Counterplans General Stuff

EXT: Cooperation Solves

Coop now

Newsweek, 14 (“As the World Warms, Navy Strategists Plan for an Arctic Rush” 5/9, proquest)//DH

But even if there are challenges, there are also tailwinds making the Navy's life easier. The Arctic remains one of the few areas where international cooperation is the norm rather than the exception. The region is governed through the Arctic Council, a forum in which Arctic states and interested observers iron out issues involving the region, from environmental protection to border disputes. When Russia planted a flag on the North Pole in 2007, many commentators speculated that it would launch a series of land grabs in the world's least hospitable region. It never came to pass.

Military-military cooperation abounds, too. U.S. naval officers engage in training exercises with Russian and Norwegian counterparts. The navies of Arctic countries share information and expertise on science and cartography. Even as tensions have flared between Russia and the United States in recent weeks over Ukraine, relations remain good on Arctic issues. "Russia does want to be a partner with the other Arctic states," says Rear Admiral Jonathan White. "We're not seeing anything to be concerned about."

The reason, according to White and independent Arctic analysts, comes back to money. "All the Arctic nations have things to gain, with additional access to resources, trade routes, fishing and tourism," White says. "I'm optimistic that we can do it together. But just like any other ocean in the world, we have to be ready."

Existing dispute resolution solves

Brigham, 10 - Distinguished Professor of Geography & Arctic Policy at the University of Alaska Fairbanks (Lawson, “THINK AGAIN: THE ARCTIC” Foreign Policy, SEPT. / OCT. 2010,

http://generalpaperpress.wordpress.com/2012/02/06/313/

Maybe not, but many countries are looking at the Arctic today with fresh eyes. Because of climate change, the Arctic Ocean’s summer ice cover is now half of what it was 50 years ago. In recent years, Russian and Canadian armed forces have staged Cold War-style exercises in the far north, and in the summer of 2009 a pair of German merchant ships conducted voyages across the relatively ice-free waters of the Northeast Passage, the long-dreamed-of trade route from Europe to Asia. And maybe the only thing heating up faster than the Arctic Ocean is the hyperbole over what’s under it. “Without U.S. leadership to help develop diplomatic solutions to competing claims and potential conflicts,” scholar Scott G. Borgerson wrote in Foreign Affairs in 2008, “the region could erupt in an armed mad dash for its resources.”

It could — but it won’t. Anarchy does not reign at the top of the world; in fact, it’s governed in a manner not unlike the rest of the planet. The region’s land borders — shared by Canada, Denmark (which controls Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States — are all set and uncontested. Several maritime boundaries do remain under dispute, most notably those between Canada and the United States in the Beaufort Sea and between Canada and Denmark in Baffin Bay. But progress has been made recently in resolving even the thorniest disagreements: In April, after 40 years of negotiating, Norway and Russia were able to forge an equitable deal for a new boundary in the Barents Sea, a continental-shelf area rich in fisheries and oil and gas reserves.

What about the part of the Arctic where sovereignty remains unresolved: the seafloor that Chilingarov tried to claim? Despite being covered with ice for much of the year, the Arctic Ocean is governed much like the rest of the world’s oceans — by a maritime treaty that has been ratified by all the Arctic countries except the United States, which generally abides by its terms anyway.

Chilingarov’s flag gambit was a clever bid for attention, but not much more than that. Although the resources of the Arctic seabed are likely to be partitioned among the five countries that could plausibly claim them, it won’t be on a first-come-first-served basis. The world has learned a lot since the resource and land grabs of earlier centuries; for the most part, the only scuffles over borders and oil fields today are in regions that are badly destabilized already.

Economic interests and existing coop prevent war

Brigham, 10 - Distinguished Professor of Geography & Arctic Policy at the University of Alaska Fairbanks (Lawson, “THINK AGAIN: THE ARCTIC” Foreign Policy, SEPT. / OCT. 2010,

http://generalpaperpress.wordpress.com/2012/02/06/313/

“Conflict Is Inevitable in the Arctic.”

No, it isn’t. The Arctic has been a geopolitical flashpoint before: During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union faced off directly in the region. But that was then. Today’s Arctic is governed by eight developed states that arguably cooperate more than they have at any other period in history. International collaboration in scientific research, for instance, is at record levels in the Arctic today.

The looming Arctic resource boom doesn’t threaten this stability — it reinforces it. States such as Norway and Russia have much to lose economically from Arctic conflict, as do the many non-Arctic countries and multinational corporations that will be among the eventual investors in, and consumers of, future Arctic ventures. No one is contesting anyone else’s sovereignty in the region; in fact, the Arctic might one day play host to the emergence of a new sovereign state, Greenland, with the support and encouragement of Denmark, its long-time colonial ruler.

This isn’t to say that saber rattling hasn’t happened and won’t happen again in the future. Canada, Norway, and Russia have conducted military and naval operations in the region to showcase their capabilities and demonstrate their sovereignty. (The United States has been more modest in this regard, though the U.S. Navy last fall did release a “roadmap” for the Arctic, emphasizing the need for military readiness in the far north.) NATO’s role in the Arctic is uncertain and unfocused — five Arctic states are members, but three (Sweden, Finland, Russia) are not — and the organization could go a long way toward reducing tension and building trust in the Arctic by promoting cooperation on matters of military security, law enforcement, and counterterrorism there.

