Counterplans General Stuff

EXT: No Arctic War

No arctic war – climate diplomacy and economic pragmatism

Donald, 14 – Ros Donald is a deputy editor for Carbon Brief, a climate journal – she holds an MA in International Studies and Diplomacy (February 11, 2014. “America in the Arctic: Melting ice and soft security” http://www.carbonbrief.org/blog/2014/02/arctic-melting-ice-and-soft-security/) zabd

If you want an indication that US ambition in the Arctic has been limited, you could turn to the size of its icebreaker fleet. Russia, which sees exploiting the Arctic as vital to its national interest, has 20 icebreakers. At present, America has just three. To the frustration of many, the US has never placed the region near the top of its list of priorities. But with the Arctic sea ice in long term retreat, and new economic possibilities opening in the region, that mindset may now be changing. Soft security Retreating sea ice creates new possibilities for resource extraction, tourism and fishing in the Arctic, as well as the prospect of a new trade route between the Atlantic and Pacific. "[A] secure and stable region where US national interests are safeguarded, the US homeland is protected, and nations work cooperatively to address challenges". Highlighting international cooperation, environmental stewardship and joint attempts to research and understand this fast-changing region, the strategy reveals a softer attitude toward security in the Arctic. The range of approaches outlined include building international cooperation through shared scientific missions, and working with other militaries and the US coastguard to respond to emergencies such as shipping accidents and oil spills. Christian le Mière, a senior fellow for naval forces and maritime security at the International Institute of Strategic Studies explains the strategy reflects a wider, less confrontational, attitude toward security in the region: "The Arctic is a relatively low-risk environment from the security point of view. Disputes are few in number and most economic claims are spoken for. In fact, trends in the region have been positive in terms of diplomacy. The lack of a security architecture means such positive trends may not be embedded in the longer term." Last year, the US Department of Defense published its Arctic Strategy, followed just recently by an implementation plan. It marks a new level of US ambition in the region - the newly-published document defines US aims for the region thus: Changing relations Relations between Arctic nations didn't always seem so congenial. Commentators describe a clear divide between countries on the Arctic Council, the intergovernmental forum for Arctic states. On one side sit countries such as Norway and the US, which emphasise stewardship of the environment and a measured approach to economic development, at least for the time being. And on the other, Russia and Canada have a more immediate interest in their own regional sovereignty and access to the Arctic's resources. Glada Lahn, a senior research fellow on energy, environment and resources at Chatham House explains: "Russia has the most obvious economic need for Arctic resources and there is interest in the greater autonomy that oil might bring Greenlanders. But compared with many governments facing choices over extractives investment in ecologically sensitive areas, Arctic states can afford not to rush. In rich democracies, risk weighs more heavily than opportunity - public scrutiny and tougher safety and environmental rules will simply make many Arctic oil and gas operations unprofitable. "Look at Shell's drilling programme in offshore Alaska - the mounting cost of lawsuits, regulation and the burden of inadequate infrastructure mean that Shell has pulled back for now." In 2007, a Russian delegation of scientists and legislators caused widespread consternation by planting the national flag on the seafloor below the Arctic ice - a move Russia said strengthened its claim to nearly half the Arctic seabed. Some commentators were almost begging the US to step in before control of the region was wrested from it by more aggressive parties such as Russia and Canada - both of whom see the Arctic as a vital source of new resources. Yet, there appears to have been a shift in relations. As Arctic expert Scott Borgerson wrote in Foreign Affairs, "a funny thing happened on the way to Arctic anarchy. [...] A shared interest in profit has trumped the instinct to compete over territory". Even Russia's prized northern naval fleet is receiving less funding than it used to, signalling that the country no longer sees America and the Nato countries