctrine, nuclear weapons are not merely one tool in the arsenals of the three NWS’s that are NATO members. Nuclear weapons make a “unique contribution” to the deterrence provided by the NATO alliance, and are therefore “essential to preserve peace.” 70 Furthermore, “deterrence” is construed so generally as to “permit the use of nuclear weapons when deemed militarily useful in virtually any circumstance.” 71 Further yet, five other NATO partners who are not NWS’s – Germany, Belgium, Greece, Turkey and Italy – allow American tactical nuclear weapons to be stationed on their territory as part of their commitment to NATO. 72 It might well be possible 73 to draft an Arctic NWFZ Treaty that does not conflict with the letter of NATO members’ commitments to the Alliance’s Strategic Concept, but the discussion above makes it clear that membership in a NWFZ would be incompatible with its spirit . Even if this were not the opinion of the participating NATO member, it would almost certainly be the view of the United States. And, historically, NATO members have almost never challenged the U.S. on matters of NATO military policy. As if this were not enough, there is still another way in which U.S. policy could pose obstacles to an ANWFZ. The U.S. has laid down conditions for its support of NWFZ’s 74 that might very well prove obstacles to the negotiation of an Arctic treaty. The most important of these are the following: 1. The content of a NWFZ Treaty should in no way disturb existing security arrangements or interfere with the rights of individual or collective self-defence guaranteed to states under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter; 11 Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue 2. A zone should not affect the rights of the parties under international law to grant or deny transit privileges, including port calls and overflights; 3. No restrictions should be imposed on the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflights by military aircraft, 75 the right of innocent passage through archipelagic seas, and the right of transit passage through international straits. It is reasonable to assume that condition 1 would apply directly to the security obligations of NATO members as discussed above, and in particular their adherence to NATO’s Strategic Concept. Since all Arctic states save the Russian Federation are NATO members, must we assume – as suggested above – that NATO nuclear doctrine would preclude participation in an ANWFZ treaty from the outset? We will argue, as we have previously in reference to Russian naval bases, that this need not necessarily be so. Condition 2 poses another sort of problem, because although most NWFZ treaties permit the zonal state to grant transit rights, these are allowed only for ships and aircraft not carrying nuclear weapons. 76 This would seem to conflict with the long-standing U.S. policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons on board its ships and aircraft. But, as we have argued elsewhere, 77 there are ways in which this seeming conflict could be circumvented. For Canada, the most important sticking point will be condition 3, because of the long-standing, albeit low-key, dispute between Canada and the United States over the status of the Northwest Passage. The Canadian government has long declared the Northwest Passage – a narrow ship channel wending its way through the Islands of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago – to be Canadian internal waters. 78 But the United States, joined by the E.U., claims that the Northwest Passage is an international strait. 79 “The Canadian claim of sovereignty would permit her govern - ment to deny transit of nuclear weapons, but otherwise Canada could not deny or impair any legal right of transit passage, in compliance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.” 80 If the NW passage is deemed an international strait all ships may transit freely under the traditional right of “innocent passage.” As Michael Byers writes, “these new threats would best be dealt with through Canadian domestic law, enforced by an enhanced Coast Guard, RCMP and Canadian Forces presence. It simply does not benefit the United States – and other responsible countries and reputable shipping companies – to have foreign vessels shielded from scrutiny and reasonable regulations by maintaining that the Northwest Passage is an international strait.” 81 Finding a solution to the problems created by conflicting claims of Canada, U.S. and the E.U. will be one of the most difficult challenges for any Canadian attempt to join an ANWFZ. In any case, even if the U.S. concedes Canadian sovereignty, the Americans may argue that Canada’s obligations to the NATO alliance prevent Canada from denying passage to American ships. While Canada has often taken differing positions from the Americans on some foreign and military policy issues, they have never refused American requests when these are presented as an obligation under the NATO Treaty. If the Americans were to insist on untrammelled passage of their warships in order to fulfill the mutual security obligations under Article V of the NATO Treaty, it is inconceivable that Canada would refuse. But despite all of these daunting obstacles, we should not give up before even getting started. It would be useful to take a step back and remind ourselves of the provisions that must be included, and the criteria that must be met to create a new Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. We might argue that while the creation of an ANWFZ poses new challenges, these are not insurmountable. An important feature of The Canadian claim of sovereignty would permit her government to deny transit of nuclear weapons... 