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Privatization CP



1nc



The United States federal government should retire the federal fleet of ice-breakers and replace them with contracted services provided by U.S.- operated commercial vendors, require that U.S. commercial vendors be capable of providing assets that will serve national security, law enforcement, and other federal maritime missions, and exempt U.S. commercial ice-breaker operators from the Jones Act.



The plan would jumpstart the US icebreaking abilities without billions in federal spending


Carafano and Dean 11 - Ph.D.is Deputy Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Davis Institute, and Deputy Director, Foreign, Defense, Trade, and Homeland Security Policy, in the Government Relations Department at The Heritage Foundation.

(James Jay, James, Breaking an Ice-Bound U.S. Policy: A Proposal for Operating in the Arctic, February 24, 2011, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/02/breaking-an-ice-bound-us-policy-a-proposal-for-operating-in-the-arctic, JZG)



The United States is losing the race to protect its own interests in the Arctic region. It is important to create a sensible policy to field an adequate fleet of U.S.-owned ice-breakers. An adequate, competent, and sustainable fleet is the key to maintaining American presence in the region, protecting U.S. sovereignty, working with allies, and rebuilding the nation’s edge in global commerce. Making America more competitive at a time when Washington is looking to cut corners in federal spending requires creative solutions to demanding problems. The U.S. can jump-start its fleet by privatizing ice-breaker operations and using ships as platforms for national security and federal scientific activities. This initiative would save federal dollars by eliminating old, inadequate, and expensive-to-operate assets while greatly expanding U.S. capacity to operate in the Arctic. Adapting to a Changing World Global shipping patterns will change in the years ahead. Melting of Arctic ice will open up new passages for transit, offering significantly shorter routes between Europe and North America and the Pacific—perhaps up to 40 percent faster sailing times and significant fuel savings and emissions reductions. Seasonal commercial lanes through the Arctic ice could appear within less than five years. The ability to navigate the region will increase the search for and development of significant natural resources including oil. Scientific research in the Arctic will also expand. America’s capacity to exercise its sovereignty, protect its interests, and participate in global scientific research and commerce, however, is collapsing. The U.S. had eight polar ice-breakers in 1970. Today, the U.S. Coast Guard has three. The youngest was commissioned 10 years ago, and the other two are approaching 35 and 40 years old, respectively. One other ship is owned by the National Science Foundation. The Department of Homeland Security Inspector General recently concluded that the Coast Guard has neither sufficient ships nor budgetary authority to accomplish its current missions. In contrast, other powers including Russia, Finland, China, South Korea, and South Africa are looking to expand their capacity significantly. America is leaving itself out in the cold. The lead that other nations will enjoy includes more than just numbers. A new generation of energy-efficient ships with advanced ice-breaking capability is being developed. The best modern ships are multi-purpose vessels that remain operational throughout the year. Ice-breaker competition is important for more than just commercial advantages. Ice-breakers are a key component of maritime and national security infrastructure. They can serve, for example, as mobile stations or search-and-rescue assets in addition to aiding maritime law enforcement and navigation. A New Paradigm Ensuring that the U.S. is not left behind will require a new paradigm. First, the U.S. should look to commercialize its ice-breaker fleet. The U.S. can learn a lesson from Finland. Nearly 80 percent of that nation’s trade is exchanged by shipping—and the Baltic Sea around Finland freezes every winter. The Finnish ice-breaker fleet helps ensure that upwards of one-third of the nation’s ports remain operational year-round. While the Finnish Transport Agency is responsible for coordinating, developing, and managing winter navigation, ice-breaking services are contracted out. Outside the ice-breaking season, the ice-breakers are leased to offshore operations around the globe. The U.S. government should consider turning over ice-breaking operations to American-owned and operated vendors. In order to protect U.S. commercial, national security, and scientific interests, U.S. operators should provide facilities, capabilities, and assets so that commercial ice-breakers can perform national security functions. For example, these ships should be capable of hosting U.S. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments (maritime law enforcement personnel that deploy aboard vessels to conduct and support law enforcement). Leasing support from the commercial operators would be far more cost-effective than operating an old and increasingly obsolete federal fleet. To aid commercial ice-breaking, Congress should exempt U.S. firms from the requirement to comply with the Jones Act. The Merchant Marine Act of 1920, also known as the Jones Act, was meant to save the merchant marine industry by requiring that ships that traveled American waters be built in the United States and manned by American crews. Like many other protectionist policies, the premises of the Jones Act seem plausible: Require goods moving from one U.S. port to another to travel on U.S.-built ships, with U.S. crews, and you will protect U.S. maritime and shipbuilding jobs. The last serious review of the Jones Act (a series of congressional hearings in the 1990s) revealed that more than 40,000 American merchant seamen and 40,000 longshoremen had lost their jobs despite Jones Act protectionism. Over the first 76 years of the act, more than 60 U.S. shipyards had gone out of business, eliminating 200,000 jobs. If the intent of the Jones Act was to save U.S. jobs, it failed. As a result, state-of-the-art ice-breakers can be built overseas today at far less expense. Exempting U.S. contractors from having to comply with an outdated law that has brought more damage than benefit to the U.S. maritime industry would provide a strong incentive for future ice-breaker operators. Breaking the Ice It is time for the United States to jump-start an Arctic policy that is as cold as a dead car battery. Moving ahead on what will be a crucial commercial, national security, and sovereignty issue for the U.S. in the future requires bold new solutions. The Administration and Congress should: Retire the federal fleet of ice-breakers and replace them with contracted services provided by U.S.-operated commercial vendors. Require that U.S. commercial vendors be capable of providing assets that will serve national security, law enforcement, and other federal maritime missions. Exempt U.S. commercial ice-breaker operators from the Jones Act. Washington’s goal should be nothing short of providing America the most advanced and robust ice-breaker fleet in the world.

