Country of origin information report Iran January 2010

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Stoning
14.17 The practice of stoning involves throwing stones at the convicted individual, who is buried up to the waist (if he is a man) or up to the chest (if she is a woman), until the individual dies from impact of the blows. (HRW, 6 February 2008) [8ah]
14.18 The FIDH report Iran/Death Penalty: a State Terror Policy, dated 28 April 2009, (FIDH Report 2009) added:
“In practice, the conditions set out for stoning are very detailed. Article 102 provides that ‘men shall be buried in a pit up to vicinity of the waist and women up to the chest in order to be stoned.’ Both hands of the condemned are also placed under the earth. And Article 104 determines the size of the stones: ‘The stones used for stoning shall not be too large to kill the condemned by one or two throws and not too small to be called a stone’.” [56i]
14.19 The FIDH Report 2009, stated: “In the draft Penal Code presented by the government to the Majlis, stoning and other corporal punishments are maintained.” [56h] The same report noted that “Although the head of the judiciary, Ayatollah Shahroodi issued a moratorium on execution by stoning in December 2002, at least seven stoning sentences have been enforced since.” [56i] In an article dated 29 October 2009, Amnesty International noted that despite the moratorium on stoning:
“…at least five men and one woman have been stoned to death since 2002. In January 2009, the Spokesperson for the Judiciary, Ali Reza Jamshidi, confirmed that two executions by stoning had been carried out in December 2008 and said that the directive on the moratorium had no legal weight and that judges could therefore ignore it.
“In June 2009, the Legal and Judicial Affairs Committee of Iran's parliament (Majles) recommended the removal of a clause permitting stoning from a new version of the Penal Code currently under discussion in the parliament. The law has yet to be passed by the whole Majles, after which it will be passed to the Council of Guardians for approval. The clause allowing the use of stoning could be reinstated at either stage.” [9m]
14.20 On 13 November 2009, Amnesty International reported that a man and a woman who had been sentenced to death by stoning in 2005/6 were released from Esfahan Central prison in Esfahan on 4 October, after their convictions for “adultery while being married” were quashed by the Head of the Judiciary. [9k]
See also Judicary, Penal code and Law on apostasy
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Political affiliation
Freedom of political expression
The section should be read in conjunction with Latest news, Recent developments and Freedom of speech and media. Information about human rights violations committed, generally, by government agencies can be found in the section on Security forces.
15.01 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment, Iran, Internal affairs, updated 30 April 2009, stated that:
“Article 26 of the Iranian constitution permits the ‘formation of parties, societies, political or professional associations, as well as religious societies, whether Islamic or pertaining to one of the recognised religious minorities ... provided they do not violate the principles of independence, freedom, national unity, the criteria of Islam, or the basis of the Islamic Republic’. A 1981 law on political parties specified what a political party is and defined the conditions under which it could operate, and it made the formation of a party dependent on getting a permit from the Ministry of the Interior.
“It was only after the May 1997 election of Mohammad Khatami as president that a real blossoming of parties took place. Today, the number of officially sanctioned political organisations exceed 100, although not all are genuine political groups.” [125g]
15.02 The US State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2008, released on 25 February 2009, (USSD Report 2008), noted
“The constitution provides citizens the right to change peacefully the president and the parliament through free and fair elections; however, the authority of unelected representatives over the election process severely abridges this right in practice. The Assembly of Experts elects the supreme leader, the recognized head of state, who can be removed only by a vote of the assembly. The assembly was composed of 86 members and was restricted to clerics, who served eight-year terms and were chosen by popular vote from a list approved by the Guardian Council (a 12-member body composed of government-appointed clerics and religious jurists). There was no separation of state and religion, and clerical influence pervaded the government. The supreme leader also approved the candidacy of presidential candidates, with the exception of an incumbent president.” [4a] (Section 3)
15.03 The same report observed:
“On March 14 [2008], the country held Majles elections, which outside observers regarded as neither free nor fair. The Interior Ministry rejected the candidacy of almost 2,000 applicants… Most of the disqualified candidates were considered reformists. Conservatives won approximately 70 percent of the seats.
“The constitution allows for the formation of political parties, although the Interior Ministry granted licenses only to political parties with ideological and practical adherence to the system of government embodied in the constitution. There were more than 240 registered political organizations, but most were small entities, often focused around an individual, and did not have nationwide membership. Political parties approved by the Interior Ministry generally operated without restriction or outside interference.
“According to the Guardian Council's interpretation, the constitution barred women and persons of non-Iranian origin or religions other than Shia Islam from becoming president. Women were also barred from serving as supreme leader or as members of the Assembly of Experts, Guardian Council, or Expediency Council (a body responsible for mediating between the Majles and the Guardian Council and serving as a consultative council for the supreme leader). Two of the 10 vice presidents were women. Eight women served in the Majles during the year. Five Majles seats were reserved for the recognized religious minorities. Other ethnic minorities in the Majles included Arabs and Kurds. There were no non-Muslims in the cabinet or on the Supreme Court.” [4a] (Section 3)
Presidential elections of June 2009
15.04 The Congressional Research Service paper, Iran: US Concerns and Policy Responses, dated 2 July 2009, reporting on the 12 June 2009 presidential elections noted that of the 500 candidates who registered to participate in the elections, only four – President Ahmadinejad, Mir Hossein Musavi (the main ‘reformist’ candidate), Mehdi Karrubi, and Mohsen Reza’I – were permitted to run. The paper stated that the June elections voter-turnout:
“… was unexpectedly high at about 85%: 39.1 million valid (and invalid) votes were cast. The Interior Ministry announced two hours after the polls closed that Ahmadinejad had won, although in the past results have been announced the day after. The totals were announced on Saturday, June 13, 2009, as follows:
“Ahmadinejad: 24.5 million votes – 62.6%

