Counterplans General Stuff

Interagency CP

1nc --- shell

The United States Coast Guard, the Department of Defense, and National Science Foundation should all share necessary expenses to ________________.

Here’s a solvency advocate- sharing expenses among agencies avoids the link to the tradeoff disad

O’Rourke 14 (Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, 7/1/14, “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, http://www.scribd.com/doc/233529641/37/Procurement-vs-Leasing, JHR)

At a March 12, 2014, hearing on the Coast Guard’s proposed FY2015 budget before the Homeland Security subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, the Commandant of the Coast at the time, Admiral Robert Papp stated: What concerns me, however, is—particularly as I'm being constrained closer to the billion-dollar range in my acquisition projects [i.e., the Coast Guard’s Acquisition, Construction, and Improvements, or AC&I, account], I don't—I don't know how you fit in a billion-dollar icebreaker. Because at some point, you're going to have to take—even if you do it with a multi-year strategy [i.e., incremental funding], you're going to have go $300 billion [sic:million] or $400 billion [sic: million] in a couple of years, which would displace other very important things. So, we're having to take a hard look at this. One way of doing it is to say, OK, this icebreaker serves the interagency. The Department of Defense could call on us. NSF certainly does, and other agencies. Why should that not be a shared expense? And, oh, by the way, if all these companies are going to be making that much money off oil exploration and the arctic, maybe they can share in the cost of this icebreaker.

2nc --- solvency

The counterplan solves- the Commandant of the Coast Guard goes neg

O’Rourke 14 (Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, 7/1/14, “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, http://www.scribd.com/doc/233529641/37/Procurement-vs-Leasing, JHR)

I can't afford to pay for an icebreaker in a 1-billion-dollar [per year] SIP [sic: CIP] because it would just displace other things that I have a higher priority for. So we're looking at other alternatives, perhaps one of those alternatives, the Congress came up with a requirement for a business base analysis on the remaining Polar Seal [sic: Sea]icebreaker, Polar Sea and potentially, we might be able to overhaul Polar Sea and fit that into the SIP [sic: CIP] as an affordable means for providing an additional icebreaker as we await a time that we can build a new icebreaker. If we are going to build a new icebreaker, if that is a priority, we just can't fit it within our acquisition account and I would look across the inter-agency [for the funding].Later in the hearing, he stated: The Offshore Patrol Cutter is my highest priority for the Coast Guard. I need to fit that in the budget and I fear that if we try to fit the cost of an icebreaker in there, it would displace the Offshore Patrol Cutter or some other very important things. So my number one option is to get support across the inter-agency, those agencies that benefit from the support of an ice breaker to contribute towards the construction of it, that would be my first choice. My second choice however, when I start looking at what can I fit within our acquisition budget refurbishment of the Polar Sea maybe a viable option for that. I would say what you would want to do is overlap and so as Polar Star is coming towards the end of that decade of service after refurbishment, we have polar—I think I said Polar Star.

2nc --- more comparative ev

Here’s comparative evidence- funding could come from DOD subagencies

Caldwell 11 (Stephen, Director of Homeland Security and Justice, December 1, “Coast Guard: Observations on Arctic Requirements, Icebreakers, and Coordination with Stakeholders” Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives,” http://republicans.transportation.house.gov/Media/file/TestimonyCGMT/2011-12-1-Caldwell.pdf, JHR)

These two studies concluded that building new heavy icebreakers was the best solution to addressing the requirements, as well as from a budgetary perspective. The latter analyses included ancillary studies and explored other options to obtain new polar icebreaking capabilities including: leasing, waiver from current government requirements that mandates the U.S. Coast Guard have full funding for vessel acquisition prior to award (unlike the U.S. Navy’s incremental funding allowed for aircraft carriers), funding U.S. Coast Guard acquisition of new polar icebreaking capabilities from the U.S. Navy SCN budget (a similar process that was used for the acquisition of the USCGC Healy).

Arctic Council CP

1nc Arctic Council CP

Working through the Arctic Council solves Russian expansionism comparatively better

Mitchell, 14 - Jon Mitchell is an independent writer working to cultivate experience in foreign policy and political-military analysis. He is pursuing his Masters degree in public policy, with a concentration in international affairs (“Russia’s Territorial Ambition and Increased Military Presence in the Arctic” 4/23, http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2014/04/23/russias-territorial-ambition-and-increased-military-presence-in-the-arctic/)//DH

Last month, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called for a united Canadian-U.S. counterbalance to Russia’s Arctic presence, pointing out “they have been aggressively reopening military bases.”[25] While the U.S. cannot legitimately criticize Putin for opening military bases and simultaneously avoid blatant hypocrisy, it is worth noting that Russia is developing a strong military presence in a potentially competitive region. Russia’s plans to reopen bases and create an Arctic military command fosters the conclusion that Russia wants to be the first established dominant force in a new region that will host economic competition and primary shipping lanes, albeit in a harsh environment that makes it difficult to extract resources. Nicholas Cunningham aptly stated “both Russia and the West fear losing out to the other in the far north, despite what appears to be a small prize.”[26]

Although the Arctic holds a mass of the world’s oil and gas deposits, the extreme environment and remote location makes it difficult to produce energy quickly and efficiently. Despite this, the Russian Federation is focused on developing disputed hydrocarbon areas that it claims are part of the country’s continental shelf. In addition, Russia is allocating funds and forces to the Arctic to protect its interests. While the U.S. is currently lacking in natural resource development and exploitation in the Arctic Circle, it desires to display a show of strength in the cold region to compete with potential Russian domination and influence. But because the Defense Department faces constant budget cuts, preparing an Arctic naval force will be slow and difficult. For now, the United States can only show strength through nuclear submarines and drone technology.