1nc --- jones act version

Repealing the Jones Act allows for effective Coast Guard leasing- that solves the case and avoids displacing other crucial programs


Slattery et al 14 (*Brian, Research Assistant for Defense Studies in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies AND **Bryan Riley, Jay Van Andel Senior Policy Analyst in Trade Policy Center for International Trade and Economics, AND ***Nicolas Loris, Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies The Institute for Economic Freedom and Opportunity at The Heritage Foundation, 5/22/14, “Sink the Jones Act: Restoring America’s Competitive Advantage in Maritime-Related Industries,” The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/05/sink-the-jones-act-restoring-americas-competitive-advantage-in-maritime-related-industries, JHR)

The U.S. Coast Guard could also benefit greatly from a repeal of the Jones Act. With the increasing interest in natural resources in the Arctic, the Coast Guard’s presence in the region will likely rise. Polar icebreaking capacity is a primary responsibility of the Coast Guard in this region, and the Jones Act hinders its ability to carry out this mission. The Coast Guard’s “High Latitude Region Mission Analysis Capstone Summary” concluded that the Coast Guard needs three heavy and three medium polar icebreakers to accomplish all of its Arctic and Antarctic missions.[8] Today, the Coast Guard fleet has one medium polar icebreaker (USCGC Healy) and one heavy polar icebreaker (USCGC Polar Star). The Healy operates primarily as a research vessel under the direction of the National Science Foundation. The Polar Star is nearly 40 years old and was inactive from 2006 to 2012, when it returned to active service after a $90 million overhaul.[9] This overhaul will extend the service life of the Polar Star for another seven to 10 years. In the meantime, the Coast Guard is trying to find funding for a new heavy polar icebreaker to begin filling its capability gap. This project could cost nearly $1 billion.[10] To commission this new icebreaker within the desired time frame, the Coast Guard would need to dedicate a large portion of its procurement budget over several years. This is virtually impossible. Instead of allocating precious funding that could be used elsewhere, the Coast Guard should pursue leasing foreign-owned commercial polar heavy icebreakers. (The U.S. lacks a commercial heavy icebreaker fleet.) However, the Jones Act inhibits this. The U.S. military already relies on Russian icebreakers to facilitate resupply missions to McMurdo Station in Antarctica.[11] In 2011, when an ice storm prevented the last winter fuel delivery to Nome, Alaska, the U.S. Coast Guard solicited the services of a Russian vessel to reach the community.[12]This response effort required the Healy to serve where a heavy icebreaker would have been much more effective. Ultimately, a Jones Act waiver allowed the Russian tanker to operate in U.S. waters, but repealing this law would allow the Coast Guard and other government services to lease foreign-built icebreakers more easily, while diminishing U.S. reliance on Russia.