Musavi: 13.2 million votes – 33.75%

Reza’i: 678,000 votes – 1.73%

Invalid: 409,000 votes – 1%

Karrubi: 333,600 votes – 0.85%” [78b]
15.05 Following the annoucement of the election results, Mssrs Musavi, Reza’I and Karrubi:
“… asserted outright fraud and called for a new election, citing the premature release of results; the barring of candidate observers at some pollingstations; regime shut-down of internet and text services; and repression of post-election protests… Protests built throughout June 13-19, although far larger in Tehran than in other cities, and regime security forces used varying amounts of force to control them, causing 17 deaths, according to official Iranian statements. However, the protest movement’s hopes of having Khamene’i annul the election were dashed by his major Friday prayer sermon on June 19 in which he refuted allegations of widespread fraud and implicitly threatened a crackdown on any further protests. That crackdown was in evidence against protesters on Saturday, June 20, with state media reporting at least ten killed that day. However, with Musavi calling for continued demonstrations but with exercise of restraint, the protests appeared to wane by June 22. The regime’s attempts to black out international media and internet access to Iran continued, with mixed success, and it has arrested a reputed 1,000 reformist leaders, although claiming to have released most by now.” [78b]
15.06 On 22 November 2009, BBC News reported that leading reformist, Mohammed Ali Abtahi, a former vice-president under President Khatami from 1997 to 2005, had reportedly been released on bail after being sentenced to six years in jail for “fomenting unrest after June’s disputed elections…Mr Abtahi has been temporarily released on bail of 7bn rials ($425,000), Iran's official Irna news agency reported on Sunday. Under Iranian law, people sentenced to more than three months in jail can be released on bail pending appeal… Mr Abtahi had been in custody since he was detained shortly after the 12 June polls.” [21m]
15.07 The same BBC article reported that “Around 80 people have been jailed and five sentenced to death over the unrest that followed President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s disputed poll victory…At least 30 protestors have been killed in clashes and thousands arrested since the elections. Some 200 opposition activists remain behind bars. Foreign media, including the BBC, have been restricted in their coverage of Iran since the election protests turned violent.” [21m]
15.08 Cable News Network (CNN) reported on 18 November 2009 that, in addition to the five people sentenced to death for their roles in the post election unrest, a further 81 people had received prison terms ranging between six months and 15 years for their roles. The CNN article continued:
“The five who received death sentences on Tuesday [17 November] were convicted of membership in terrorist groups and carrying out bombings across Iran, the Tehran judiciary said in a statement reported by state media.
“The others were found guilty on various charges, including acting against the national interest, disturbing the peace and destroying public property.