as the threats it once did. Potential territorial disputes have been defused through agreements such as the ilulissat Declaration, which requires nations with Arctic coasts to resolve claims peacefully. Meanwhile the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, though never ratified by the US, has provided the template for settling maritime boundary arguments. The Arctic Council and its more secretive security counterpart, the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable, have found new relevance as the forums for negotiation and cooperation in the region. Economic pragmatism and climate diplomacy Such actions help illustrate the atmosphere of pragmatism in relations between Arctic nations. Despite playing to their respective domestic audiences with stirring rhetoric and grand gestures - including Russia's unexpectedly harsh treatment of Greenpeace protesters last year - both Canada and Russia depend on cooperation from others to allow them to exploit the potential resources available. Duncan Depledge, research analyst on environment and security at the Royal United Services Institute says: "Russia needs international cooperation - such as investment from Asia and technology from Europe and North America - if it's going to exploit its Arctic resources. And every country needs the help of others when it comes to cleaning up transboundary environmental threats like oil spills or conducting search and rescue missions." The Arctic strategy also offers the US an opportunity to craft its image beyond Arctic relations. Secretary of State John Kerry sees America's stint at the head of the Arctic Council, starting next year, as an opportunity to showcase the country's commitment to tackling climate change - both in the Arctic and on the international stage. In contrast to the current chair Canada, which strongly emphasises economic development in the region, Kerry has vowed to make climate change the priority - a move that reflects his desire to lead on reaching an internationally binding agreement on greenhouse gas emissions reduction at negotiations next year. The US military's softer security stance complements Kerry's intentions. The US Arctic strategy outlines possible roles for military diplomacy such as working with other nations to monitor ice loss, map the region and support sustainable economic activity. Even activities like supporting civil transport and boosting infrastructure are expressed with an eye to promoting sustainability. National interest But while there is great emphasis on international sharing and caring, the plan is fundamentally geared toward the US national interest. This ranges from uncontroversial concepts such as increasing telecommunications infrastructure, to more contested principles. An important part of the strategy involves ensuring the freedom of the seas - an old doctrine designed to allow access to the high seas for merchant vessels. The new document shows the military sees that preserving this right is of national interest to the US. It is also ready to "challenge excessive maritime claims" from other Arctic nations. Future tensions may indeed arise if maritime traffic increases. For instance while Canada sees the northwest passage off its coast as its sovereign territory, the US has other ideas. Soft security, blurred roles The Arctic has become a place where preconceived notions and roles are challenged. Despite diplomatic deadlock on many other issues in international politics, Arctic nations manage to coexist relatively harmoniously - at least for the moment. The US military's future role in the Arctic looks set to be more fluid, mixing diplomacy with support for development and stewardship. It has also emerged as a key actor in America's climate policy in the region, deeply involved with the practical aspects of responding to the Arctic's fast-changing climate. America's strategy currently appears reflect the wider, more conciliatory, tone of Arctic relations. As the country is gears up to take a greater leadership role in the region, this state of affairs suggests it won't encounter the degree of opposition it might have just a few years ago. But without a formal security framework, that could change. More countries are flocking to stake their claim in the region. China is the latest country to gain observer status on the Arctic Council, while Norway's depleting oil stocks could force it to reassess its own priorities when it comes to stewardship over economic development. As the ice melts, and the balance of power and priorities shifts in the region, the US may have to work hard to assert its soft security approach.