But none of this friction is beyond the realm of diplomacy. Even Chilingarov, the flag-wielding champion of Russian northern expansionism, understands the virtues of negotiation. When he met Chuck Strahl, Canada’s minister of northern affairs, in June, the first thing he reportedly did was invite his would-be adversary to a conference-called “The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue” — scheduled for this September in Moscow. The two countries’ representatives have since trumpeted their thawing relations in the Arctic, meeting regularly and even discussing plans to work together on mapping the seafloor where Chilingarov planted the Russian standard. The lesson is clear enough: The world has plenty of regions where serious conflict is a way of life already. Let’s worry about them first.

Cooperation is far more likely in the Arctic – combat is too difficult

Stavridis, 13 - Former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO; US retired Admiral (James, “High North or High Tension?” Foreign Policy, 10/21, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/10/21/high_north_or_high_tension_arctic_competition) //DH

Canadian General Walt Natynczyk, the former chief of Canada's armed forces, was once asked what his response would be if the Canadian Arctic was ever invaded. With a very slight twinkle in his eye he said, "If someone was foolish enough to attack us in the High North, my first duty would be search and rescue."

Good humor aside, the general's point is reasonably well taken. The likelihood of a conventional offensive military operation in the Arctic is very low, despite some commentators' overheated rhetoric. While there are many diplomatic and ecological challenges, the odds are good that the international community will eventually find its way to a true zone of cooperation around the Arctic Circle and manage to avoid turning the region -- the last frontier on Earth -- into a zone of needless conflict. But there are issues that must be addressed as competition rises in the High North if we are to avoid high tension.

Cooperation is inevitable – disputes will be settled and the council is effective

Petroleum Economist ’14 – journal on energy and power (“The Arctic land grab”, April 2014, ProQuest) //J.N.E

Icy Cooperation

Yet in the Arctic, cooperation is winning the day. Rather than fuelling conflict, the region's riches have pulled the Arctic nations together. When Russia sent a pair of submarines to plant its flag on the seabed at the North Pole in August 2007, a potential provocation that could have escalated tension, the move was widely dismissed by other Arctic nations.

"This isn't the 15th century," Peter MacKay, Canada's foreign minister at the time, said. "You can't go around the world and just plant flags and say, 'We're claiming this territory'."

The eight Arctic nations - Russia, Canada, the US, Denmark (via Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Norway, Iceland, Sweden and Finland - have come together under several international organisations that provide a legal framework for cooperation.

The most contentious issue in the Arctic is how to draw up the region's borders. To do so, the Arctic countries have largely committed to using the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos) treaty to settle its conflicting territorial claims.

Under Unclos, each country has exclusive economic rights, including the right to drill for oil and gas, in waters up to 200 nautical miles from its coastline. These borders are largely settled, though there are disputed island claims that complicate matters.

However, a country can extend its territorial claim further afield, up to 350 nautical miles, by showing that its continental shelf stretches beyond 200 nautical miles.

Most Arctic nations have claimed such extensions. But figuring out precisely where certain geological structures end and begin can be a tricky business. Compounding the problem is the region's sketchy cartography.

The result is that Unclos has been left with a dizzying array of overlapping territorial claims to disentangle. The Lomonosov Ridge, which is thought to hold significant oil deposits, comes with the most controversy.

A section of the 1,700 km long underwater ridge that sits atop the North Pole is claimed as sovereign continental shelf by Russia, Canada and Greenland. The US, on the other hand, has argued that Lomonosov is an independent geological feature beyond the sovereign claim of any nation.

Unclos will rely on soil samples, mapping and other data from the area submitted by the countries themselves to try to determine the rightful claim.

The Russian government says the point of its trip to the North Pole seabed was not to stake a claim to territory but to gather soil samples and other geological data to bolster its case under Unclos.

Staking claims

Contested areas of the Arctic are scattered around the region. Canada and the US have a long-standing border dispute over a large section of the Beaufort Sea. Canada and Denmark have never settled their disputed claims to the tiny Hans Island, a barren and unpopulated rock in the Kennedy Channel, which separates Ellesmere Island in Canada's north and Greenland.

The countries have engaged in tit-for-tat flag plantings on the rocky outcropping for years. Norway has put forward claims to exclusive economic zone and continental shelf territory six times the size of the Norwegian mainland, including overlapping claims with Iceland, Denmark and Russia. Every Arctic nation has some sort of competing territorial claim with Russia.

For now those disputes are being sorted out not by generals armed with battle plans, but lawyers brandishing geological surveys and soil samples.

It will take many years for the process to run its course, though. In the meantime, many disputes could be settled in bilateral negotiations, particularly in those areas where countries are keen to start oil and gas exploration. Russia and Norway finally reached a deal over their disputed maritime border - and the seabed - in the Barents Sea in 2010.

The Arctic Council, an inter-governmental body, has proved to be another effective forum for cooperation on Arctic issues.

It was founded in 1996 and has become an increasingly robust international bureaucracy, developing joint initiatives on a range of environmental, social and commercial activities, from protecting indigenous communities to oil-spill response.