12 Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue NWFZ agreements will guide our reasoning: they do not have to be created by negotiating a single, all-encompassing legal instrument. They can be, and often have been, put together piecemeal, step by step. What follows is, first, a recapitulation of the “rules of the road” for the creation of NWFZ’s. Then, we put forward a series of initial steps of a move toward the goal of a nuclear-free Arctic. Finally, we will attempt to demonstrate that factors and forces external to the region may help us move toward the final goal of an inclusive ANWFZ treaty. In short, we are not claiming that building an ANWFZ will be an easy task, or that it will necessarily closely resemble previous agreements. But we can combine the lessons of history with the unique circumstances of the Arctic to achieve our goal. Say YesThe counterplan is possible and the US has pushed non-proliferation before – proves it solves the link to politicsAxwrothy ’10 – served as Principal Secretary and Chief Speechwriter to Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, currently the President and CEO of the Walter and Duncan Gordan Foundation and Secretary General of the Inter Action Council, senior fellow at both the Munk School of Global Affairs and Massey College at the University of Toronto (Thomas S., “A Proposal for an Arctic Nuclear-Free Zone”, http://interactioncouncil.org/proposal-arctic-nuclear-weapon-free-zone) //J.N.E The process towards creating an ANWFZ is not “doomed”. It is true that debates and negotiations on nuclear disarmament issues are often shut down outright by those who do not think that the major nuclear weapon states of Russia and the United States would be willing to ever give up their freedom to action with nuclear weapons. They envision any process working towards this end as “naive” and “doomed” from the outset[213]. Such a view is overly deterministic. There has already been progress made towards restricting nuclear weapon use, including a plethora of arms control agreements – from the NPT Treaty to the recent New START - including the pledge by all five nuclear-weapon states to negative security assurances to not attack or threaten to attack with nuclear weapons those that do not have them[214]. The progress towards the completion of an ANWFZ is not likely to be linear. It should be expected that the progress towards completing the treaty will likely be “two steps forward, one step back”. It is also possible, as Hamel-Green has argued that even if Russia and the United States were not willing to include their territories within the zone that the remaining Arctic states could establish a NWFZ in their regions and continue to push the two nuclear weapons superpowers to join[215]. Dhanapala writes that, “...if the non-nuclear countries among the group together with indigenous peoples living in the region combine with civil society sufficient pressure could be exerted on the US and Russia to agree to a ANWFZ primary as an environmental measure to safeguard the Arctic”[216]. The UN criteria for NWFZ does not prohibit this kind of strategy, because it simply mandates that it is desirable that all states in the region are involved, not that they must be involved[217]. While this is not an ideal solution, it is a means by which there can be forward progress, instead of standing still in the dangerous position which exists today. The United States has previously laid down three conditions for its support of any NWFZ. According to Wallace and Staples, these are: 1. The content of a NWFZ Treaty should in no way disturb existing security arrangements or interfere with the rights of individual or collective self-defence guaranteed to states under Article 51 of the UN Charter. 2. A zone should not affect the rights of the parties under international law to grant or deny transit privileges, including port calls and over flights. 