Zero chance of arctic conflict-countries are co-operative-indicts all their authors

Fries 12- Communications manager for the Arctic Council's Permanent Secretariat in Tromsø, Norway (Thomas, “Perspective Correction: How We Misinterpret Arctic Conflict”, The Arctic Institute, http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2012/04/perspective-correction-how-we.html)//WK

*We do not endorse gendered language

War and conflict sell papers -- the prospect of war, current wars, remembrance of wars past. Accordingly, a growing cottage industry devotes itself to writing about the prospect of conflict among the Arctic nations and between those nations and non-Arctic states, which is mostly code for “China.” As a follower of Arctic news, I see this every day, all the time: eight articles last week, five more already this week from the Moscow Times, Scientific American or what-have-you. Sometimes this future conflict is portrayed as a political battle, sometimes military, but the portrayals of the states involved are cartoonish, Cold-War-ish...it’s all good guys and bad guys. I’m convinced that this is nonsense, and I feel vindicated when I see the extent to which these countries' militaries collaborate in the high North. From last week's meeting of all eight Arctic nations' military top brass (excepting only the US; we were represented by General Charles Jacoby, head of NORAD and USNORTHCOM) to Russia-Norway collaboration on search & rescue; from US-Canada joint military exercises to US-Russia shared research in the Barents...no matter where you look, the arc of this relationship bends towards cooperation. But there's a bigger misconception that underlies the predictions of future Arctic conflict that we read every week. This is the (usually) unspoken assumption that the governments of these states are capable of acting quickly, unilaterally and secretly to pursue their interests in the Arctic. False. This idea that some state might manage a political or military smash-and-grab while the rest of us are busy clipping our fingernails or walking the dog is ridiculous. The overwhelming weight of evidence suggests that the governments of the Arctic states are, like most massive organizations, bureaucratic messes. Infighting between federal agencies is rampant all around, as are political shoving matches between federal and state/provincial/regional governments. Money is still scarce, and chatter about military activism isn’t backed up by much: Canada is engaged in a sad debate over the downgrading of the proposed Nanisivik port; the United States’ icebreaker fleet is barely worth mentioning and shows little sign of new life in the near-term future; US Air Force assets are being moved 300+ miles south from Fairbanks to Anchorage; and Russia’s talk about a greater Arctic presence has been greatly inflated for the sake of the recent elections. In a more general sense, we have viciously polarized governments in the US and, to a lesser extent, Canada, as well as numerous “hotter” wars elsewhere that will take the lion’s share of our blood and treasure before the Arctic gets a drop of either. The smaller states might be able to act more nimbly, but Norway and Denmark are successful Scandinavian social-market economies with modestly-sized militaries who aren’t likely to put military adventurism in the Arctic at the top of their to-do lists. They’re also patient decision-makers who are making apparently sincere (if not always successful) efforts to incorporate their resident indigenous communities into national politics. This makes fast, unilateral, secret action unlikely. And then there is Russia. From the outside, it can often seem as though the Russian government rules by fiat. This reasonably leads to the concern that someone might take it into his head to assert Russia’s military might or otherwise extend the country’s sovereignty in the Arctic. But it is fairly clear that Russia’s success is currently, and for the near-term future, dependent on its position within the constellation of global hydrocarbon suppliers. To continue to develop its supply base, Russia needs the assistance of the oil majors of neighboring states, and indeed it is showing signs of warming up to foreign engagement with its Arctic hydrocarbons in significant ways. Its political relationships with its regular customers are also critical to its future success. Russia isn’t likely to wantonly sour those relationships by acting aggressively against all four of its wealthy, well-networked littoral brothers [states] in Europe and North America. It’s not only the handcuffs of many colors worn by the Arctic states that will keep them from getting aggressive, it is also the good precedents that exist for cooperation here. Russia and Norway recently resolved a forty year-old dispute over territory in the Barents. There are regular examples of military cooperation among the four littoral NATO states and between Norway and Russia. Even the US and Russia are finding opportunities to work together. Meanwhile, the need to develop search-and-rescue capabilities is making cross-border cooperation a necessity for all Arctic actors. There are numerous international research and private-sector ventures, even in areas other than hydrocarbons. These will only grow in importance with time. In fact, it would seem that for many of these countries, the Arctic is a welcome relief - a site where international collaboration is comparatively amicable.

Interest driven approaches don’t preclude cooperation

Keil ’13 – Europe Director for the Arctic Institute, Project Scientist at the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies (IASS) in Potsdam, Germany, in the Sustainable Interaction with the Atmosphere (SIWA) cluster, PhD at the Berlin Graduate School, Fellow at the NVP-Nansen interdisciplinary PhD and Post-doc Summer School (“The Arctic: A new region of conflict? The case of oil and gas”, June 6th, SagePub) //J.N.E

The evidence shows that talk of a new Cold War in the Arctic is overblown. Closer analysis of the actual importance of Arctic oil and gas to the countries concerned, as well as the consideration of the uncertainty and spatial distribution of Arctic hydrocarbons, offers a much more differentiated picture. The USA and Canada are unlikely to join a potential rush for Russia’s Arctic resources given their own vast resource bases. Norway and Denmark both concentrate on their own hydrocarbon potential, because it is needed for economic and autonomy reasons, respectively.