Solvency



Relying upon commercial icebreakers solves


Slattery and Coffey 13 - Brian Slattery is a Research Assistant in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, and Luke Coffey is the Margaret Thatcher Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Davis Institute, at The Heritage Foundation (“Strengthen the Coast Guard’s Presence in the Arctic” 4/2, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/strengthen-the-us-coast-guard-in-the-arctic)//JV

The U.S. Cannot Afford to Dither



The U.S. should catch up with the other Arctic nations and field a presence that can legitimately protect U.S. sovereignty in the region. In order to do this, the U.S. should:

  • Develop a new strategy for icebreaking capability. The USCG should explore options such as buying commercial icebreakers with similar capabilities. Privately operated icebreakers could make way for commercial vessels and be called upon to support the USCG in emergency scenarios. This would in turn require a reevaluation of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (also known as the Jones Act).[8]

  • Build the entire required fleet of national security cutters. The U.S. should ensure that the USCG is properly funded to meet its fleet requirements.

  • Provide permanent stationary assets in the Arctic region. Due to the increase in maritime traffic, there will be a great need for helicopters, as well as communication and maintenance personnel, based in the Arctic region for longer periods of time. Congress should work to fund Arctic operations at a level sufficient to make FOL Barrow a more capable base.

  • Continuing to strengthen cooperation between the USN and the USCG. Combined with the blue-water-centric missions of the NSC, the joint operations between the sea services will become more significant in the future in the Arctic. Furthermore, the USCG cooperates effectively with the USN in its drug interdiction missions. The sea services should look to find lessons learned and apply them in the Arctic.

Needed: A Fully Resourced USCG

Interest in the Arctic region will only increase in the years to come. As other nations direct resources and assets there, America cannot afford to fall behind. As an Arctic nation, the U.S. needs to field a strong Arctic presence. In order to make this a reality, the USCG will require adequate funding and resources.


Private leasing solves faster- prefer evidence from the Commandant of the Coast Guard


O'Rourke 12 (Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, 6/14/12, “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf, JHR)