Cooperation, though, has its limits. An agreement similar to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty is not in the cards. Before that treaty, a number of countries had made overlapping claims to parts of Antarctica, similar to today's situation in the Arctic. But the treaty set aside those claims and established a shared governance structure for the region, while also discouraging military and industrial activity in favour of scientific research. In the North, countries are pursuing strategies clearly aimed at maximising their slice of the Arctic.

Russia, more than any other country, has pinned its fortunes on developing the Arctic and sees itself as an Arctic power. "For Russia, the Arctic is our home and our future; we are by far the largest Arctic nation and for this reason alone we bear a special responsibility for the state of affairs in the Arctic," Anton Vasiliev, Russia's most senior Arctic official, said recently.

Energy is at the centre of Russia's Arctic strategy. Nearly half the Arctic's oil and gas resources are thought to lie in Russian territory. National oil companies Rosneft and Gazprom have signed joint exploration deals with ExxonMobil, Statoil and BP. The government is also keen to push ahead with gas development in the Arctic.

The government has broken Gazprom's long-standing gas export monopoly to allow Novatek and France's Total to move ahead with the Yamal liquefied natural gas (LNG) project.

Built on the Yamal peninsula's permafrost and under constant threat from ice floes, it is one of the most technically complex LNG projects in the world. Newly passable Arctic sea routes are crucial to getting that gas to lucrative Asian markets.

Canada takes the reins

Under prime minister Stephen Harper, Canada has taken a far more aggressive line on its sovereignty over the Arctic.

In December 2013, the Harper government made Canada's claim to the North Pole official in claiming the Lomonosov Ridge at Unclos. "Canada has a choice when it comes to defending our sovereignty over the Arctic: either we use it or we lose it," Harper said early in his term. "And make no mistake, this government intends to use it."

Click here to view map

Despite Harper's hard talk, action has been slow to follow. After pledging when he took office to build three large icebreakers to help Canada operate more effectively in the Arctic, ambitions have been scaled back.

Just one vessel has been ordered and it is still years from delivery. Harper also pledged to build a naval base at Canada's only Arctic deep-water port in Nanisivik. Nearly seven years after the announcement little has come of the plan. Nor has the country moved aggressively to explore its Arctic oil and gas resources. Chevron, Statoil and Repsol have carried out some initial exploration activity in the Beaufort Sea, but no drilling has been planned.

The US is an outlier in the Arctic. While other nations have moved aggressively to claim territory and bolster their capabilities in the Arctic, the US has been left behind. That is at least partly because staunch opposition from conservative congressional Republicans to Unclos has prevented the US from signing onto the treaty.

Agreeing to the treaty, they argue, would be an unacceptable sacrifice of US sovereignty - along the lines implied by former president Ronald Reagan, who called it a "dramatic step towards world government".

In practice, successive US administrations have seemed to largely accept the Unclos framework for settling territorial disputes in the Arctic. The government has spent millions of dollars to prove that its continental shelf extends north of Alaska beyond the 200-mile exclusive economic zone.

And as other countries have stepped up activity to strengthen their Arctic claims with Unclos, opposition in Congress has softened. But if the US does not sign on to the treaty it risks being left out of the process as the Arctic's borders are drawn up. The US has a long history of Arctic oil and gas activity. Alaska's North Slope has been a prolific oil province for decades and a major supplier to the lower-48 states.

The government has also handed out a number of exploration licences in the Arctic Beaufort and Chukchi seas. Shell's difficult experience in the Arctic, though, has slowed momentum.

Outside actors are also shaping the future of the Arctic. China, not wanting to be left out of the action, has signed a major oil exploration deal with Iceland and is keen to play a role in new Arctic shipping routes. Non-Arctic countries are also keen to get a foot in the door at the Arctic Council. China, along with a number of others such as India, France, Germany, the UK, South Korea and Japan have joined as observers.

Non-governmental organisations are also getting involved in the region. The global environmental movement has sought to prevent oil and gas development and other industrial activities in the Arctic, arguing that the risks to the environment are too high.

None has been as provocative as Greenpeace. The group has hounded Shell over its Arctic exploration plans and taken direct action against drilling activities in Greenland and Russia.

In Russia, 30 Greenpeace activists were arrested and held for weeks after attempting to occupy the Gazprom-operated Prirazlomnaya platform in the Kara Sea. JJ

What is Unclos?

THE United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos) is an international treaty governing the world's oceans and its resources.

Unclos was opened for signing in 1982 and came into force in 1994. It has been ratified by more than 160 UN member states and is the pre-eminent international rulemaking body for issues related to the sea and maritime borders. It covers a wide range of economic, environmental, scientific and commercial activities related to the sea. The UN secretary general oversees Unclos.

Key terms of the treaty include: Coastal states may exercise complete sovereignty over seas extending 12 nautical miles from its shores; Coastal states have the right to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extending 200 nautical miles from its shores, where it can develop natural resources, carry out economic activity and regulate scientific research and environment protection; Coastal states have similar economic rights over their continental shelf. The continental shelf can extend as far as 350 nautical miles from its shore if it is determined to be a natural prolongation of the stateaEUR (TM)s sovereign territory; The rules for EEZs and continental shelf also apply to islands, but not rocks that could not sustain human habitation or economic life of their own; and Disputes can be submitted to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the International Court of Justice or to arbitration.