The judiciary said the defendants can appeal the verdicts. The government had announced three protest-related death sentences in October [2009].” [60a]

See also Latest news, Recent developments, Arbitrary arrest and detention and Freedom of speech and media.
Political dissidents outside Iran

15.09 Demonstrations against the election results also occurred beyond Iran. A Times article dated 11 July 2009 reported that there had been protests outside the Iranian Embassy in London following the June presidential election. The article observed:

“From the rooftop of the Iranian Embassy in London an unmanned video camera records the faces of the angry crowd gathered in Knightsbridge, emboldened by their fury over what they believe was a rigged election. A Metropolitan police officer who has been patrolling the demonstrations since they began three days after the close of polls in mid June, told The Times: ‘They’re filming quite a lot. Any intelligent person would assume they’re sending the footage back to Iran.’” [15d]
15.10 The Times article also reported that many of the demonstrators in London had covered or disguised their faces with sunglasses, hats, wigs and paint to avoid being recognised in Iran. In addition “Local activists are developing fresh ways of dodging the regime’s dissent radar by developing secret communication methods with their counterparts back home. Their greatest weapon has been cyberspace, despite the Iranian Government’s attempt to monitor websites and personal e-mails.” [15d]
15.11 On 4 December 2009 the Wall Street Journal reported that:
“In recent months, Iran has been conducting a campaign of harassing and intimidating members of its diaspora world-wide - not just prominent dissidents - who criticize the regime, according to former Iranian lawmakers and former members of Iran's elite security force, the Revolutionary Guard, with knowledge of the program. Part of the effort involves tracking the Facebook, Twitter and YouTube activity of Iranians around the world, and identifying them at opposition protests abroad, these people say.
” Interviews with roughly 90 ordinary Iranians abroad -- college students, housewives, doctors, lawyers, businesspeople -- in New York, London, Dubai, Sweden, Los Angeles and other places indicate that people who criticize Iran's regime online or in public demonstrations are facing threats intended to silence them. Although it wasn't possible to independently verify their claims, interviewees provided consistently similar descriptions of harassment techniques world-wide…
“Dozens of individuals in the U.S. and Europe who criticized Iran on Facebook or Twitter said their relatives back in Iran were questioned or temporarily detained because of their postings. About three dozen individuals interviewed said that, when traveling this summer back to Iran, they were questioned about whether they hold a foreign passport, whether they possess Facebook accounts and why they were visiting Iran. The questioning, they said, took place at passport control upon their arrival at Tehran's Imam Khomeini International Airport.
“Five interviewees who traveled to Iran in recent months said they were forced by police at Tehran's airport to log in to their Facebook accounts. Several reported having their passports confiscated because of harsh criticism they had posted online about the way the Iranian government had handled its controversial elections earlier this year [June 2009].” [91]
See also Latest news, Recent developments, Arbitrary arrest and detention and Freedom of speech and media.

