FINANCING OF THE TERRORIST ORGANISATION ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAQ AND THE LEVANT (ISIL)
2015
23
Case Studies 5 and 6: Use of tax refunds to fund foreign terrorist fighters
(
5)
In March 2013, Jonathan Paul Jimenez was sentenced to 10 years in prison for making a false
statement to a federal agency in a matter involving international terrorism, and conspiring to
defraud the US Government by submitting a false income tax return in 2010. Jimenez was training
to become an FTF and began making preparations to participate in violent extremism overseas. On
the return, Jimenez falsely claimed three children of the co-conspirator as his dependents and
falsely represented that he lived with each of the three children for all of 2010. As a result of those
false representations, Jimenez obtained a refund from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in the
amount of 5,587 USD.
(6)
In June 2014, Michael Todd Wolfe pleaded guilty to attempting to provide material support to a
Foreign Terrorist Organisation, namely, ISIL. Wolfe allegedly planned to travel to the Middle East to
provide his services to radical groups engaged in armed conflict in Syria. Wolfe and his family
expected a tax refund of around 5,000 USD which they planned to use to fund their travel expenses.
Wolfe planned to first fly to Europe before traveling to Syria through Turkey, but was arrested at the
airport in Texas when he attempted to board an international flight to Denmark.
IRS-Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI) has implemented administrative procedures to quickly identify
and stop the processing of fraudulent claims for tax refunds, regardless of the amount involved in a
fraud scheme. By detecting and preventing large and small fraudulent refund schemes, the flow of
funds intended for illicit purposes can be significantly limited. IRS-CI’s role in the fight against
terrorism is similar to its role in all financial investigations which is to follow the money and
collaborate with other federal agencies in terrorist financing investigations.
Source: United States
A larger global terrorism risk exists with returning FTFs or those individuals who were not allowed
to travel to become a FTF. Knowledge of the financing aspects of returned fighters is often not
known due to the limited number of fighters returning back to their home country. It is difficult to
assess which of these returning fighters or lone actors have been acting or gaining support under
the direction of others. Any potential TF risks related to returning FTFs will need to be explored
further.
Case Study 7: Continued Access to bank accounts by FTFs
According to sensitive financial information, terrorist financing risks were discovered regarding
foreign cash withdrawals via ATMs that were made in areas located near territories where ISIL
operates by unknown individuals. These withdrawals were taken from US-based bank accounts
using a check card. Another terrorist financing risk identified was the existence of large deposits
into bank accounts followed by immediate foreign cash withdrawals in areas located near to
territories where ISIL operates. This information reveals the terrorism financing risks posed by the
continued ability of the individuals who are believed to have travelled to areas occupied by ISIL to
reach their bank accounts in their home countries.
Source: United States
FINANCING OF THE TERRORIST ORGANISATION ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAQ AND THE LEVANT (ISIL)
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2015
5. FUNDRAISING THROUGH MODERN COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
While key players in terrorist networks may be identified by the international community as
terrorists, many of the lower-level, tenuously-connected contributors to terrorist networks remain
unknown. These low-level contributors, prompted by group actions which mimic popularized
crowdfunding strategies have become another source of financing and physical resources for ISIL.
Most of the social media platforms that are named throughout this report are unintentionally
providing an effective method for terrorist groups and their sympathizers to exploit this technology
for terrorist financing purposes. It should be stressed that it is not the company itself that is actively
contributing to ISIL, and that many of these companies work with competent authorities to shut
these accounts down.
As an organisation, ISIL has a propaganda arm called the Al-Itisam Establishment for Media
Production and a newly established Al Hayat Media Center outlet, specifically targeting the West by
playing on regional sentiments.
54
Al Hayat Media Center is predominantly focused on the
distribution of ISIL propaganda via social media platforms, controlling dozens of social media
accounts related to the group.
55
Through such accounts, ISIL was able to maximize its ability to go
“viral” to gain wide range support by generating a “Twitter storm” on June 18, 2014.
56
A “Twitter
storm” is the epitome of internet popularity, creating an opportunity to gain immense support and
potential funding.
The development of a Twitter campaign like #AlleyesonISIS and a mobile android phone application
free for public download are signs of ISIL’s growing technological savvy.
57
Advertised as a way to
keep up with ISIL-related news and content distributed by ISIL itself, “The Dawn of Glad Tidings”
app strategically tweets varied content. The “Twitter storm” during ISIL’s summer offensive,
resulting in 40,000 tweets in one day, was due to apps like “The Dawn of Glad Tidings” and a viral
contagion furthered by Twitter accounts like @ActiveHashtags that tweet the day’s highest trending
tags.
58
As a result of its campaign and hashtags such as #ISIS and #Islamicfront, ISIL overtook
Jabhat Al Nusra on social media in the summer of 2014 with respect to the number of followers.
59
ISIL’s presence on the internet and social media has allowed it generate
and convert international
support into tangible funds.
Case Study 8: Fundraising through the Internet
Intelligence information indicates that some individuals associated with ISIL have called for
donations via Twitter and have asked the donors to contact them through Skype. The donors would
be asked to buy an international prepaid card (e.g., a credit for a mobile line or to purchase an
54
Gertz, B. (2014).
55
Bleiberg, J., and West, D.M. (2014).
56
Maher, S., and Carter, J. (2014).
57
Della Ratta, D. (2014).
58
Berger, J.M. (2014).
59
Id.; Berger, J.M. (2014).