Activities concerning the most promising resources, Arctic offshore oil and gas, are currently of rather secondary importance in a global perspective. In the near- to medium-term future, however, increased activity can be expected. Given the empirical findings, it is safe to conclude that this will not lead to major inter-state confrontations, but if any conflict about Arctic natural resources were to arise, it will most likely concern complicated business relationships between the Russian state and foreign oil and gas companies wanting to get a share of Russia’s vast hydrocarbon base to satisfy especially high European demand. In this respect, Russia is confronted with a delicate balancing act. On the one hand, it aims to protect its resources by declaring them strategic and thus strongly limiting non-Russian involvement in any development activities. On the other hand, Russia’s economy is highly dependent on the continued expansion of its oil and gas production, which will be impossible to achieve in the future without foreign expertise and capital. This precarious situation is exacerbated by the overall risky and unpredictable Russian investment climate. It remains to be seen how joint exploration and exploitation agreements between Russian (state) firms and foreign companies will work out. After the failed Rosneft–BP agreement, the new deal between Rosneft and Exxon to explore and exploit fields in the Kara Sea offers a new chance of observing the development of such a joint venture (Kramer, 2011b; Washington, 2011; Werdigier, 2011).

The empirical conclusions suggest, first and foremost, that it is of utmost importance to start the analysis of the political state of a region by critically examining the actual stakes and interests involved, rather than arriving at premature conclusions based on underlying assumptions. Closer empirical scrutiny indicates that neorealist expectations of a geopolitical rush for Arctic resources are unrealistic, while the addition of constructivist variables in empirical analysis can supplement rational materialist accounts of actors’ interests. While the overall interest-based approach is useful to unpack the black box of ‘Arctic interests’, the constitution of these interests cannot be solely understood in rationalist terms but has to include identity, cultural and historical considerations of the importance of the Arctic region to the respective countries.

Finally, these conclusions also help to clarify institutionalist arguments about the necessary institutional adjustments for Arctic affairs. The lack of an imminent confrontation over Arctic commodities renders new institutional mechanisms to deal with such confrontations premature, if not redundant. In particular, UNCLOS appears to be a suitable and detailed rule collection to govern possible contentious issues such as extended jurisdiction over countries’ continental shelves. The Arctic Council is an expedient forum for scientific knowledge accumulation, and steps have been taken to involve interested, non-Arctic states (Senior Arctic Officials (SAO), 2011: 50).

Neorealism is wrong – your evidence doesn’t have empirical backing which proves there will be no war

Keil ’13 – Europe Director for the Arctic Institute, Project Scientist at the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies (IASS) in Potsdam, Germany, in the Sustainable Interaction with the Atmosphere (SIWA) cluster, PhD at the Berlin Graduate School, Fellow at the NVP-Nansen interdisciplinary PhD and Post-doc Summer School (“The Arctic: A new region of conflict? The case of oil and gas”, June 6th, SagePub) //J.N.E

While neorealists have made grandiloquent statements about the likelihood of conflict in the Arctic, and neoliberal institutionalists have made judgements about the necessary reform of the institutional system governing Arctic issues, both arguments have been based on only limited empirical support. To overcome this lacuna, this study outlines the actual stakes involved.

The argument here draws on both rational–institutionalist and constructivist concepts to explain the political state of the Arctic. It is assumed that the state of international politics in the Arctic is explained by the distribution of interests of the five coastal Arctic states, the presence of international institutions adequate to these countries’ interests and the strength of the respective country’s Arctic identity. This approach emphasizes actors’ interests, based on cost–benefit analysis, as the major determinants of cooperation and conflict (e.g. Keohane, 1989; Koremenos et al., 2001; Moravcsik, 1997); however, the constructivist focus on identity and culture are taken as important factors in the formation of states’ interests (Adler, 2002; Fearon and Wendt, 2002; Jepperson et al., 1996; Wendt, 1992, 1999). In this study, therefore, rational–institutionalist and constructivist variables are analytically separated but assumed to be mutually determined, which helps to overcome some of the weaknesses of previous Arctic research.

To make Arctic interests explicit, this article uses the issue area of Arctic oil and gas as the most pre-eminent and allegedly conflict-prone issue area. Arctic hydrocarbon resources have been on the forefront of rising political interest, given the rising importance of energy security on countries’ agendas, the relative political stability of the Arctic region, technological advances, increasing global energy demand, fewer available alternatives and high energy prices. Arctic hydrocarbons can therefore be considered ‘most likely’ to lead to rising stakes among the Arctic states and thus to an increased likelihood of competitive or conflictive behaviour between these states (George and Bennett, 2005: 120–124). This article therefore examines the Arctic oil and gas interests of the five Arctic littoral states (herein also called the Arctic five), in order to establish how important they are for the respective countries’ policies. The key explanatory factors for the Arctic five’s interests are overall standing of the Arctic in countries’ policies, market relevance of Arctic oil and gas, and the identity, cultural and historical relevance of the Arctic to each country.