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Political prisoners
15.12 The USSD Report 2008 observed:
“Exact data regarding the number of citizens imprisoned for their political beliefs were not available; however, human rights activists estimated the number in the hundreds. Although there were few details, the government arrested, convicted, and executed persons on questionable criminal charges, including drug trafficking, when their actual ‘offenses’ were political. The government charged members of religious minorities with crimes such as ‘confronting the regime’ and apostasy, and conducted trials in these cases in the same manner as it would treat threats to national security.
“Authorities occasionally gave political prisoners suspended sentences or released them for short or extended furloughs prior to completion of their sentences, but they could be ordered back to prison at any time. These suspended sentences often were used to silence and intimidate individuals. The government also controlled political activists by holding a file in the courts that could be opened at any time and attempted to intimidate the activists by calling them in repeatedly for questioning. Numerous observers considered [former] Tehran public prosecutor Saeed Mortazavi (see paragraph 15.13 below) the most notorious persecutor of political dissidents and critics.
“Authorities routinely held political prisoners in solitary confinement for extended periods of time and denied them due process and access to legal representation. Political prisoners were also at greater risk of torture and abuse while in detention. The government did not permit access to political prisoners by international humanitarian organizations.” [4a] (Section 1e)
15.13 On 31 August 2009, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported that “Iran’s judiciary chief has named hard-line Tehran prosecutor Said [Saeed] Mortazavi – the man behind mass trials of post-election detainees – deputy prosecutor general. Officially the move is a promotion for Mortazavi, but legal experts say his power has diminished.” Mortazavi’s successor as Tehran prosecutor, Abbas Jafari Dolatabadi, was appointed on 29 August 2009. “ [42i]
See preceding subsection, plus Security forces for information about arbitrary arrest and detention, Recent developments, Latest news and Freedom of speech and media.
Freedom of association and assembly
15.14 Freedom House’s report ‘Freedom of Association Under Threat – Iran’, dated 21 November 2008, stated that:
“Article 27 of the constitution grants the right to peaceful assembly but limits this right to ‘public gatherings and marches ... that are not detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam.’ Permits for holding demonstrations are routinely denied to activists, and women's rights advocates claim particular discrimination, reporting an especially cumbersome and erratically enforced process. Open discussions at universities as well as gatherings at concerts and other cultural events are frequently attacked by the Basij or Ansar-i Hezbollah. Protesters, especially students and ethnic minorities demanding human rights, risk public beatings and humiliation as well as routine surveillance, intimidation, prolonged interrogation sessions, torture, and imprisonment, including solitary confinement in cramped, unsafe conditions. Activists accused of organizing protests are often forced to give televised confessions about supposed collusion with foreign enemies.” [112e]
15.15 The USSD Report 2008 stated that:
“The constitution permits assemblies and marches ‘provided they do not violate the principles of Islam’; in practice the government restricted freedom of assembly and closely monitored gatherings to prevent antigovernment protests. Such gatherings included public entertainment and lectures, student meetings and protests, labor protests, women's gatherings and protests, funeral processions, and Friday prayer gatherings. According to activists, the government arbitrarily applied rules governing permits to assemble, with conservative groups rarely experiencing difficulty, and groups viewed as critical of the government experiencing harassment regardless of whether a permit was issued.
“The government continued to prohibit and forcibly disperse peaceful demonstrations during the year. Paramilitary organizations such as the Ansar-e Hizballah also harassed, beat, and intimidated those who demonstrated publicly for reform. They particularly targeted university students.” [4a] (Section 2b)
15.16 A report by the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran (ICHRI) dated 21 September 2009 stated that violations of the right to freedom of association and assembly had occurred since June 2009:
“Following the disputed 12 June elections, Iranian authorities banned peaceful demonstrations in Iran’s main cities including Tehran, Shiraz, Isfahan, Tabriz, Mashad and Rasht, as well as elsewhere, to protest electoral fraud and to demand human rights. Security and intelligence forces as well as Basiji militias on motorcycles brutally attacked demonstrators, using batons, tear-gas, pepper-spray, water cannon, chains, and live ammunition and plastic bullets, killing an as yet undetermined number of them. The use of force against demonstrators has been excessive, unlawful, and in gross violation of the standards contained in the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force by Law Enforcement Officers upheld by the UN General Assembly. Many victims were killed or gravely injured by gunshots or blows to the head, which is to say, intentionally. Security agents have arrested injured demonstrators when they sought medical treatment in hospitals.
