Counterplans General Stuff

AT: Russia Expansion

Russia is increasing military in the Arctic but it is slow and modest

Le Mière and Mazo 13 -- Senior Research Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and IISS Consulting Senior Fellow for Environmental Security and Science Policy and Consulting Editor, Survival (Christian* and Jeffrey**, “Arctic Opening: Insecurity and Opportunity,” Adelphi Series 53:440, Taylor and Francis Online)BC

Russian activity in the Arctic has also increased. In August 2007, Moscow renewed long-range aviation patrols to the Atlantic and the Pacific, and over the Arctic, oceans. Strategic bomber flights along the Norwegian coast increased from just 14 in 2006 to 97 in 2008; although the number declined in subsequent years, it rose to over 55 in 2012.16 In March 2013, two Tu-22M3 Backfire bombers and four Su-27 multi-role aircraft flew within 20 miles of Sweden’s borders; the failure of the Swedish Air Force to scramble in response to the night-time exercises led to searing media criticism.17 Surface naval patrols also returned Downloaded by [141.213.236.110] at 13:51 07 July 2014 The Arctic as a theatre of military operations | 87 to Arctic waters for the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union in 2008.18 The Russian military has therefore recovered somewhat from the dire circumstances of the post-Cold War environment, but it is equally struggling to deal with the legacy of a lack of investment in its equipment. The recapitalisation of its fleet is on the surface a concern for neighbouring states, but it is occurring from a very low base of capability. Equally, the focus on smaller vessels will, for the foreseeable future, benefit organisations beyond the Northern Fleet. In line with this military rejuvenation, Moscow has touted the need to increase its military presence in the Arctic, but the force posture announced thus far is modest. The primary change in the next few years will be a renovation of the SSBN fleet, a factor that underlines the strategic importance of the Arctic but does not suggest state-based military competition in the region on a significant scale. It seems, therefore, presumptive to call the Russian defence modernisation a militarisation of the Arctic, particularly as current activity remains a shadow of that seen in the Cold-War era.

AT: SCS

SQ solves South China Sea conflict – cooperation now

Lutfia 7/1/12 (Ismira Lutfia, staff writer, Jakarta Globe, “China Dispute Over South China Sea on Asean Agenda,” http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/china-dispute-over-south-china-sea-on-asean-agenda/527712 )

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations and China have formulated a draft code of conduct regarding the potentially resource-rich area. Competing claims over the sea are expected to be the source of heated debate at the July 9-13 Asean foreign ministerial meeting in Cambodia. “From early on, Indonesia thinks that this is a polemic that should have never occurred,” Marty said. “The COC is designed to be a conflict-prevention instrument. Indonesia will test whether this COC is authoritative enough. … We need to test this to ensure the COC is feasible and clearly defines steps taken in the event of an incident and its report mechanism.”

EXT: Can’t Solve Conflict

Coast Guard cant deter conflict

Hughes 12 – ASA Branch Chief @ US Coast Guard (Timothy, “Deterrence and the US Coast Guard”) Google Scholar. http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Steven_Hall6/publication/235955764_Deterrence_and_the_United_States_Coast_Guard_Enhancing_Current_Practice_with_Performance_Measures/file/e0b49514b9af853454.pdf//Laura T

Deterrence displaces or delays unwanted behavior. More ambitiously, deterrence aims to permanently discourage an individual or individuals from such behavior. It operates through the prospect of pain or pleasure. Fear of future pain and hope of future pleasure influence choices, habits, and predilections. Individuals seek to avoid pain and maximize pleasure. Expectations of pain and pleasure will vary, but given an individual’s or group’s specific sensibilities a pattern of pain-minimization and pleasure-maximization persists.¶ An effective deterrence strategy rewards “good behavior” and punishes “bad behavior.”¶ Interviews with personnel from each of the six core Coast Guard programs and the Maritime Awareness function were conducted for this study. The interviews found an absence of any consistent Coast Guard definition of deterrence. Yet this study observed that the Coast Guard is often an effective practitioner of deterrence, regularly using the prospect of pain and pleasure to achieve its mission.¶ Its effectiveness is anchored in a multifaceted approach to safety, stewardship, and security in maritime communities. The Coast Guard is also effective in customizing its approach to particular communities or sub-groups within a community to deter unwanted behavior.¶ But the Coast Guard has not adopted an explicit data-informed strategy of deterrence. As a result Coast Guard practice and outcomes are uneven, measurement is not possible, and continual improvement is accordingly difficult. The effectiveness of Coast Guard practice is limited by the absence of an organizing theory, systematic process, and measures of performance.