What is the Arctic Council?

The Arctic Council is a high-level inter-governmental forum established by the 1996 Ottawa Declaration to promote cooperation and coordination among Arctic states.

It is a voluntary organisation and its decrees do not carry the weight of international law, but it has become a key body for joint decision-making on issues related to the Arctic.

The Arctic Council is comprised of member states, permanent participants and observers. Member states are the founding Arctic nations: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the US; Permanent participants include indigenous groups such as the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Arctic Athabaskan Council and the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North; and Observers do not take part in decision-making, but they participate in Arctic council meetings. They include non-Arctic countries such as China, India, Germany, Japan and the UK, as well as other international non-governmental groups such as the UN Development Programme and WWF.

The Arctic Council's chairmanship rotates among member states every two years. Canada is the current chair, and the US will take over in 2015. Meetings with senior Arctic officials from member countries are held every six months and are hosted in the chair's country.

Initially focused on scientific and environmental issues, the Arctic Council has increasingly taken on security, geopolitical and economic matters.

It has carried out detailed studies on oil and gas and shipping activities in the Arctic and developed some guidelines and rules to regulate these activities.

Cooperation checks arctic conflict

Economist 12 – Cites Danish federal estimates (6-16-2012; “Too much to fight over” http://www.economist.com/node/21556797) zabd

Yet the risks of Arctic conflict have been exaggerated. Most of the Arctic is clearly assigned to individual countries. According to a Danish estimate, 95% of Arctic mineral resources are within agreed national boundaries. The biggest of the half-dozen remaining territorial disputes is between the United States and Canada, over whether the north-west passage is in international or Canadian waters, hardly a casus belli. Far from violent, the development of the Arctic is likely to be uncommonly harmonious, for three related reasons. One is the profit motive. The five Arctic littoral countries, Russia, the United States, Canada, Denmark and Norway, would sooner develop the resources they have than argue over those they do not have. A sign of this was an agreement between Russia and Norway last year to fix their maritime border in the Barents Sea, ending a decades-long dispute. The border area is probably rich in oil; both countries are now racing to get exploration started. Another spur to Arctic co-operation is the high cost of operating in the region. This is behind the Arctic Council's first binding agreement, signed last year, to co-ordinate search-and-rescue efforts. Rival oil companies are also working together, on scientific research and mapping as well as on formal joint ventures. The third reason for peace is equally important: a strong reluctance among Arctic countries to give outsiders any excuse to intervene in the region's affairs. An illustration is the stated willingness of all concerned to settle their biggest potential dispute, over their maritime frontiers, according to the international Law of the Sea (LOS). Even the United States accepts this, despite its dislike for treaties—though it has still not ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, an anomaly many of its leaders are keen to end.

Despite minor disputes, cooperation is occurring now and will continue to do so

Käpylä and Mikkola ’13 – Finnish Institute of International Affairs (Juha, Harri, “The Global Arctic”, August, FIIA BRIE FING PAPER 133) //J.N.E

New prospects are also attracting the attention of new players that are keen to tap into the economic potential and have a say in the way the region is accessed, exploited and governed, including China and the EU. The net effect of these – and other – developments is that the Arctic today is a global Arctic: it can no longer be perceived as a spatially or administratively confined region, but is instead taking on a new form and dynamics in the midst of contemporary global politics. While there are unresolved and contentious issues in the global Arctic (e.g. the status of maritime passages and extension of continental shelves) that may spark diplomatic disputes or even conflicts, the region is characterized by multilateral cooperation and governance. That said, there are divergent political interests to endorse Arctic multilateralism. Russia, for example, utilizes multilateralism to create a stable investment environment, whereas China relies on it to legitimately access Arctic affairs as a non-aggressive rising power and extra-Arctic state. While a traditionally reluctant Arctic player, the US currently sees Arctic multilateralism as the most prominent tool to establish its presence and promote its interests in the region within the framework of its general smart power strategy. The EU endorses multilateralism in its external policy – in general and in the Arctic – to present itself as a relevant global actor and a normative power in a situation where its global relevance is decreasing.

The globalization of the Arctic and the new focus on the economy will have various consequences in the region. Firstly, the focus on sustainable development in Arctic governance is likely to suffer from a sharper focus on the economy that favours environmentally challenging but globally interesting hydrocarbon extraction and maritime transport industries. Secondly, the indigenous people in the Arctic will most likely lose influence with the introduction of new major players into the Arctic governance. At the very least, it is unlikely that China, for example, would contribute to the enhancement of indigenous influence in Arctic affairs given its economic emphasis, interest in domestic stability, as well as its history with Chinese minorities.

Thirdly, new actors, interests and dynamics are bound to affect the traditional Arctic states. In general, the emergence of new major players will reduce, albeit with exceptions, the influence of traditional and especially small Arctic states. Yet, for some, the appearance of new major players may in fact be a boon. Iceland, for example, may stand to gain from increasing Chinese interest in the region by receiving direct foreign investments after its economic crisis. And lastly, Arctic governance is likely to turn more complex and complicated as the economic and political stakes are raised with the introduction of new global players in the region.