“Iran’s Leader, Ayatollah Khamane’I demanded an end to demonstrations and threatened to hold opposition candidates responsible for any problems. Others among Iran’s highest religious and political authorities announced a policy of criminalizing dissent, which can have lethal consequences, given Iran’s excessive use of the death penalty and lack of independent courts. Ayatollah Khatami, an influential hard-line cleric, has demanded tat demonstrators be considered ‘enemies of God (Mohareb)’, guilty of crimes under Iran’s Islamic legal code for which they can be executed. Iran’s Leader has also demeaned protesters, terming them ‘rioters’ and has thus legitimated harsh punishment of those who have been detained on the basis of their political views and for exercising their right to freedom of assembly and to peacefully demonstrate their views.” [52a] (p2)
15.17 The ICHRI report also observed that:
“Despite these threats, hundreds of thousands of Iranian citizens peacefully demonstrated on several occasions including 20 June, 9 July, to commemorate student demonstrations ten years earlier, on 17 July, at Friday Prayers, and on other dates. The gatherings were met with severe violence by the authorities, resulting in hundreds of arrests and injuries and numerous killings. The Mayor of Tehran, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, estimated that three million persons have taken part in demonstrations on 20 June.” [52a] (p3)
15.18 A female student, Neda Soltan, “…became a symbol of the opposition after she was shot dead during an anti-goverment demonstration on June 20.” Footage of her murder spread around the world on the internet. (The Times, 16 November 2009) [15a] It is unclear who was responsible for the killing. A Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty article dated 25 November 2009 stated that, according to the commander of the Basij, she was killed by someone from the US whereas female Basij members were reported as saying that the doctor who tried to save Neda, Arash Hejazi, was her murderer and called for his extradition from Britain. “Hejazi has come under fire from the Iranian government for saying that it was a member of Iran’s Basij that shot her in the chest. He has said that the Basij member was detained by the crowd, who took away his ID card.” [42j]
15.19 The Times article of 16 November reported that, according to Neda Soltan’s fiancé, Caspian Makan, the Iranian regime “… tried to force him and Ms Soltan’s parents to say that she was killed by the opposition, not by a government militiaman [Basij] on a motorbike as eyewitnesses have claimed.” Mr Makan is currently in hiding. He “… fled from Iran after being released on bail following 65 days in prison.” It was also reported that “On November 4 Ms Soltan’s parents were attacked and detained when they joined a protest in Iran. One source told The Times that members of the security forces taunted them, saying that they could meet the same fate as their daughter.” The Times also reported that Neda Soltan’s grave had been desecrated by supporters of Iran’s regime. [15a]
See previous subsections, also Recent developments, Latest news and Employment rights.
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Opposition groups and political activists
15.20 The USSD Background Note of September 2009 noted:
“The Islamic Republican Party (IRP) was Iran's sole political party until its dissolution in 1987. Iran now has a variety of groups engaged in political activity; some are oriented along ideological or ethnic lines, while others are more akin to professional political parties seeking members and recommending candidates for office. Conservatives consistently thwarted the efforts of reformists during the Khatami era and have consolidated their control on power since the 2004 Seventh Majles elections and President Ahmadi-Nejad's 2005 victory.
“The Islamic Republic of Iran has faced armed opposition from a number of groups, including the Mujahideen-e Khalq (added to the U.S. Government’s Foreign Terrorist Organizations list in 1999), the People's Fedayeen, the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (added the to the U.S. Government’s Foreign Terrorist Organizations list in 2009), and the Baluchi group Jundallah.” [4u] (Political conditions)
Mojahedin-e Khalq Organisation (MEK/MKO) or People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran (PMOI) or Holy Warriors of the People
15.21 The Danish Immigration Service’s report Human Rights Situation for Minorities, Women and Converts, and Entry and Exit Procedures, ID Cards, Summons and Reporting, etc. (Danish Immigration Service Report 2009), released April 2009, stated that:
“The MKO also known as Mojahedin-E Khalq (Mek) and People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran (PMOI) is an Islamist socialist organisation formed in 1965. It is led by husband and wife Masud and Maryam Rajavi. The MKO has been classified as a terrorist organisation by several countries including the United States and the EU. In 2002, EU member states decided to freeze the assets of the MKO. However, this decision was annulled by the European Court of Justice in December 2006. While the MKO is still on the EU’s terror list [since removed, see below], the organisation was removed from the UK’s list of alleged terrorist groups in June 2008.