Putin and the Russian Federation are laying disputed claims to territories both inside and outside the Arctic while creating the foundation for a potential military buildup in the Arctic – provided that the U.S. and Canada can even allocate sufficient budgets for Arctic military expansion. One thing is sure: if the Arctic region continues to melt and open up vital shipping lanes, there must be international cooperation to provide security and rescue elements for commercial shipping. Since Russia has significant territorial claims and the most coastlines in the Arctic Circle, it would be natural for the Russian Federation to have a wide security presence in the region, but this must be coupled with international cooperation in commercial shipping lanes and by providing support elements, such as search and rescue. The United States will not be able to fully compete with a country that is heavily investing in the Arctic region – particularly due to budget constraints and lack of Arctic-prepared vessels. If the U.S. desires to limit Russian influence and territorial claims, it must do so by partnering with other members of the Arctic council – not by entering into a military buildup simply to dominate Russia in the Arctic.

2nc Arctic Council CP

US action through the Arctic Council can solve climate change and support US Arctic leadership

Kelly et al 4-24-14 -- Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress. Michael Conathan is the Director of Ocean Policy at the Center. Vikram Singh is the Vice President for National Security and International Policy at the Center (Cathleen, “Helping the Arctic Council Find Its True North” The Center for American Progress, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/report/2014/04/24/88474/helping-the-arctic-council-find-its-true-north/)BC

For millennia, the Arctic has lain beneath a blanket of ice and snow—an ocean locked out of all interaction with the rest of the world, save subsea currents and icebreaking marine mammals. Yet in recent decades, rapid declines in ice coverage due to global climate change have begun to unlock what may be the world’s last undisturbed vault of natural resources, potentially opening trade routes dreamt of by explorers since the late 15th century. The opening of the Arctic has already begun to stimulate economic development, and the changes at the top of the world present massive global challenges. In the Arctic, which is warming two times faster than any other region on Earth, the effects of climate change are staggering. Arctic sea-ice volume has shrunk by 75 percent since the 1980s, and we are very likely to see ice-free summers by midcentury. These and other rapid changes directly affect the livelihoods, infrastructure, and health of the 4 million people who live in the region and have economic, environmental, geostrategic, and national security implications for the United States and the world. Despite growing interest in capitalizing on the region’s rich and increasingly accessible resources, the profound changes in the Arctic pose grave risks and high costs to America and the planet. For example, melting sea ice in the Greenland Arctic is speeding up global sea-level rise; increasing flood risks; and endangering infrastructure and communities in coastal cities such as Miami, New York, and many others. Just five nations border the Arctic Ocean—Canada, Norway, Russia, the United States, and Denmark, via its dominion over Greenland. In 1996, they joined forces with Finland, Iceland, and Sweden* and established the Arctic Council, an international body designed to address emerging challenges in the region. The chairmanship of the Arctic Council rotates among them, and in 2015, the United States will take its turn at the top when Secretary of State John Kerry assumes the role. By any metric, climate change is the key driver of growing Arctic commercial interests and profound environmental and economic risks in the region and around the globe. For this reason, Secretary Kerry should establish climate change as the overarching theme of his Arctic Council chairmanship. As chairman, he should also seek to conserve invaluable Arctic marine and coastal ecosystems, ensure global security by minimizing potential conflicts in the region, and promote sustainable Arctic development that will allow Arctic communities to become more resilient and prosperous. The federal government should also seize this opportunity to raise the domestic profile of Arctic issues and strengthen our presence in this emerging and vital region. This should include expansion of America’s capabilities to manage Arctic oil spills and other disasters, including through our icebreaker fleet, navigation and communication satellites, ports, and other infrastructure needed to support emergency preparedness and response. The United States is taking steps to respond to the challenges and opportunities of a rapidly changing Arctic, but more action is needed. President Barack Obama’s National Strategy for the Arctic Region, the White House’s Arctic Strategy Implementation Plan, the Department of Defense 2013 Arctic Strategy, and the U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap for 2014 to 2030 identify a suite of actions through which to advance national and international security, pursue responsible environmental stewardship, and strengthen international cooperation in the region. Consistent with these priorities, as well as with the president’s Climate Action Plan, Secretary Kerry should seize the opportunity to set an ambitious agenda to combat climate change. To implement it, he should work closely with Canada—the current Arctic Council chair—to secure black carbon emission reduction commitments at the 2015 Arctic Council ministerial-level meeting. Lastly, President Obama should convene a presidential Arctic summit for Arctic Council members and observers in 2016 to make rapid progress on the priority initiatives described below. In this report, we recommend these actions and more. We propose policy initiatives that can be implemented domestically, as well as specific guidance to lead the Arctic Council to new and improved international policy standards. First, we provide a brief background on the rationale for urgent action in the Arctic region. We then provide specific guidance for both Arctic Council and U.S. domestic initiatives in the following three categories: 1. Establish climate change as the overarching theme of Secretary Kerry’s chairmanship term. Reduce Arctic warming by centering the 2015–2017 Arctic Council agenda on the effects of global climate change and the efforts to combat it. 2. Reduce climate change and build resilience in the Arctic region. The following attainable goals focus on reducing Arctic warming and strengthening community resilience in the region. Meeting these goals should be a top priority for Secretary Kerry during his chairmanship. Reduce black carbon emissions in and beyond the Arctic region. Reduce methane emissions in and beyond the Arctic region. Expand Arctic communities’ access to energy efficiency and renewable energy. Strengthen Arctic communities’ resilience. Expand Arctic climate change research and information sharing. Ensure safe and clean Arctic transportation. Expand the commercial fishing moratorium to all Arctic Council nations and collaborate on fisheries research. Establish protected areas in the Arctic and conserve the region’s unique and climate-sensitive wildlife. 3. Take domestic actions to support Arctic leadership. The following unilateral steps will both help the United States drive an ambitious Arctic Council agenda centered on climate change and prepare the United States to better manage Arctic challenges going forward. Freeze U.S. oil and gas drilling in the Arctic Ocean. Connect the U.S. public to the Arctic people and the value of a healthy climate and marine and coastal environments in the region. Ensure a peaceful, safe, and stable Arctic. Ratify the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. These recommended priorities were developed through collaboration between members of multiple policy teams at the Center for American Progress, including leaders on the Energy, Public Lands, Ocean, and National Security and International Policy teams.