Arctic coop is high now

Grätz 12 - Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (Jonas Grätz, “The Arctic: Thaw With Conflict Potential,” International Relations and Security Network, July 2012, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Articles/Special-Feature/Detail/?lng=en&id=157901&contextid774=157901&contextid775=157922&tabid=1453469894) zabd

Prospects for cooperation Against the background of the changes in the Arctic, this region is occasionally identified as a potential area of future conflict. However, it is important first to point out that there is much scope for cooperation. This is particularly apparent when considering “soft” security concerns such as environmental pollution resulting from the extraction of raw materials. The threats that arise for humans from the exceptional climatic situations are pushing actors towards cooperative approaches, too. Many of these issues are taken on by the Arctic Council. Founded in 1996, the Council is a forum to promote coordination among the eight Arctic countries. Representatives of indigenous peoples have a consultative role. One concrete result of the Arctic Council is a binding agreement on maritime search and rescue activities. For 2013, an agreement on standards for oil spill preparedness and response is expected, which will reinforce the current non-binding offshore oil and gas guidelines. Cooperation among the littoral states is also advancing in the sensitive area of national sovereign rights. The 2010 border treaty between Russia and Norway indicates that bilateral agreements are possible – even though the power asymmetry between the two countries is reflected in a deal advantageous to Russia. International maritime law and the pressure of non-Arctic countries are also fostering multilateral cooperation, at least in areas where all parties can still gain further sovereign rights. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) allows for the extension of the continental shelf towards the North Pole, which would extend the mining privileges of the coastal states at the expense of the interests of non-Arctic states. The water column and the animals living in it, by contrast, would continue to enjoy international status. In the Ilulissat Declaration adopted in 2008, the coastal states declared their intention to settle any territorial conflicts within the framework of UNCLOS. By signing the declaration, the US – which has not ratified UNCLO S – has signalled its willingness to observe it within the Arctic. What is more, the coastal states have been collaborating for a long time in the exploration of the sea bed. Provided that there are no major conflicts among these countries, non- Arctic players will hardly be able to assert themselves in this context. Potential for conflict The scope of sovereign rights in the maritime area around the Svalbard archipelago, believed to be rich in oil and gas, is a question that is not easy to resolve. On the one hand, the archipelago and the surrounding 200-mile zone are an undisputed part of Norwegian territory. On the other hand, Norwegian sovereignty over the archipelago is substantially limited by the Svalbard Treaty of 1920. All 40 signatory countries have the right to exploit natural resources and to conduct research. The treaty also states that the archipelago must not be used for offensive military purposes. Likewise, the right to levy taxes is limited to the administrative requirements of Svalbard. It was only later under UNCLO S that the EEZ emerged as an institution. Hence, it remains unclear whether the Svalbard Treaty also applies to this zone. Countries such as Russia, Iceland, and the UK assume this to be the case. Norway takes the opposite view. Nevertheless, Oslo has not declared a full EEZ in this area, but established a fisheries protection zone instead. It concedes fishing privileges to Russia, Iceland, and other nations. This has never been explicitly acknowledged by these countries, but is usually accepted in practice. The modus vivendi has so far provided stability as it has served Russian interests too, with the fisheries protection zone granting privileges to Russian fishing interests over other signatory states. Moreover, Russia has sufficient oil and gas reserves at its disposal on its own territory. Norway, by contrast, has a strong interest in opening up the area for oil and gas exploration. Such an opening, however, would undermine the current fragile balance and encourage other signatory states to question openly the scope of the Treaty. Even if Norway were to take no action, other nations could try to push for an opening of the area for exploration with reference to the Treaty. Due to the variety of the players concerned and the absence of international rules, the issue can ultimately only be resolved at a political level.

Interests and positions diverge concerning the issue of sovereignty over the new sea routes as well. Again, even the Arctic coastal states do not agree on the legal status: Russia and Canada regard the routes as internal waterways in what is a very broad interpretation of UNCLO S. This implies that ships flying foreign flags must request permission for transit. Other coastal nations, such as the US, and non-Arctic players like the EU and presumably China, however, consider these to be international waterways for which no authorisation for transit is necessary.

For the time being, no escalation of this conflict is to be expected, since the commercial navigation routes are competing with non-Arctic sea routes and the use of these routes will correlate with the extent of their opening and the stability of the agreed arrangements. In addition, Russia and Canada depend on the cooperation of foreign non-state and state-owned players in order to attract investments in their inadequate coastal infrastructures. Also, the International Maritime Organisation is working on a binding Polar Code, which will establish clear rules for polar navigation. This will weaken the case for additional national regulations and approval procedures.