“Even though the MKO has a worldwide network of members and supporters, it is an unpopular organisation among many Iranians because of its armed struggle against Iran during the past 30 years. This struggle has led to the losses of many official and civilian lives. The MKO has conducted several bombing campaigns and other violent attacks in Iran and other countries and fought on Iraq’s side in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, where MKO fighters were used in suicidal, mass wave attacks against Iranian forces. Even though the activities of many individual MKO members may be minor, MKO members are considered traitors by many Iranians.
“The MKO has its head quarters in Ashraf Camp in Iraq. Ashraf Camp is a military base situated some 100 kilometres west of the Iranian border and 60 km north of Baghdad. Saddam Hussein gave the camp to the MKO in the 1980s. Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Coalition Forces disarmed the MKO. According to the Iranian organisation for former MKO members, the Nejat Society, approximately 3,400 MKO members still live in Ashraf Camp. Since 2003, these members are considered protected people under the Geneva Convention.” [86b] (p16)
15.22 A Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty report dated 26 January 2009 noted:
“… the European Union has decided to remove the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO) from its list of terrorist organizations. The decision marks the first time the EU has ‘de-listed’ an organization from its terrorist index, and could free the MKO, also known as the People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran, to expand its activities in Europe. … The former U.S. administration reaffirmed its designation of the MKO as a foreign terrorist organization on January 7.” [42d]
15.23 GlobalSecurity.org, 28 January 2009, noted: “The British government insists that the deproscription of the MKO was 'a judicial and not a political decision' both in the European Union as it was earlier in the UK and that it opposed its removal.” [80h]
15.24 Jane’s Sentinel, dated 23 January 2009, stated that “The group's armed wing is the National Liberation Army (NLA). The MEK is the main body in the political coalition of Iranian opposition groups known as the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI). This organisation claims to be the transitional parliament-in-exile, with 570 members and a head office in Paris, France.” [125c] (Non-state Armed Groups)
15.25 Jane’s added that: “The group was founded in 1965 as a splinter group of the Iran Liberation Movement, although it did not engage in armed struggle until 1971 after five years of deliberation over strategy. The NLA was formed in June 1987.” [125c] (Non-state Armed Groups)
15.26 The Danish Immigration Service Report 2009 stated that:
“In 2003, President Khatami announced an amnesty offer to former members of the MKO in Iraq stating that those who repent past acts are welcome back in Iran where they will be judged according to law. According to Khatami, the amnesty did not cover leaders of the MKO.
“According to the Nejat Society, around 500 to 600 former MKO members have left Ashraf camp and have returned to Iran voluntarily during the period 2004 to 2007. These returnees have not been prosecuted and they have not faced problems with the Iranian authorities or private people upon return, as the Iranian authorities will only prosecute a returnee if a private person brings a complaint.” [86b] (p17)
15.27 The report continued:
“According to an international organisation in Turkey, former MKO members who repent and cooperate with the Iranian government may be granted amnesty. High profile members are not granted amnesty though. The organisation is unsure of the kind of assurances MKO returnees are given. The amnesty was announced before President Ahmadinejad’s time and he does not recognise it. Furthermore, the amnesty is not stated in any law or regulation and is not written down anywhere… (p17) The organisation believed that, in general, it is safe for former MKO members to return to Iran, even though not all international organisations agree with them on this point. However, the organisation did stress, that a group of people consisting of leaders who have committed serious crimes, were likely to face severe problems with the authorities upon return.” [86b] (p19)
15.28 The USSD Report 2008 stated that: “The government reportedly held some persons in prison for years under charges of sympathizing with outlawed groups, such as the terrorist organization Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK).” [4a] (Section 1e)
15.29 On 3 August 2009, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported that Iraqi forces had taken control of Camp Ashraf, the MKO’s base on the Iranian border, resulting in clashes between police and residents:
”Residents said 13 people died in the clashes, many of them shot dead by police, and many others wounded. Iraq's government said seven died, most of them because they threw themselves under police vehicles. Abdul Nassir al-Mehdawi, governor of Diyala province, which has jurisdiction over Ashraf, confirmed 36 had been arrested the day after the clashes… Mehdawi said some of the 36 would be released but others would have to face trial.” [42n]
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Rastakhiz Party and Monarchists
15.30 The Advisory Panel on Country Information (APCI) review of the COI Service’s Iran COI Report of Augst 2008, undertaken by Dr Reza Molavi and Dr Mohammad M Hedayati-Kakhki of the Centre for Iranian Studies at Durham University, dated 23 September 2008, (APCI Report 2008) stated that:
“The support of a return to the Monarchy is divided amongst a variety of groups and organisations…
“Babak Khorramdin Organization (BKO)

