Counterplans General Stuff

Incremental Funding CP

1nc --- shell

The ____________ should substantially increase its _____________ through a process of incremental funding.

Here’s a solvency advocate- the CP avoids the link to the tradeoff disad- spreading out costs over multiple years avoids a price spike that destroys other Coast Guard priorities

O’Rourke 14 (Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, 7/1/14, “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, http://www.scribd.com/doc/233529641/37/Procurement-vs-Leasing, JHR)

Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress Congressional Research Service Incremental Funding vs. Full Funding Another potential issue for Congress concerns the Coast Guard’s proposal to fund the acquisition of a new icebreaker using incremental funding (i.e., a series of annual funding increments) rather than full funding (i.e., placing most or all of the ship’s acquisition cost into a single year). Section 31.6 of Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-11 normally requires executive branch agencies to use full funding for acquiring capital assets such as a new ship. The Coast Guard appears to have received permission from OMB to propose the use of incremental funding for acquiring a new polar icebreaker; Congress may choose to approve, reject, or modify this proposal. Supporters of using incremental funding to acquire a new polar icebreaker could argue that funding this ship in a single year would create a one-year “spike” in Coast Guard funding requirements that could require offsetting and potentially disruptive one-year reductions in other Coast Guard programs, and that using incremental funding mitigates the spiking issue by spreading the ship’s cost over several years. Supporters could argue that avoiding such budget spikes is a principal reason why the Navy in recent years has been given permission by OMB and Congress to use incremental funding to procure aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships, and that a polar icebreaker is analogous to an aircraft carrier or an amphibious assault ship in being a very expensive (for the Coast Guard) ship that is procured once every several years.

2nc --- solves better

Incremental funding is superior- costs and flexibility

O’Rourke and Daggett 7 (*Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional Research Service AND **Stephen, Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, 6/15/7, “Defense Procurement: Full Funding Policy — Background, Issues, and Options for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31404.pdf, JHR)

A principal effect of the full funding policy is to prevent the use of incremental funding, under which the cost of a weapon is divided into two or more annual portions. Incremental funding fell out of favor because opponents believed it could make the total procurement costs of weapons and equipment more difficult for Congress to understand and track, create a potential for DOD to start procurement of an item without necessarily stating its total cost to Congress, permit one Congress to “tie the hands” of future Congresses, and increase weapon procurement costs by exposing weapons under construction to uneconomic start-up and stop costs. Supporters of incremental funding, however, could argue that its use in DOD procurement programs could produce certain advantages in terms of reducing disruption to other programs, avoiding investment bias against very expensive items, improving near-term production economies of scale, and preserving flexibility for future Congresses to halt funding for weapons under construction that have become unnecessary or inappropriate.

Incremental funding solves- the Coast Guard budget alone is insufficient

Conely et al 13 (Heather, director and senior fellow of the Europe Program at CSIS, B.A. in international studies from West Virginia Wesleyan College and M.A. in international relations from Johns Hopkins, July 2013, “Arctic Economics in the 21st Century The Benefits and Costs of Cold,” Center for Strategic International Studies, http://csis.org/files/publication/130710_Conley_ArcticEconomics_WEB.pdf, JHR)

According to Rear Admiral Christopher C. Colvin, the USCG requires additional icebreakers or ice- hardened vessels with embarked helicopters to accomplish its objectives to project a sovereign U.S. maritime presence in the Arctic. Additional icebreakers are required to carry out USCG duties to protect maritime commerce, critical infrastructure, and key resources in the Arctic region.9 The U.S. Coast Guard has requested $8 million in the fiscal year (FY) 2013 budget to initiate design activities for a new polar icebreaker, and it plans to ask for another $852 million over the next five years to incrementally fund its acquisition, with more funding (up to $1 billion) required to complete the order.10 Congress must decide whether the acquisition costs should be incrementally funded, as the Coast Guard proposes, or if the funds should be fully allocated in one fiscal year, as typically required by the Office of Management and Budget. Congress might also consider whether the funding should be allocated in the Coast Guard’s budget (part of the Department of Homeland Security), or if it should be partly funded through the Department of Defense and/or the National Science Foundation’s budgets, in accordance with the USCG commandant’s assessment that “an icebreaker ought to be a shared cost across the government.”11 According to the commandant, Admiral Robert Papp, the Coast Guard’s goal is to have a fleet of three heavy- duty and three medium- duty icebreakers to fulfill its mission in the Arctic and Antarctic regions; this requires an investment estimated at $3.2 billion. The past couple years have seen a decline in acquisition spending that until recently was around $1.5 billion annually. The White House budget proposal for the next fiscal year allocates just $1.08 billion for Coast Guard acquisition. Papp has elsewhere said the Coast Guard really needs $2.5 billion annually to address all its outstanding needs, including recapitalization of an inland waters fleet that's around half a century old. One option under consideration is refurbishing the laid-up heavy icebreaker USCGC Polar Sea, possibly waiting to do so until the Coast Guard's other heavy icebreaker the USCGC Polar Star nears the end of its recently completed seven- to 10-year life extension. The Polar Sea, tied up "cold iron" in Puget Sound, experienced a catastrophic failure of one of its main propulsion diesel engines in April 2010."I want to make sure for the record that I didn't say [it's] a good option. I said it may be an option," Papp told lawmakers. A Coast Guard analysis has concluded that it can make do without a second heavy icebreaker through 2022. Papp also dismissed leasing as a serious possibility, stating that the annual leasing cost would eat into operations money, which would require further reducing the number of Coast Guard personnel. "We're down to the point now when we talk about displacing things, what we're talking about is displacing people," he said. The budget proposal for fiscal 2015 would decrease personnel by another 800, a number that would add up to a 2,000 position decrease since 2011, Papp said. "One of the most important things to me when I became commandant was preserving our end strength for our service. In my opinion, I've failed miserably," said Papp, who ends his four year term as commandant this May. Even without an icebreaker in the proposed budget – except for $6 million to study the matter – the Coast Guard must cut personnel-driven capability, such as reducing by four the number of Vessel Boarding and Search Teams. "We're making some very tough decisions as this budget gets tamped down, squeezed down. And, as I said earlier, we have no other option now that to start cutting people in specific locations," Papp said.