Another potential issue for Congress is whether future polar icebreakers should be acquired through a traditional acquisition (i.e., the government procuring the ship and owning it throughout its service life) or through a leasing arrangement (under which the icebreakers would be privately built and privately owned, leased to the Coast Guard, and crewed by an all-Coast Guard crew or a mix of Coast Guard personnel and civilian mariners). Factors to consider in assessing this issue include the comparative costs of the two options and the potential differences between them in terms of factors such as average number of days of operation each year and capability for performing various missions. Comparing the potential costs of leasing versus purchasing a capital asset often involves, among other things, calculating the net present value of each option. At a December 1, 2011, hearing that focused on the polar icebreaker fleet (see “December 1, 2011, Hearing” in “Background”), Admiral Robert Papp, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, stated: As far as we can determine, there are no icebreakers available—no heavy icebreakers available for leasing right now. They would have to be constructed [and then leased]. If we were to lease an icebreaker, I’m sure that a company building an icebreaker outside of the government does not have to contend with the same federal acquisition rules that we have to if we were to construct an icebreaker. It could probably be done quicker. Personally, I’m ambivalent in terms of how we get an icebreaker for the Coast Guard. We’ve done the legal research. If we lease an icebreaker, we can put a Coast Guard crew on it and still have it as a U.S. vessel supporting U.S. sovereignty. But the—but they aren’t available right now. And the other challenge that we face is the federal acquisition rules and [Office of Management and Budget Circular] A-11 requirements that [direct how to] score the money [in the budget] for leasing. We’d have to put up a significant amount of upfront money even with a lease that we don’t have room for within our budget currently.58 At another point in the hearing, Admiral Papp stated: We have looked at various business case scenarios, each and every time looking at, once again, from our normal perspective, the Coast Guard perspective, which has been owning ships forever. And generally, we keep ships 30-40 years or beyond. There is a point where leasing becomes more expensive, it’s at or about the 20-25-year timeline. I just don’t have the experience with leasing to be able to give you a good opinion on it. And once again, I'm ambivalent. We just need the icebreaking capability, I think it’s for people who can do the analysis, the proper analysis of—but also have to take into account the capabilities required and we need to get about the business of determining the exact capabilities that we need which would take into account National Science Foundation requirements, Coast Guard requirements, requirements to break-in at McMurdo, to come up with a capable ship.59 At another point in the hearing, he stated: As I said, sir, I am truly ambivalent to this except from what I experienced. I do have now two points, yes the Navy leases some ships, but we've got a Navy that has well over 300 ships. So if they lose a leased vessel or something is pulled back or something happens, they have plenty of other ships they can fall back upon. Right now, all I am falling back on is the Coast Guard cutter Healy. And it feels good to know that we own that and that is our ship for 30 or 40 years and we can rely upon it. In terms of leasing, I don't know. My personal experience is I lease one of my two cars and I pay a lot of money leasing my car. But at the end of the lease period, I have no car and I've spent a lot of money. So I don’t know if that’s directly applicable to ships as well, but right now I got half my garage is empty because I just turned one in.60 At another point in the hearing, he stated: We’ve looked through the legal considerations on this, as long as we have a Coast Guard crew. In fact, you can even make a mixed crew of civilians and Coast Guard people. But as long as it’s commanding by—commanded by [a] commissioned officer, you can assert sovereignty, you can take it into war zones and, in fact, the Navy does that as well.61 Another witness at the hearing—Mead Treadwell, the lieutenant governor of Alaska—stated: [Regarding] The issue of the ships, the company that is building these ships for Shell [Oil] has visited with me and other state officials, and that’s why you heard us say in our testimony that we think the leasing option should be considered. We don’t have a way to judge the relative cost. But if on the face of it, it seems like it may be a way to get us the capability that the admiral needs.62

Private companies build the ships now anyway


O'Rourke 12 (Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, 6/14/12, “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf, JHR)

The nation’s fourth polar icebreaker is Nathaniel B. Palmer, which was built for the NSF in 1992 by North American Shipbuilding, of Larose, LA. The ship, called Palmer for short, is owned by Edison Chouest Offshore (ECO) of Galliano, LA, a firm that owns and operates research ships and offshore deepwater service ships.14 NSF uses a contractor, Raytheon Polar Services Company (RPSC), to lease the ship from ECO.15

Privatizing solves- solves fleet modernization and saves money


Davis 11 (Tyler, 12/9/11, “The Lone Icebreaker: U.S. Sovereignty in the Arctic,” The Heritage Foundation, http://blog.heritage.org/2011/12/09/the-lone-icebreaker-u-s-sovereignty-in-the-arctic/, JHR)

The United States Coast Guard is being left behind in the Arctic. While countries such as Russia are building up their icebreaker fleet and actively increasing their presence in the Arctic, the United States is losing its only form of sovereignty in the region. On December 1, Rear Admiral Jeffrey M. Garrett, U.S. Coast Guard, testified before Congress on protecting U.S. sovereignty in the Arctic. He stated in Second Line of Defense that “the Icebreaker fleet represents the main surface presence that the U.S. can exert in what is essentially a maritime domain in the Arctic Ocean.” Yet today, the Coast Guard has an icebreaker fleet of only three ships. Worse yet, two of these ships are out of commission due to maintenance work and will not be available for at least seven more years. The lone icebreaker in commission is the USCGC Healy, which conducts all types of missions from search and rescue to navigational aid to scientific research. Though the ship has been effective at its job in the Arctic, it is designed to break through ice of only medium thickness; for ice of heavy thickness, the Healy is absolutely useless. And like the other two icebreakers, it is quickly aging. Without efforts to modernize the fleet, the future of the U.S. national maritime interest and security in the Arctic is looking pretty bleak. Icebreakers are a necessity in the region, and without them the U.S. might as well throw in the towel. These ships are key to year-round access to the Arctic and are the only U.S. insurance policy for future hazardous events. If something happens to the Healy, then the United States would not only lose access to the region but would not be able to react to potential oil spills and would become less effective in search-and-rescue missions. Complicating matters even further, ice in the Arctic is melting, producing more ocean area for the transportation of goods and services in the region. Essentially, whoever best utilizes this route will control trade and transportation of goods and materials in the upper hemisphere. With all other nations around the Arctic building their icebreaker fleets and exploiting the key transportation route that connects the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, the United States is falling behind. In order to create an icebreaking fleet to maintain U.S. presence in the region, the Administration should look toward privatizing the fleet. Allowing private companies to own and operate the U.S. icebreaking fleet and perform national security functions would not only allow for crucial modernization but also save federal dollars and expand U.S. capabilities in the Arctic. This is particularly important at a time when the government is looking to cut corners in federal spending. Ultimately, something must be done. If the U.S. does not act fast, it will come in last in the race for the Arctic.