3. No restrictions should be imposed on the high seas, freedom of navigation and over flights by military aircraft, the right of innocent passage through archipelagic seas, and the right of transit through international straits[218]. Based on these criteria, it seems unlikely that the United States would sign on to the proposed ANWFZ, as all three conditions are contravened by the proposed treaty. The first is contravened by the fact that it calls for rethinking of the NATO Strategic Concept. The second and third are contravened because the goal of the zone is to deny transit to all vessels and aircrafts transporting nuclear weapons or weapons related materials. Subsequently, a change in US policy will be absolutely essential if the ANWFZ is to move forward. This will require political leadership that is willing to use much political capital to accomplish this. However President Barack Obama has indicated that his outlook is amendable at least in entertaining the policy stance advocated in this paper. In Prague he outlined a vision of a world in which nuclear weapons would not have the prominent role that they do today[219], and has since worked towards this goal with New START. Obama has proposed an extensive working program for the United States on nuclear non-proliferation which indicates a move in a positive direction. His working program includes reducing the US arsenal, reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the national security strategy and promising to ratify the CTBT[220]. However, he has also been criticized by his base for failing “to break away from Bush era national security policy in some fundamental ways”[221]. His support for this initiative would be a legacy issue and he is best placed out of any President to conclude these types of negotiations. As mentioned earlier in this paper, Russia’s nuclear force structure poses the greatest threat to the establishment of an ANWFZ, as the bulk of the force falls within the proposed perimeter of the NWFZ. Bases located on the Kola Peninsula - such as Zapadnaya Litsa - are home too much of the Russian SSBM fleet. From there these submarines can find sanctuary below the noisy ice of the relatively unmonitored Arctic Ocean[222]. When viewed through the lens of nuclear deterrence, Russia can be expected to be extremely reluctant to give up these bases and the Arctic patrols of its nuclear ballistic submarines. However one should bear in mind the time element of this paper; what seems likely improbable now could become possible later. The major goal of the short term (2010-2012) action plan of this paper is to reduce the perceived need of nuclear weapons and the international prestige that comes with them. Indeed, it is not until the medium term (2012-2025) action plan, after substantial advances in nuclear arms reduction and control measures, does the paper envision establishing an ANWFZ. While this paper focuses on the medium term, in the short term, the success of moving Russia towards accepting an ANWFZ would be greatly enhanced by positive framing and communications; minimizing the international prestige of nuclear weapons. Michael Byers has said that “the Russian government seeks to remind people that Russia is a powerful country...” by strengthening its Arctic posture[223]. Communications and engagement strategies must be cognoscente of this fact in treating Russia as the great power that it is in the Arctic. There is a distinct Russian fear that they will lose their international status if they agree to reduce or eliminate their nuclear arsenals, and so to get Russia engaged there needs to be great sensitivity to this fact[224]. Furthermore, the argument has rightfully been made that “great power status” is no longer contingent on the possession of a large nuclear arsenal. Citing the “peaceful rise of China,” which is believed to have one of the smallest arsenals out of the nuclear weapon states the argument is made that it is economic strength that demarcates who is and who is not a great power[225]. Consequently, instead of trying to get Russia to relinquish Great Powers ambitions, communication strategies and diplomatic interactions with Russia should emphasize that it can maintain its great power ambitions despite committing to an ANWFZ. Ultimately, the important part of “getting to yes” is to not become deadlocked in circular argumentation. The argument that it is necessary to get rid of all conflict and only then will it be possible to get rid of arms is fallacious[226]. The presence of nuclear weapons encourages their use. Rydell argues that there is little logic to the argument that the elimination of nuclear weapons or any other weapon of mass destruction “is to await the prior establishment of world peace and security...”[227]. It is thus necessary to get rid of nuclear arms, because only then can there be a world without nuclear war.
The counterplan solves Arctic cooperation best – it sets a standard for multilateral treaties with the Arctic CouncilAxwrothy ’10 – served as Principal Secretary and Chief Speechwriter to Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, currently the President and CEO of the Walter and Duncan Gordan Foundation and Secretary General of the Inter Action Council, senior fellow at both the Munk School of Global Affairs and Massey College at the University of Toronto (Thomas S., “A Proposal for an Arctic Nuclear-Free Zone”, http://interactioncouncil.org/proposal-arctic-nuclear-weapon-free-zone) //J.N.E The prominent scholar Oran Young once told a Canadian parliamentary committee that “we’re still in the first grade in terms of learning to cooperate in the Arctic”[45]. There is room for more intensified cooperation and one such cooperative project could be a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. The Arctic is a good potential