The empirical analysis shows that the five littoral states have radically different levels of interests towards the High North. The USA dedicates rather low importance to the Arctic in general and to the region’s hydrocarbons in particular, whereas for Russia, in contrast, the Arctic is of tremendous importance because of a combination of security, economic and identity reasons. Canada, Norway and Denmark/Greenland all show high interest but for very different reasons. While for Canada, the Arctic and its hydrocarbon resources are important predominantly for sovereignty reasons, Greenland’s main interest in Arctic oil and gas is owing to the inhabitants’ ambitions for political autonomy. Norway, in contrast, has very high economic stakes in its northern resources. This has important implications for the international politics of the Arctic region and for the theoretical understanding of Arctic affairs. Firstly, neorealist expectations of a geopolitical rush for Arctic resources are unlikely to eventuate. Further, while finding that institutional adjustments are necessary, this article refines the general institutionalist call for institutional reform to environmental issues. Lastly, rational materialist and ideological constructivist notions have to be combined in order to satisfactorily assess actors’ interests in the Arctic region.

Russia is pragmatic – won’t attack

Käpylä and Mikkola ’13 – Finnish Institute of International Affairs (Juha, Harri, “The Global Arctic”, August, FIIA BRIE FING PAPER 133) //J.N.E

Russia also has strategic military forces in the Arctic, most notably the Northern Fleet and its ballisticmissile submarines (SSBNs). These mobile forces are of increasing strategic importance due to the challenges that Russian land-based intercontinental ballistic-missile capability faces today.8 However, developments in Russian hard power in the Arctic have been relatively modest, especially if compared to the Cold War era, and there is widespread agreement that instead of re-militarization or the potential for a hot conflict, Russia is seeking to govern its increasingly busy northern front and secure its interests therein.9

While Russia seeks to modernize and project hard power in the Arctic, it is a pragmatic player that has relied on international cooperation to maintain stability conducive to economic activity in the region. It has resolved long-standing border disputes through bilateral negotiations and endorsed multilateral governance in the Arctic. It has also endorsed the Arctic Council as the legitimate institutional governance framework, including its recent Kiruna developments. Even if Russia is likely to harbour concerns about the growing role of China in the region and its governance, on the whole, Russia seems to have little to lose in the AC co-operation as the forum cannot produce independent and binding resolutions without Russia’s consent.

Russia has also supported the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the legitimate multilateral legal framework for governing the Arctic Ocean, including the resolution of maritime boundary issues, resource disputes on the continental shelves, and maritime navigation disagreements. The key question that remains, however, is how committed pragmatic Russia is to supporting multilateral governance in the Arctic, for example in the event of a potentially unfavourable CLCS decision regarding Russia’s claim to extend her continental shelf.

Russia’s attempt to increase presence is slow and modest

Le Mière and Mazo 1-13 -14 -- Senior Research Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and IISS Consulting Senior Fellow for Environmental Security and Science Policy and Consulting Editor, Survival (Christian* and Jeffrey**, “Arctic Opening: Insecurity and Opportunity,” Taylor and Francis Online)BC

Russian activity in the Arctic has also increased. In August 2007, Moscow renewed long-range aviation patrols to the Atlantic and the Pacific, and over the Arctic, oceans. Strategic bomber flights along the Norwegian coast increased from just 14 in 2006 to 97 in 2008; although the number declined in subsequent years, it rose to over 55 in 2012.16 In March 2013, two Tu-22M3 Backfire bombers and four Su-27 multi-role aircraft flew within 20 miles of Sweden’s borders; the failure of the Swedish Air Force to scramble in response to the night-time exercises led to searing media criticism.17 Surface naval patrols also returned Downloaded by [141.213.236.110] at 13:51 07 July 2014 The Arctic as a theatre of military operations | 87 to Arctic waters for the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union in 2008.18 The Russian military has therefore recovered somewhat from the dire circumstances of the post-Cold War environment, but it is equally struggling to deal with the legacy of a lack of investment in its equipment. The recapitalisation of its fleet is on the surface a concern for neighbouring states, but it is occurring from a very low base of capability. Equally, the focus on smaller vessels will, for the foreseeable future, benefit organisations beyond the Northern Fleet. In line with this military rejuvenation, Moscow has touted the need to increase its military presence in the Arctic, but the force posture announced thus far is modest. The primary change in the next few years will be a renovation of the SSBN fleet, a factor that underlines the strategic importance of the Arctic but does not suggest state-based military competition in the region on a significant scale. It seems, therefore, presumptive to call the Russian defence modernisation a militarisation of the Arctic, particularly as current activity remains a shadow of that seen in the Cold-War era.