Leasing solves the case better immediately- it also avoids the disad


Slattery 14 (Brian, Research Assistant for Defense Studies in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation, 5/12/14, “Congress Should Support the Coast Guard’s Modernization Efforts,” The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/05/congress-should-support-the-coast-guards-modernization-efforts, JHR)

Polar Icebreakers. The Coast Guard icebreaking capability is lacking. Currently, the sea service sails one medium icebreaker, the Healy (which serves primarily as a research vessel for the National Science Foundation), and the Polar Star, which is over four decades old and recently received a $90 million upgrade to extend its service life for seven to 10 years. This falls well below the Coast Guard’s requirement for three medium and three heavy-duty polar icebreakers. A new heavy polar icebreaker is estimated to cost nearly $1 billion. In the FY 2013 budget, the Coast Guard planned to direct $380 million to the program in FY 2015, but this year only $16 million was requested.[7] Considering the Coast Guard’s overall budgetary pressures, other major recapitalization programs, and the icebreaker’s unrealistic funding schedule, the Coast Guard should look to other options, such as leasing foreign icebreakers more readily available. This would fulfill the primary capability requirement more quickly while also saving the Coast Guard from having to dedicate an enormous portion of its budget to one vessel. Gains in Aviation Though the Coast Guard’s aviation funding saw a dramatic decrease, requesting $107 million less than in FY 2014, this is partly due to the transfer of C-27J Sherpa aircraft from the U.S. Air Force.

This transfer enables the Coast Guard to modernize its aircraft fleet without buying as many HC-144 Ocean Sentry aircraft. The sea service had planned to buy 36 HC-144s, but since they acquired 14 C-27Js, that number was significantly reduced.[8] However, this does not completely fulfill the Coast Guard’s aviation recapitalization requirement and also does not address how the planes’ different capabilities change operational planning. Robust Coast Guard Modernization

As Congress continues vetting the budget request, it should do the following to ensure that the Coast Guard continues to have the assets it needs to perform its missions into the future:

  • Better fund the FRC fleet. If only two FRC vessels are procured in FY 2015, the consequences could include both per-unit cost increases and a failure to adequately replace legacy craft coming out of the fleet. Congress should support the Coast Guard’s original plan to procure six FRCs in 2015.

  • Support other fleet modernization. The Coast Guard has made progress in modernizing its fleet, and Congress should support the efforts to fulfill the NSC requirement this year. Congress should also require more explanation of the OPC program’s development and how reductions in advanced funding will affect it.

  • Look to alternatives to icebreaker procurement. It is extremely unlikely that the Coast Guard will be able to afford a new heavy polar icebreaker without crowding out other acquisition programs, let alone reach its requirement of six polar icebreakers. Congress should enable the government to lease foreign-built icebreakers, which would in turn require exemptions from the Merchant Marine Act of 1920.