US action through the Arctic Council solves sustainable development in the Arctic

Ebinger 6-5-14 -- director of the Energy Security Initiative at Brookings, which is housed within the institution’s Foreign Policy program (Charles K., “The Way Forward for U.S. Arctic Policy,” The Brookings Institute, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/planetpolicy/posts/2014/06/05-way-forward-us-arctic-policy-ebinger)BC

A report recently released by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) offered recommendations for U.S. Arctic policy to the State Department—specifically on how best to enhance the United States’ 2015 chairmanship of the Arctic Council. This report, although informative on the large issue at hand, leaves much to the imagination as to how exactly the United States should go about exacting effective participation in the Arctic. In the report, the GAO stresses that the State Department needs to track and follow through with its recommendations on Arctic policy. While these recommendations are a good start, clearer objectives are needed in order to capitalize on U.S. leadership in the Arctic going forward. This past March, the Brookings Energy Security Initiative (ESI) released a policy brief for the State Department that addresses very specific Arctic issues that should be part of the United States’ agenda as Arctic Council chair in 2015. Based on our analysis and conclusions, we in ESI believe that it is in the national interest of the United States to take the lead in strengthening the Arctic offshore oil and gas governance regime. The cornerstone of U.S. chairmanship should be enhancing oil spill prevention, control and response through the development of Arctic-specific standards for all equipment and resource sharing arrangements to ensure that adequate standards, procedures, financial resources, equipment and infrastructure are in place and available. Our specific recommendations in our March policy brief are as follows: Establish oil spill prevention, control and response as the overarching theme for U.S. chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2015-2017. Create the diplomatic post of “Arctic Ambassador.” Establish a Regional Bureau for Polar Affairs in the U.S. Department of State. Accelerate the ongoing development of Alaska-specific standards and discuss their applicability in bilateral and multilateral forums. Strengthen bilateral regulatory arrangements for the Chukchi Sea with Russia, and the Beaufort Sea with Canada. Support the industry-led establishment of an Arctic-specific resource sharing organization for oil spill response and safety. Support and prioritize the strengthening of the Arctic Council’s influence through enhanced thematic and global coordination of offshore oil and gas issues. Support the establishment of a circumpolar Arctic Regulators Association for Oil and Gas. While we wish that the GAO’s report had outlined more specific recommendations, we applaud the increasing interest by the U.S. government in Arctic research. Last October, U.S. Secretary of Energy Ernest J. Moniz requested that the National Petroleum Council undertakea study on major energy issues in the Arctic that is currently underway. We hope that this and other reports will continue to reflect and reinforce the recommendations we have proposed. The changing Arctic is outpacing the U.S. government’s current policy. Russia, Norway, Denmark and even several non-Arctic nations such as China and Japan, all have Arctic strategies. Perhaps it is time the U.S. viewed the Arctic not only as a security threat in a strictly military and geopolitical sense, but also as a safety threat in the context of climate change, sustainability of indigenous communities and the protection of the environment. Chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2015 will allow the U.S. to take leadership in these important issue areas going forward, and we in ESI hope that the U.S. will seize this opportunity.