Constitutionalist Movement of Iran - Frontline (Sazeman-e Mashroteh Khahan-e Iran)

Guardians of Eternal Iran (Negahbanane Iran e Djawid)

Iranian Monarchist Council of Canada (Shora-e Saltanat Talaban-e Iran dar Kanada, IMCC)

Iran Paad (Saltanat Taliban, Saltanat Talab)

National Movement of Iranian Resistance (NAMIR)

Organization of Kaviyani Banner (Kaviyani Flag, Derafsh-e Kaviani)

The Imperial Iranian Guards (Rastakhiz of Iran Organization, Sazemane -Rastakhize Iran)

Shahin
“One of these, Iran Paad, claims to have been founded in London about 19 years ago, with the aim of providing an umbrella organisation that would invite all other Monarchist groups to be part of their network. Iran Paad claims to have thousands of members both inside and outside of Iran. They also organise demonstrations which take place outside Iranian Embassies in other countries of the world, to keep their campaign in the public’s eye.” [6a] (p24)
15.31 The Danish Immigration Service Report 2009 stated that:
“A western embassy (3) stated that Monarchists, be it as movements or individuals, have no influence in Iran and therefore are not at risk of persecution. ‘They are simply not considered a threat to the ruling government’. Another western embassy (1) stated that monarchist groups still exist in the universities in Iran. (p20)… while Monarchists are not as active as other political oppositional groups, they still exist as a movement…To the knowledge of the international organisation, the nature of the activities of the Monarchists is usually peaceful. For instance, the Monarchists staged a protest in Iran in July 2008. At 9pm, people in support of the Monarchists were to turn on the high beam of their cars and drive around the city. In another peaceful demonstration, supporters of the Monarchists were to wear a white shirt and go to a certain park. Monarchist groups also distribute leaflets and spread their messages through the internet. They are particularly active outside Iran, for instance in the United States, where they run three TV stations.” [86b] (p21)
15.32 Following the presidential election on 12 June 2009, it was reported that a death sentence had been imposed on an individual accused of having links with a monarchist group. On 9 October 2009, Amnesty International reported that Mohammad-Reza Ali-Zamani had been sentenced to death in connection with the protests that followed the election. A Tehran Revolutionary Court had passed the sentence after Zamani was
“…convicted of ‘emnity against God for membership of and activities to further the aims of the terrorist grouplet Anjoman-e Padeshahi-e Iran (API)’. The API is an exiled opposition group which advocates the ending of the Islamic Republic and the establishment of an Iranian monarchy. He was also convicted of ‘propaganda against the system’, ‘insulting the holy sanctities’, ‘gathering and colluding with intent to harm national internal security’ as well as of leaving the country illegally to visit Iraq where he was alleged to have met US military officials.” [9l]
15.33 An Observer article dated 11 October 2009 reported that three unidentified people arrested after the post-election protests had been sentenced to death. Zahed Bashiri Rad, a spokesman for the Ministry of Justice revealed only the initials of those sentenced: “‘MZ and AP were convicted for ties with the Kingdom Assembly of Iran’ – an organisation that seeks to bring back the Shah – while NA was convicted for ties with the People's Mujahideen, an exiled opposition group. It is unclear whether Zamani [see paragraph above] is the ‘MZ’ mentioned by ISNA [Iranian Student’s News Agency].” [55] NA was subsequently identified as Nasser Abdolhosseini. “Abdolhosseini was sentenced to death for belonging to the exiled Mujahedin Khalq Organization, considered a terrorist organization by Iran. But that charge has been fiercely rejected by Abdolhosseini's brothers Mojtaba and Nader Abdolhosseini, who say Nasser has never been involved in politics.” (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty) 17 October 2009) [42g]
15.34 The same Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty article reported that a fourth person, believed to be student Hamed Ruhinejad, faced the death penalty:
“…after being convicted of ’moharebeh,’ or waging war against God… Ruhinejad has been charged with being member of a little-known monarchist group, the ‘The Assembly of Kingdom.’ Three members of the group were executed several months ago after being convicted over a 2008 bombing in Shiraz. In a letter posted by Iranian news websites, Ruhinejad has said he has no connection with The Assembly of Kingdom, or any other group, and didn't have anything to do with the June vote and the unrest that followed.” [42g]
SAVAK
15.35 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment, Iran, Security and Foreign Forces, updated 23 January 2009, stated that:
“The MOIS, initially better known by the acronym SAVAMA (Ministry of Intelligence and National Security; Sazman-e Ettela'at va Amniat-e Melli-e Iran), is the successor to SAVAK (National Intelligence and Security Organisation; Sazeman-e Ettela'at va Amniyat-e Keshvar), the intelligence agency that operated under the Shah and which was dissolved in 1979 at the time of the Islamic revolution. Senior officials of SAVAK were executed after the Khomeini regime took power. However, some analysts believe it is likely that former SAVAK personnel were employed in the new agency, because of their intimate knowledge of left-wing groups and Iraq's Baath Party. During the 1981-88 Iran-Iraq war, an intense rivalry developed between the agency and the Intelligence Directorate of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). It was decided that the IRGC would continue to maintain its own intelligence directorate. While SAVAK operated largely outside government control, it was decided that the MOIS would operate as part of the mainstream civil service apparatus, as a government ministry.” [125e] (Security and Foreign Forces)
See also Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and Vezarat-e Ettela’at va Amniat-e Keshvar (VEVAK) aka Ettela’at.
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Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI, also DPIK)