Specifically successful in the context of shipbuilding- empirics prove

O’Rourke and Daggett 7 (*Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional Research Service AND **Stephen, Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, 6/15/7, “Defense Procurement: Full Funding Policy — Background, Issues, and Options for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31404.pdf, JHR)                    

Advance Appropriations for Navy Ships in SCN. In 2001 and again in 2005, some Navy officials advocated the use of a funding arrangement called advance appropriations for Navy ships, particularly as a means of increasing the number of ships that could be placed under construction in the near term with available funding. Use of advance appropriations would enable the Navy to begin construction on a ship in a given year even though the budget authority for that year provided only an initial increment of the total procurement cost of the ship. Under advance appropriations, funding for the entire procurement cost of a ship would be approved by Congress in a single decision. In contrast, however, to traditional full funding, in which the full procurement cost of the ship is assigned to (i.e., scored in) the budget year in which it is procured, under advance appropriations, the procurement cost of the ship approved in a given year would be divided into several portions, or increments, that would be scored across several budget years starting with the original year of procurement. In contrast to incremental funding, under which Congress must take a positive action each year to approve the portion of the ship’s cost assigned to that year, with advance appropriations, Congress each year would need to take a positive action to cancel the portion of the ship’s cost assigned to that year. Although Navy supporters of the advance appropriation concept stressed that advance appropriations is a form of full funding rather than incremental funding, they acknowledge that advance appropriations could be described informally as a legislatively locked-in counterpart to incremental funding.

The CP ensures funding- ties down future congresses

O’Rourke and Daggett 7 (*Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional Research Service AND **Stephen, Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, 6/15/7, “Defense Procurement: Full Funding Policy — Background, Issues, and Options for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31404.pdf, JHR)                    

Alternative of Incremental Funding. Prior to the imposition of the full funding policy, DOD weapon procurement was accomplished through incremental funding. Incremental funding fell out of favor because opponents believed it did (or could do) one or more of the following: !  make the total procurement costs of weapons and equipment more difficult for Congress to understand and track; !  create a potential for DOD to start procurement of an item without necessarily understanding its total cost, stating that total cost to Congress, or providing fully for that total cost in future DOD budgets — the so-called “camel’s-nose-under-the-tent” issue; !  permit one Congress to “tie the hands” of one or more future Congresses by providing initial procurement funding for a weapon whose cost would have to be largely funded by one or more future Congresses;

               

2nc --- at: links to nb

The CP avoids the link- cost distribution means no program displacement

O’Rourke and Daggett 7 (*Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional Research Service AND **Stephen, Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, 6/15/7, “Defense Procurement: Full Funding Policy — Background, Issues, and Options for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31404.pdf, JHR)

Although incremental funding fell out of favor due to the above considerations, supporters of incremental funding could argue that its use in DOD (or federal) procurement can be advantageous because it can do one or more of the following: permit very expensive items, such as large Navy ships, to be procured in a given year without displacing other programs from that year’s budget, which can increase the costs of the displaced programs due to uneconomic program-disruption start-up and start costs; !  avoid a potential bias against the procurement of very expensive items that might result from use of full funding due to the item’s large up-front procurement cost (which appears in the budget) overshadowing the item’s long-term benefits (which do not appear in the budget) or its lower life cycle operation and support (O&S) costs compared to alternatives with lower up-front procurement costs; !  permit construction to start on a larger number of items in a given year within that year’s amount of funding, so as to achieve better production economies of that item than would have been possible under full funding;