No Arctic Conflict—status quo cooperation solves

Kraska and Baker 2014 -- Mary Derrickson McCurdy visiting scholar at Duke University Marine Laboratory and senior fellow at the Center for Oceans Law and Policy, University of Virginia School of Law and associate professor of law and senior fellow for Oceans and Energy at the Institute for Energy and the Environment at Vermont Law School (James* and Betsy**, “Emerging Arctic Security Challenges,” Center for a New American Security Strategy, http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_EmergingArcticSecurityChallenges_policybrief.pdf)BC

Security It would be easy to become pessimistic about Arctic military stability; we are not. International conflict in the region is unlikely because the Arctic nations are committed to a rules-based approach to security. Worries about the potential for conflict over seabed rights in the Arctic are misplaced.6 War is far less likely above the Arctic Circle than in nearly any other part of the world.7 Cooperation is breaking out everywhere in the region; international law is followed; there is no political vacuum.8 While elsewhere Russia is exhibiting its propensity toward military displays, in the Arctic, Russia is playing a constructive role in maintaining regional stability. Russia is intently focused on regional security in part because it sees in the Arctic an opportunity to recapture the former influence and superpower standing that it enjoyed during the Cold War. Russia strategically and successfully takes advantage of its dominant geographic position surrounding 170 degrees of the Arctic Circle, and its energy and economic presence in the region dwarfs that of all other Arctic states combined. The United States and Russia enjoy a pragmatic working relationship in managing the security of the Bering Strait.9 The U.S. Coast Guard and Russian Border Patrol have cooperated for nearly two decades under a bilateral treaty to manage safety and security in the 53-mile-wide strait.10 The neighbors also jointly led negotiations among all eight Arctic states to adopt binding agreements on search and rescue and oil spill preparedness and response. Now the United States and Russia are leading efforts to adopt agreements on marine pollution prevention and marine scientific research in the region. The remoteness and physical isolation of the Arctic region also reduces military risk. Arctic states find comfort in their exclusive and shared geography. the region that might erode, let alone upend, the contemporary order. The one thing all Arctic states have in common is a rather circumspect view of states from outside the region that seek to play a greater role in the Arctic. Furthermore, all Arctic states are invested in a rules-based approach to stability and security, based principally on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).11 The consensus among Arctic states that UNCLOS is the framework for distribution of rights and duties in the region minimizes risk of conflict over maritime boundaries. Every Arctic nation is a party to the treaty except the United States, which, since 1983, has made a commitment to adhere to most provisions of the treaty.12 Finally, the likelihood of conflict breaking out over the region’s vast offshore resources is also remote since Arctic states are pursuing their maritime claims through the multilateral Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), an independent international technical body established by UNCLOS. Every Arctic coastal state except the United States has submitted at least partial information for consideration of a claim to sovereign rights over seabed riches of oil, gas and minerals. To the extent that overlapping maritime claims exist, the four other Arctic Ocean coastal states, including Russia, are proceeding with deliberate professionalism in appropriate bilateral forums and with the CLCS to resolve them.13 In 2010, Russia and Norway, for example, signed a treaty to resolve their 40-year disagreement over maritime resource boundaries in the Barents Sea. More recently, Denmark and Canada established maritime delimitation in the Lincoln Sea, northwest of Greenland. Similarly, Canada and the United States are exploring a way ahead to resolve a benign disagreement over a single boundary line in the Beaufort Sea.

Arctic disputes are being resolved peacefully in the status quo

Borgerson August 2013 -- International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, CEO at CargoMetrics and Cofounder, Arctic Circle (Scott, “The Coming Arctic Boom: As the Ice Melts, the Region Heats Up,” Foreign Affairs through ProQuest, http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/1411622848?pq-origsite=summon)BC

MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING Just a half decade ago, the scramble for the Arctic looked as if it would play out quite differently. In 2007, Russia planted its flag on the North Pole's sea floor, and in the years that followed, other states also jockeyed for position, ramping up their naval patrols and staking out ambitious sovereignty claims. Many observers-including me-predicted that without some sort of comprehensive set of regulations, the race for resources would inevitably end in conflict. "The Arctic powers are fast approaching diplomatic gridlock," I wrote in these pages in 2008, "and that could eventually lead to . . . armed brinkmanship." But a funny thing happened on the way to Arctic anarchy. Rather than harden positions, the possibility of increased tensions has spurred the countries concerned to work out their differences peacefully. A shared interest in profit has trumped the instinct to compete over territory. Proving the pessimists wrong, the Arctic countries have given up on saber rattling and engaged in various impressive feats of cooperation. States have used the 1982 un Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos)-even though the United States never ratified it-as a legal basis for settling maritime boundary disputes and enacting safety standards for commercial shipping. And in 2008, the five states with Arctic coasts-Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United States-issued the Ilulissat Declaration, in which they promised to settle their overlapping claims in an orderly manner and expressed their support for unclos and the Arctic Council, the two international institutions most relevant to the region. The Arctic powers have kept that promise. In 2010, Russia and Norway settled their long-running maritime boundary disagreement near the Svalbard Islands, and Canada and Denmark are now exploring a proposal to split Hans Island, an uninhabited rock they disputed for decades. In 2011, the Arctic countries signed a search-and-rescue agreement brokered under the auspices of the Arctic Council; this past April, they began working on an agreement to regulate commercial fishing; and this summer, they are finalizing plans for jointly responding to oil spills. Some Arctic countries are even sharing one another's icebreakers to map the seabed as part of a process, established under unclos, to demarcate their extended continental shelves. Although some sticking points remain-Ottawa and Washington, for instance, have yet to agree on whether the Northwest Passage constitutes a series of international straits or Canadian internal waters and where exactly their maritime boundary in the Beaufort Sea lies-the thorniest differences have been settled, and most that remain involve areas far offshore and concern the least economically relevant parts of the Arctic. None of this cooperation required a single new overarching legal framework. Instead, states have created a patchwork of bilateral and multilateral agreements, emanating from the Arctic Council and anchored firmly in unclos. By reaching an enduring modus vivendi, the Arctic powers have set the stage for a long-lasting regional boom.