Establishing public private partnerships is key to cost reduction


Conely et al 13 (Heather, director and senior fellow of the Europe Program at CSIS, B.A. in international studies from West Virginia Wesleyan College and M.A. in international relations from Johns Hopkins, July 2013, “Arctic Economics in the 21st Century The Benefits and Costs of Cold,” Center for Strategic International Studies, http://csis.org/files/publication/130710_Conley_ArcticEconomics_WEB.pdf, JHR)

Should the United States choose to fully maximize the economic benefits of the American Arctic, the United States will need to make significant and long- term investments in its Arctic infrastructure to develop the region’s potential as well as to cope with challenges of working in extreme climatic conditions and an increasingly fragile ecosystem. The range of infrastructure includes new ports, including deep water ports, and icebreaking capabilities and support vessels, improved satellites, aviation assets, as well as maintenance of airstrips, roads and pipelines. The cost of such infrastructure development exceeds state and national infrastructure budgets. Clearly, the private sector will play a prominent role in Arctic infrastructure development, particularly in the form of innovative public- private partnerships between state or federal governments and private corporations seeking to tap into the Arctic’s natural resource wealth. Brother, Can You Spare an Icebreaker?


AT: Military Deficit



The counterplan solves sufficiently


Slattery 13 (Brian, The Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy at The Heritage Foundation, 12/31/13, “Stranded Vessel in Antarctica Illustrates Need for New U.S. Icebreaker Policy,” The Daily Signal, http://dailysignal.com/2013/12/31/stranded-vessel-antarctica-illustrates-need-new-u-s-icebreaker-policy/, JHR)

With economic interests in the Arctic rising and capability gaps in the Antarctic, the U.S. needs to forge a new path when it comes to icebreaking. The Navy, which has been suggested as a potential bill payer for this fleet, has too many shipbuilding funding concerns of its own to legitimately take on an additional multi-billion-dollar project. Instead, the U.S. should look to lease foreign heavy-duty icebreakers from the private sector. These vessels are not as militarily robust as those in the Coast Guard, but they would provide the icebreaking capability the U.S. currently lacks, immediately and cost-effectively.

AT: Perm do both



Privatization solves – doing both causes the government to outcompete the private sector


Moore, 14 – Michael, Pacific Maritime Magazine, “The Age of the Arctic: The Rush Has Just Begun” 6/1, http://www.pacmar.com/story/2014/06/01/features/the-age-of-the-arctic-the-rush-has-just-begun/256.html)//DH

Most of today's Arctic commercial carriers (bulk carriers, tankers, and LNG carriers) are designed as icebreaking ships capable of independent operations (without icebreaker escort). Most of the Arctic commercial carriers operating in the Canadian and Russian Arctic regions do not require icebreaker escort during a three- to four-month navigation season. The availability of capable commercial icebreakers must also be taken into account when determining the requirements for a federal icebreaking capacity.

The use of privately-owned icebreakers in the US maritime Arctic in support of offshore exploration and, potentially, the escort of commercial shipping to a US Arctic port is a compelling opportunity for the US maritime industry. US federal agencies and Congress should be supportive of this commercial opportunity and not compete with industry by using a fleet of solely government-owned icebreakers.

AT: CP Links to politics



The counterplan’s creative financing mechanism is uniquely popular


Demarban 12 (Alex, University of Texas-Austin, former editor at Alaska Newspaper, 4/11/12, “Should Alaska take the lead in financing new icebreakers?” Alaska Dispatch, http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/should-alaska-take-lead-financing-new-icebreakers JHR) He = Alaska Representative Don Young

He continues: "Given the current fiscal climate in D.C., funding the acquisition of new vessels presents a significant challenge. It is clear that we must consider creative financing and ownership options to move forward." In addition to helping bankroll the project, the state should also think about owning an icebreaker with private firms. The state could refurbish the Polar Sea or the Polar Star. It could then lease its icebreakers to the Coast Guard and National Science Foundation, wrote Young.


2nc --- at: links to coast guard da


Leasing avoids the link- stops pressure on annual budgets

Laster 11 (Jill, reporter for The Navy Times in Washington, D.C., covering the Coast Guard, 9/15/11, “CG must balance cuts with Arctic mission,” Navy Times, http://www.navytimes.com/news/2011/10/coast-guard-arctic-mission-balance-cuts-101511w, JHR)

"In these difficult budgetary times, leasing should be considered as an option to relieve stress on annual budgets," Young said in a statement announcing the bill. "My legislation does that while modernizing our icebreaker fleet so that we are able to compete with any other country in the world."

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