candidate to be the next area covered by a NWFZ because of the history of nuclear activities in the region, climate change, bringing with it new challenges to state sovereignty and subsequently increasing military activity, the continued presence of the superpower’s nuclear arsenals, and the existence of current treaties which can serve as a foundation to build an ANWFZ upon. Historically, the Arctic has been construed in the minds of southern defence planners as a “military theatre” in which all interests – including those of the local indigenous population – were subordinated to national security concerns[46]. During the Cold War, in the event of a nuclear exchange, most of the Soviet and American nuclear arsenals would have transited through the Arctic on their way to their targets. In addition to this, the Arctic has been home to “great power transit and deployment of strategic nuclear weapons above and below the ice; nuclear weapon accidents; atmospheric and underground nuclear testing; and radioactive waste and fallout contamination (and associated health impacts for indigenous peoples); and displacement of indigenous peoples as a result of military bases and infrastructure”[47]. Both the United States and the USSR have carried out nuclear tests in the Arctic region. Three American underground nuclear tests occurred on Amchitka Island, Alaska, in the Bering Sea from 1941 to 1992. The largest was a 5 Megaton (Mt)[48] bomb on November 6, 1971. In 1996 Greenpeace reported that there had been leakage of radionuclides from the test sits, contaminating the surrounding environment, including freshwater sources, which has affected the subsistence food supplies of the Aleut natives. Soviet testing was much more extensive. Beginning in 1954 atmospheric, underground and oceanic testing of nuclear weapons were carried out on Novaya Zemlya, which consists of two large islands approximately 450 kilometers from the Arctic Circle between the Barents and Kara polar seas. Under the supervision of the Soviet Navy, a total of 130 tests have been carried out at Novaya Zemlya with 224 separate explosive devices equal to about 265Mt (the 50 Mt Tzar Bomba, the largest nuclear explosion to date, was tested here on October 20, 1961). The underground tests are unique in that they were conducted in frozen rock, which has not occurred elsewhere. There have been three accidental releases of significant radioactive materials, including two which resulted in what the Soviets termed "emergency situations". Testing at Novaya Zemlya continued even after the LTBT (1963), which banned nuclear test explosions in the atmosphere, underwater and in space, as well as tests that cause fallout outside of the borders of the Soviet Union (Norway has been affected by the tests). Not only was Novaya Zemlya the site of many nuclear tests, but it also served as a graveyard for various nuclear weapons, nuclear-powered submarines and reactors.
Unlike the invisible threat of radioactive contamination, climate change is having discernable effect on the Arctic region. As has been demonstrated in countless documentaries, studies, reports and news pieces, the Arctic ice is receding. Depending on who is consulted the rates at which this is occurring vary remarkably. The Arctic Council’s Arctic Climate Impact Assessment in 2004[51] projected the “near total loss of sea ice in summer for late this century”. Rapid ablation of sea ice in recent years and the conclusions of the 2007 Fourth Assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has some to conclude that the Arctic Ocean and its littoral states may be free of ice in summer within the next five to fifteen years, while the majority predicts that sometime shortly after 2030 is a more reasonable date. Eventually it is expected that the Arctic Ocean will come to resemble the Baltic Sea, with a thin layer of seasonable ice covering it during the winter months, so that it is navigable year round with the right equipment[52]. The receding ice will make the vast natural resources of the region increasingly accessible for extraction. Several states have laid claim to these resources, often in the same area. Sovereignty is the issue du jour in the Arctic with boundary disputes and inflammatory domestic legislation abounding[53]. There are several boundary disputes in the Arctic, as neighbouring states lay claim to the same, resource-rich territory. For example, Canada has six outstanding boundary-related disputes, including most significantly in the Northwest Passage, a body of water connecting the Arctic and Pacific Oceans. On September 10, 1985 then External Affairs Minister Joe Clark announced Canada would draw straight baselines around its archipelago and since that time the United States, the European Union, and Japan have all refuted that claim[54]. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev stated on September 17, 2008 that Russia should pass a law to mark its Arctic territory in the disputed areas where significant natural resource deposits can be found[55]. To ensure Canada’s sovereignty the Canadian Government under Stephen Harper has promised to increase military resources in the region through large procurement programs and increased military activity. Like Canada, other governments around the region have been devoting increasing resources to further developing their military presence in the Arctic. Denmark has released a defence position paper recommending the establishment of a dedicated Arctic military contingent drawing on all divisions of its armed forces. Norway is purchasing new fighter jets and has built and continues to build ships that are suitable for Arctic patrols. Russia too, has approved the establishment of a stronger military presence in the Arctic in the form of a special brigade designated towards defending Russia’s Arctic and the necessary resources to pay for it[56]. The United States Navy has declared that it will increase its Arctic operations as the ice recedes[57]. For example, in 2005 a Los Angeles-class American submarine spent two weeks under the North Pole, a feat that was considered to be a technological achievement that will have implications for future missions[58]. These competing sovereignty claims cause concern for increased military activity in the Arctic, but there is little consensus as to whether military conflict in the Arctic is likely or not. There are those who argue that war in the Arctic is a sure thing. For example, Borgerson writes that “the combination of new shipping routes, trillions of dollars in possible gas and oil resources, and a poorly defined picture of state ownership makes for a toxic brew”[59]. Similarly, Jayantha Dhanapala, the former UN Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs has written that, “...as someone who has devoted most of his working life to the cause of disarmament, and especially nuclear disarmament, I am deeply concerned over the fact that two nuclear weapon states ... converge on the Arctic and have competing claims. These claims ... could, if unresolved, lead to conflict escalating into the threat of use of nuclear weapons”[60]. However, there is equal evidence to suggest that this can be avoided, because disagreements “are being handled in an orderly fashion” and that there is a history of cooperation among the concerned states and interest in preserving the stability of the region[61]. It should be noted that the May 2008, Ilulissat Declaration the five coastal nations bordering the Arctic Ocean agreed to refer to and respect have the law of the sea as the basis for resolving all of their outstanding maritime boundary disputes[62]. While this did not specifically reference the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLSO), it is hoped that the sovereignty disputes over jurisdiction will be resolved by UNCLOS with no need to resort to military means[63]. Indeed, in 2010 Russia and Norway peacefully negotiated a settlement to a forty-year-old boundary dispute in the Barents Sea[64]. The Arctic is also a favourable candidate for a NWFZ because -like UNCLOS - there are existing arrangements covering non-proliferation concerns in the Arctic, including the Seabed Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty though none of these are comprehensive enough to adequately address nuclear issues[65]. The Seabed Treaty (1971) requires that parties to the treaty (which all Arctic states are) do not place nuclear weapons on the seabed, ocean floor or subsoil, or facilities designed to store, test, or use nuclear weapons[66]. In addition, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s Article VII commits the Arctic states (again because they are all state parties) to conclude regional treaties to “assure the total absence of nuclear weapons from their respective territories”[67]. The fact that regional states were able to agree to these non-proliferation efforts is a positive starting point for the negotiation of a NWFZ Treaty. The fact that there is already a somewhat robust legal framework governing activities in the Arctic means that there is a positive foundation upon which a NWFZ treaty can be built. However, these agreements are not wide enough in their scope or specific enough to address the Arctic’s unique security issues[68]. AT: No ProliferationYes proliferation – North Korea, Pakistan, and key Middle Eastern states are developing – new treaties are keyChoksy and Choksy ’13 – Lecturer Strategic Intelligence and Information Management at Indiana University, Professor of International Studies at Indiana University (Carol, Jamsheed, “WMD Proliferation Threatens the World”, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/wmd-proliferation-threatens-world, Yale Global) //J.N.E Weapons of mass destruction are back in the news, raising fresh fears of proliferation and use. On April 2 North Korea announced its nuclear reactor would restart. Two weeks earlier the Syrian government and rebel forces accused each other of discharging a deadly chemical near the city of Aleppo, although what exactly happened remains murky. The threat from nuclear, chemical and biological weapons hangs over the planet. Six conventions, two treaties, one protocol, one regime, one arrangement, one code, one initiative and ten regional or zone treaties have been instituted since 1925 to