Cooperation is prevalent in the Arctic

Le Mière and Mazo 1-13 -14 -- Senior Research Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and IISS Consulting Senior Fellow for Environmental Security and Science Policy and Consulting Editor, Survival (Christian* and Jeffrey**, “Arctic Opening: Insecurity and Opportunity,” Taylor and Francis Online)BC

The various militaries of the Arctic have, in fact, been more focused on cooperating and building nascent military–military relations than engaging in competitive procurement or gunboat diplomacy. Formal Arctic military cooperation in the post-Cold War era dates back to 1996, when the US, Russia and Norway signed an agreement on Arctic military environmental cooperation, which sought to prevent environmental harm to the region through military (and, in particular, nuclear) activities. Since 2010, Norway has held joint exercises with Russia, through the bilateral Pomor series, reflecting Oslo’s desire to build a more collaborative military–military relationship with Moscow even as it purchases high-end platforms and weapons. Exercise Northern Eagle has been an annual bilateral Russia–US exercise since 2004, but in 2008 it was expanded to include Norway. The second chiefs-of-defence meeting was held in Greenland in June 2013, bringing together the heads of the militaries or coastguards of all eight Arctic nations. The meeting was preceded by a message from Danish Chief of Defence General Peter Bartram, chair of the gathering, who noted that ‘we do not want to militarise the Arctic. Quite the opposite.’29 The meeting led to an agreement to expand maritime surveillance cooperation and joint military exercises. The US-sponsored, annual Arctic Security Forces roundtables also act as a form of confidence building in a region with little security architecture, a fact noted by the US DoD Arctic strategy, which focused heavily on international cooperation and burden sharing to enable objectives to be met with little cost or possibility of deterioration in relations. Putin himself, often seen as a belligerent voice of Russian nationalism, has highlighted the importance of cooperation in the Arctic and the fact that the region should not be seen as one of competition. Speaking in 2010, Putin suggested that the Arctic should be a ‘zone of peace and cooperation’, and that ‘all the problems existing in the Arctic ... can be resolved through an atmosphere of partnership’.30 Downloaded by [141.213.236.110] at 13:51 07 July 2014 The Arctic as a theatre of military operations | 97 Given the potential riches to be gained from the opening of the Arctic, Moscow is indeed eager to ensure a stable High North that would allow for the continuous and safe economic exploitation of the Arctic. As Yevgeny Lukyanov, a deputy secretary of the Russian Security Council, noted in January 2013, ‘Russia needs to cooperate with other Arctic states in strengthening and defending its Arctic borders and in monitoring transportation routes.’31 As such, Russia has been encouraged to seek collaborative solutions to problems in the region, such as the 2010 Barents Sea agreement between Russia and Norway that was the result of 40 years of negotiation over maritime delimitation of potentially hydrocarbon- rich waters. Russia’s desire to utilise the Arctic for commercial purposes means that Moscow is more likely to perceive collaboration as in its interests. The monitoring of traffic through different EEZs along the NEP, for example, would necessitate coordination among constabulary agencies and information sharing. The fact that NATO has strenuously avoided competition with Russia in the Arctic also reflects this dynamic (as well as the desire of NATO members such as Canada to avoid internationalisation of the region). Although Oslo has encouraged a greater NATO presence there through the Cold Response invitational exercises it has hosted since 2006, the organisation has explicitly stated that it will not maintain a permanent presence in the High North. After announcing that NATO would not have a direct presence in the Arctic in May 2013, Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen noted that ‘the Arctic is a hard environment. It rewards cooperation, not confrontation, and I trust we will continue to see cooperation.’32

There is Arctic cooperation in the status quo

Borgerson et al 3-25-14 – International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, CEO at CargoMetrics and Cofounder, Arctic Circle (Scott, Lawson Brigham-- Distinguished Professor of Geography and Arctic Policy, University of Alaska Fairbanks, Michael Byers -- Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law, University of British Columbia, Heather Conley -- Senior Fellow and Director of the Europe Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Marlene Laruelle -- Research Professor of International Affairs, George Washington University, “The Emerging Arctic,” The Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/arctic/emerging-arctic/p32620#!/#Diplomacy%20and%20Security