EXT: Conflict Turn

Increasing US access causes influx of corporate interest – the US will militarize and raise tension - This causes great power war

Backus 12 - Principal member of technical staff at Sandia National Laboratories and uses behavioral and physical simulation methods to access security risks associated with climate change (George Backus “Arctic 2030: What are the consequences of climate change? The US response,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists July/August 2012 vol. 68 no. 4 9-16) zabd

Because no entity, other than perhaps the Russian government, has the military bases and means to accommodate area-wide protection and enforcement needs, the United States will necessarily have to maintain strong cooperative arrangements with nations and corporations for the coordinated, safe, and secure use of Arctic resources. Although the Arctic nations themselves may strive for cooperation, entanglement with corporations and other foreign entities will assuredly produce tensions that are outside the domain of the US Coast Guard.

Right now, the US military position in the Arctic is problematic. Both the Northern Command and the European Command have responsibility for what, in a cooperative multinational environment, is a single area (Carafano et al., 2011; Carmen et al., 2010). Some analysts argue that NATO should play the coordinating role in the Arctic (Conley, 2012), but such a path would create new tensions among the national players, and it does not resolve the specific position of the United States in the Arctic (Wezeman, 2012).

The United States asserts that it has power projection and strategic deterrence capabilities in the Arctic because of its submarine, missile, and airborne assets (Defense Department, 2011). But security events in the Arctic may be largely associated with expensive commercial assets populated by civilians and monitored or escorted by foreign government representatives. Fighter jets and torpedoes have no role to play in such confrontations. A naval presence is required, with personnel who can board and secure the facility, as necessary. In general, the US Defense Department lacks the naval resources to maintain sea control for these situations. If non-Arctic countries set a precedent—even simply through prospecting surveys or shipping activity—their case for limiting the unresolved sovereignty rights of the Arctic nations is strengthened. Corporations necessarily engage in such activities, and it is natural for commercial ventures to test the boundaries of their franchises. But in a more negative sense, there is also the fear that access to a relatively unmonitored Arctic may offer an alternative location for companies to dispose of toxic waste.

In assessing US security needs in the Arctic, the question to ask is not “What are the security risks when the Arctic opens?” but rather “How will security risks evolve as the geopolitical and economic expansion play out?” The physical speed with which the Arctic changes will determine the gap between reality and expectations. For example, the more Russia, China, or South Korea experience significant benefit from Arctic activities—to the point where they expect and depend on the growth from those activities—the more likely that a period where the Arctic again becomes environmentally inhospitable, or that the rules of sovereignty change to limit access, or that commercialization of the region will cause political strains from lost revenue or prestige.

Abrupt changes in expectations and in a nation’s ability to cope with changing circumstances appear to be factors that can trigger conflict (Agency for International Development, 2009). If the early international relations dynamics in the Arctic move fairly slowly, all parties could co-evolve toward balanced positions with relatively little conflict. Rapid dynamics could raise tensions. If all nations sustain approximately equal positive or negative repercussions from changes in Arctic regulations or climatic conditions, or they all believe they could limit the pace and extent of negative impacts through negotiation, routine diplomatic processes could mollify tensions. Climate change will, however, produce an ever-shifting playing field that heightens tensions among countries more concerned with relative rather than absolute advantage in the area.

Will events in the Arctic require US military responses before 2030? The consideration of uncertainty is part of climate and economic forecasting (Hendry and Ericsson, 2001; Meehl et al., 2007), and uncertainty is a mainstay of military planning: The adversary seldom announces battle plans prior to engagement. Military preparedness hinges not on best estimates, but on uncertainties that reflect risks the nation wants managed. From the vantage point of the present, the best estimate is that the Arctic of the near future will be free of military conflict. Risk, however, is the combination of probability (uncertainty) and consequence. Lower-probability, high-consequence events generally contribute more to risk than the best estimate. They are consequently much more relevant to national security planning than high-probability, routine-consequence conditions.

Perceived economic accessibility to the Arctic and commercial success in the Arctic change the conditional probabilities; they increase the odds that a sequence of events that leads to conflict will materialize. It would be foolhardy to disregard the risks that low-probability, high-consequence events imply. An unexpected confluence of vessels and aircraft being in the wrong place, when Arctic weather conditions prevent adequate communications, could lead to tense situations, unless national security forces have the ability to readily manage the situation.