15.36 The Human Rights Watch (HRW) report Iran: Freedom of Expression and Association in the Kurdish Ardebil Regions dated 9 January 2009, stated that:
“Left-leaning Kurdish activists formed the Komala Party in Mahabad in the 1940s. In July 1945, Komala changed its name to the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI). Since 1984 the party has been based in Iraq. In 1991, the KDPI called off its armed activities in Iran, although its ‘self-defense units’ have clashed with Iranian troops during Iranian military incursions into Iraqi Kurdistan. According to KDPI leaders, the party does not carry out armed operations inside Iran, a position that Mostafa Hejri, secretary-general of the KDPI reaffirmed as recently as July 2008.” [8h]
15.37 Jane’s Sentinel, dated 23 January 2009, stated that the party is called the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (DPIK) and that it was founded in 1945 with Mustafa Hijri elected Secretary General in July 2004. [125c] (Non-state Armed Groups)
15.38 The Danish Immigration Service Report 2009 stated that:
“… being in possession of a CD, a pamphlet or something similar made by the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), Komala or other Kurdish organisations, may be considered as an act against national security. This form of persecution for political activities is a problem all over Iran. However, the authorities are watching Kurdish areas and Tehran more carefully than other areas.” [86b] (p9)
15.39 Freedom House in its Freedom in the World 2008 report, released July 2008, noted that: “Kurdish opposition groups suspected of separatist aspirations, such as the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI), are brutally suppressed.” [112c]
15.40 The Chatham House Middle East Programme Briefing Paper, The Kurdish Policy Imperative, dated December 2007, stated that:
“Iranian Kurdish parties have also consistently fractured and there have been major splits in both the KDPI and Komala since early 2007. In December 2006 a significant number of members in the KDPI broke away, renaming themselves KDP (removing ‘Iran’ from the name of the Party and returning to the original name as established in1945). The change of name not only distinguishes the new party from the old but also relates to its more broadly nationalist approach.” [73a] (p7)
See Ethnic groups, Kurds
Komala
15.41 The Human Rights Watch (HRW) report dated 9 January 2009 noted that “Left-leaning Kurdish activists formed the Komala Party in Mahabad in the 1940s. In July 1945, Komala changed its name to the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI).” [8h] The same HRW report also referred to a second organisation named Komala being formed after the first changed its name to the KDPI:
“After the 1979 revolution, another left-leaning movement, also calling itself Komala, took up arms against the central government in an attempt to gain Kurdish independence. Komala unilaterally laid down its arms in the 1990s. According to Hassan Rahmanpanah, a member of Komala’s central committee, the group did so after realizing that government authorities were using the existence of an armed opposition as an excuse for suppressing the peaceful work of a range of activists.
“The Iranian government has not since alleged any armed activities by Komala members or sympathizers.” [8h]
15.42 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment, Iran, Non-State Armed Groups, updated 23 January 2009, stated that the full name is the Kurdish Communist Party of Iran otherwise known as Komaleh, Komala lidni Kurdistan (Council on Rebirth of Kurdistan) or Komalay Shoreshgeri Zahmatkeshani Kurdistani Iran (the Revolutionary Organisation of the Toilers of Kurdistan). [125c]
15.43 Jane’s continued: “Komala should not be confused with Komala Islami Kurdistan (Islamic Society of Kurdistan), an Islamist group based in northern Iraq which was the target of US cruise missile attacks during the Iraq military campaign in 2003.” [125c] (Non-state Armed Groups)
15.44 Jane’s also noted that:
“As an independent Marxist group Komala aims to establish a social system based on social justice and equality. It strives to end oppression and to achieve autonomy for Iranian Kurds. While the group aims to secure the right of self-determination it also seeks changes in the existing status quo of Iranian politics at large. These changes include the separation of religion from the state, freedom of speech and assembly, equality of nationalities, an end to bureaucratic interference by the central government, devolution of power and expulsion of government forces from Iranian Kurdistan. The organisation also advocates the linking up of the Kurdish people's struggle for independence with social justice for the working people of Iran. It raises questions such as the quest for economic improvement, of gender-based political and social inequalities and of farmers vis-à-vis landowners. Komala's struggle also aims at obtaining the support of mass institutions such as trade unions, youth and women's organisations and the expression of the popular will through local councils. Essentially, Komala officially presses for the unqualified political freedoms and rights of workers… The official spokesperson and first secretary of Komala is Ebrahim Alizadeh. Komala has a central committee composed of 15 elected members and holds meetings every three months to discuss the work of the organisation.” [125c] (Non-state Armed Groups)
15.45 The Chatham House Middle East Programme Briefing Paper, The Kurdish Policy Imperative, dated December 2007, stated that “Iranian Kurdish parties have also consistently fractured and there have been major splits in both the KDPI and Komala since early 2007…In October 2007 a number of Komala’s leading figures broke away to form ‘Komala – the faction of reform and development’. In both cases there were physical clashes among the followers of the various factions.” [73a] (p7)
The Chatham House Briefing Paper of December 2007 gives further historical information on Kurdish political parties in Iran and may be accessed directly:

http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/10685_bp1207kurds.pdf