control these instruments of mass murder. Most of the accords require only passive agreement and are trumped by influence-peddling, profit-seeking and ideology-spreading considerations. As a result the danger of nuclear, chemical and biological agents passing to non-state actors is on the rise, too. Countries have spurred proliferation of every WMD category since the 1950s. Figure 1 shows major patterns of WMD proliferation. Disseminating the weapons, relevant technologies and dual-use materials remains a surefire way for not only rogue states and terrorist organizations but even superpowers to sway other nations, make quick profits or destabilize foes. Not surprisingly, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research concluded: “The non-proliferation treaties lack effective mechanisms to enforce compliance. The less formal export control regimes suffer from the same lack and have limited membership.” Mustard gas was used extensively during World War I. Negative public reaction led to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Yet Italy in 1936, Japan from 1937 to 1945, Egypt from 1963 to 1967 and Iraq in the 1980s all deployed chemicals against military and civilian targets. Owing to the transfer of materials and technologies, 23 countries stockpile or have chemical WMD capability: China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Libya, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, South Africa, South Korea, Sudan, Syria, Taiwan, United States and Vietnam. Major Patterns of WMD Proliferation 1950s, 1960-1989. Enlarge Image
The number of nations tempted by nuclear WMD is growing. Iran’s nuclear program, having drawn upon Chinese, North Korean and Pakistani expertise, has fissile material for at least five warheads. China has benefited by receiving several billion dollars in revenue, securing access to crude oil, and strengthening its foreign footprint. Iran could even buy a nuclear weapon off the shelf from China or North Korea – the next stage in proliferation. So a broader nuclear acquisitions cascade is building as Sunni Arab nations like Saudi Arabia seek to neutralize both their Shiite neighbor’s might and Israel’s WMD program. Major Patterns of WMD Proliferation 1990-2000. Enlarge Image Biological WMD are popularly considered the most taboo of offensive capabilities. Nonetheless the Imperial Japanese Army from 1939 to 1940 and the Rhodesian Army in the 1970s deployed typhoid, bubonic plague, anthrax, botulism and cholera against Chinese and Africans, respectively. Several nations did relinquish biological WMD capability after acceding to international accords: the US in 1972, Britain, France, Germany and Canada by the late 1980s, the former Soviet Union/Russia in 1992. China signed the BTWC in 1984; however, the US suspectsBeijing maintains capability plus provides assistance to Pyongyang and Tehran. In the Middle East, Egypt weaponized anthrax, botulism and plague in the 1970s with Soviet aid. Israel followed suit with poorly-documented offensive and defensive capabilities. Iran commenced its biological WMD program at Damghan, after experiencing Iraqi chemical WMD, with technical assistance from Russian scientists. Iraq appears to have possessed biological weapons capability under Saddam Hussein, but there is no evidence of the program’s continuation. Likewise Syria is suspected of exploring biological weapons development. Again Russia, China and North Korea appear to be abettors. Major Patterns of WMD Proliferation 2001-Present. Enlarge Image WMD proliferation usually focuses on technology and materials like precursor chemicals, biological agents, toxins and uranium. Yet delivery devices, projectile weapons, launch platforms and guidance systems are essential components. The Israelis sell those technically non-WMD items to the Chinese who resell to the North Koreans who then resell to Iran, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen, the UAE and Pakistan. As countries like North Korea and Iran collaborate on missile development, the WMD one develops could fit the other’s delivery systems. Many deals are conducted covertly with countries like Malaysia and Dubai serving as third-party transfer venues. Equally unsettling for global security, WMD trades for profit and ideology have taken place though private outlets such as Pakistan’s former atomic chief A. Q. Khan. Materials siphoned from Russia and the Ukraine also continue fueling the nuclear black market. Indeed the danger of nuclear, chemical and biological agents passing to non-state actors is on the rise. Since 2001 Al Qaeda and its affiliates have sought WMD capability. During Syria’s civil war some sarin, mustard gas and cyanide from government depots reportedly have fallen into illicit hands. The possibility of Islamists wresting materials from Pakistan’s WMD facilities increases as that nation’s political instability grows. Iran for its part appears to have transferred some technologies to regional militant organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Yüklə 0,87 Mb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
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