Diplomacy and Security)BC

Less than a decade ago, many geopolitical analysts warned that the Arctic had all of the makings for great-power rivalry reminiscent of the Cold War. However, the movement has gone quite the other way. Despite a few remaining territorial disputes, the overwhelming majority of Arctic resources fall within accepted national boundaries and all Arctic governments have committed to settling disagreements peaceably. Notably, Russia and Norway resolved a decades-old maritime border dispute in 2010, equally dividing some 67,600 square miles of water in the Barents Sea, and partnering in the region on energy development. The historic deal is often cited as a model for future Arctic diplomacy. The Arctic Council, the leading international forum for cooperation in the region, was established by the eight Arctic states in 1996 with participation from indigenous peoples like the Inuit and Saami, and all member states except the United States and Norway have appointed ambassador-level diplomats to represent their interests in the region. With a secretariat in Tromsø, Norway, the council is a forum that sponsors major assessments and studies, and develops policies and guidelines that focus on environmental protection and sustainable development. Chairmanship of the council rotates every two years. But Arctic cooperation takes place in a variety of other forums. Nordic nations—Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Iceland—also partner on sustainability and issues related to Arctic indigenous peoples via the Nordic Council. Nineteen countries are party to the International Arctic Science Committee, a nongovernmental organization dedicated to research. The nonprofit Arctic Circle, formed in 2013 by Icelandic president Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, aims to provide a setting for political and business groups, as well as other organizations from around the world, to discuss Arctic issues. Still, steady diplomacy has not precluded nations from maneuvering to protect their interests in the region. Each of the eight Arctic nations has updated their strategy for the region in the last several years, including the United States (see interactive diagram below). Russia, the only non-NATO littoral Arctic state, has made a military buildup in the Arctic a strategic priority, restoring Soviet-era airfields and ports and marshaling naval assets. In late 2013, President Vladimir Putin instructed his military leadership to pay particular attention to the Arctic, saying Russia needed “every lever for the protection of its security and national interests there.” He also ordered the creation of a new strategic military command in the Russian Arctic by the end of 2014. Economic powers further afield are also angling for a larger role in the Arctic. India, Italy, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and China became Arctic Council observer states in 2013. Analysts say Beijing is particularly attracted to the region given its mounting energy demands and reliance on maritime trade. Chinese officials now characterize their country as a “near-Arctic state,” and Beijing has recently increased its investment in polar research, spending some $60 million annually, and ordered a second, $300 million ice-breaking research ship. China strengthened its toehold in the Arctic by signing a free trade agreement with Iceland, its first with a European country, and building an embassy that is Reykjavik’s largest

Arctic exploration is inevitable and doesn’t cause conflict

Economist ‘12 (“The melting north” June 16^th, http://www.economist.com/node/21556798) //J.N.E

Yet this special report will suggest that warnings about Arctic conflict are, like the climate, overcooked. The Arctic is no terra nullius. Unlike Antarctica, which is governed by an international treaty, most of it is demarcated. Of half a dozen territorial disputes in the region, the biggest is probably between the United States and Canada, over the status of the north-west passage. Those two countries will not go to war. And the majority of Arctic countries are members of NATO. Yet the melting Arctic will have geostrategic consequences beyond helping a bunch of resource-fattened countries to get fatter. An obvious one is the potentially disruptive effect of new trade routes. Sailing along the coast of Siberia by the north-east passage, or Northern Sea Route (NSR), as Russians and mariners call it, cuts the distance between western Europe and east Asia by roughly a third. The passage is now open for four or five months a year and is getting more traffic. In 2010 only four ships used the NSR; last year 34 did, in both directions, including tankers, refrigerated vessels carrying fish and even a cruise liner. Asia's big exporters, China, Japan and South Korea, are already investing in ice-capable vessels, or planning to do so. For Russia, which has big plans to develop the sea lane with trans-shipment hubs and other infrastructure, this is a double boon. It will help it get Arctic resources to market faster and also, as the NSR becomes increasingly viable, diversify its hydrocarbon-addicted economy. There are risks in this, of dispute if not war, which will require management. What is good for Russia may be bad for Egypt, which last year earned over $5 billion in revenues from the Suez Canal, an alternative east-west shipping route. So it is good that the regional club, the Arctic Council, is showing promise. Under Scandinavian direction for the past half-decade, it has elicited an impressive amount of Arctic co-operation, including on scientific research, mapping and resource development.

Alt causes to Arctic Conflict

Conley and Kraut 2010 -- senior fellow and director of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a research assistant in the CSIS Europe Program, where she conducts research and coordinates program activities on U.S.-European political, security, and economic relations and

the ongoing process of European political and economic integration (Heather* and Jamie,** “U.S. Strategic Interests

in the Arctic,” The Center for Strategic and International Studies, http://csis.org/files/publication/100426_Conley_USStrategicInterests_Web.pdf)BC

However, the disputed sovereign claims over these passages have complicated both commercial and military use of these transit corridors. Russia, for instance, requires by regulation that all vessels intending to enter the Northeast Passage give advance notice to Russian authorities and submit an application for guiding, which implies paying a fee for using the route. Navigating these treacherous waterways requires advanced icebreaker capabilities to break through the multilayer and multiyear ice, even during the summer months. The Arctic five (or A-5), in addition to China, Finland, Germany, Japan, and Sweden, maintain icebreaker fleets at varying levels of modernity and capability. But before the Northwest and Northeast Passages can be used extensively, the international community must address these territorial disputes and environmental concerns over increased pollution, as well as determine responsibility for patrolling these shipping routes and for responding to emergencies requiring search-and-rescue capabilities and oil spill cleanup. “Who owns, controls, and manages these waterways? The answer could be of strategic interest to America’s trading partners and competitors.”16 The most significant security threats involve nonstate actors, “such as drug smugglers, gunrunners, illegal immigrants and even terrorists who might take advantage of ice-free Arctic waters to move contraband or people between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans or into North America or Europe.”17 Increased commercial, tourist, and military traffic has already outpaced the development of emergency response infrastructure, such as search-andrescue capacity, setting the stage for potentially fatal scenarios in the Arctic.