The Arctic isn’t Ukraine – Russia knows it can’t attack and will adhere to multilateralism

Byers ’14 – professor at the University of British Columbia, and expert on international law, won the Donner Prize for best Canadian public-policy book (Michael, “The Arctic is not Ukraine”, May 1^st, ProQuest) //J.N.E

Moscow in winter is like the bar scene in Star Wars . Blue-eyed women in long fur coats ride the subway alongside Asian labourers in snowmobile suits. This December, I will return to Moscow to launch the Russian translation of my book. I am not naive about Russian President Vladimir Putin, whom I have met and do not like. The former KGB agent acts like one in his dealings with opponents, from Alexander Litvinenko to Pussy Riot. In the 1990s, Mr. Putin's forces killed tens of thousands of civilians in Chechnya. A decade later, he blasted his way into Georgia, prying away two Russian-speaking enclaves. Mr. Putin enabled Bashar al-Assad to commit mass murder in Syria and is now dissecting the sovereign country of Ukraine. Much tougher economic sanctions are needed, perhaps even a North Atlantic Treaty Organization-wide embargo of Russian natural gas. A gas embargo would require costly measures to protect European citizens and businesses against shortages. But meaningful sanctions are painful for both sides - and a gas embargo would squeeze Mr. Putin hard. At the same time, diplomatic contacts are more important than ever. Cutting back on diplomacy is cheap, easy and counterproductive. In the short term, it cost Canada nothing to boycott an Arctic Council meeting on "black carbon" a couple of weeks ago. The long-term costs are more difficult to calculate. Arctic countries are making progress on reducing the soot produced by diesel engines and coal-fired plants - soot that, when it lands on ice and snow, absorbs solar energy and accelerates melting. Reducing black carbon may be the most effective, readily available measure for slowing climate change. Arctic countries have been co-operating on environmental protection since 1973, when, at the height of the Cold War, they signed the Polar Bear Treaty. The treaty saved an iconic species by prohibiting big-game hunters from shooting bears from ships and helicopters. In 1982, Canada chaired the committee that drafted the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Russia has abided by the convention, negotiating fisheries management regimes and maritime boundaries with the United States and Norway, and mapping the central Arctic Ocean in preparation for a science-based claim to areas of seabed beyond its existing, legally recognized 200-mile exclusive economic zone. Mr. Putin is a thug, but not a fool. In 2010, I watched him say: "If you stand alone, you cannot survive in the Arctic." Russia needs foreign capital, technology and markets to develop its Arctic oil and gas, which already account for 20 per cent of its gross domestic product. Investment, technology transfer and trade depend, in turn, on political and legal stability. Mr. Putin understands the scale of Russia's Arctic, which stretches across seven time zones, and the region's punishing weather and ice conditions. He knows that Russia cannot afford the vast sums it would take to prepare for state-to-state conflict there. Recently, Russia's military spending in the Arctic has focused on the challenges that come with increased civilian access, whether by foreign cargo ships, smugglers or Greenpeace. In the Arctic, Russia is not that different from Canada. Both countries' leaders want to develop the natural resources of vast uncontested territories and continental shelves. Along the fringes of those shelves, they seek the maximum extent of their country's rights under international law. In Ukraine, Mr. Putin is behaving abhorrently. He should be punished - and hopefully redirected - through much tougher economic sanctions. The Arctic has a different constellation of relationships and interests. If Russia and the West cannot co-operate in the Arctic, they cannot co-operate anywhere. When I return to Moscow in December, I will be following the course recommended by Winston Churchill: "To jaw-jaw is always better than to war-war."

Conflict is unlikely in the Arctic

Le Mière and Mazo 1-13 -14 -- Senior Research Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and IISS Consulting Senior Fellow for Environmental Security and Science Policy and Consulting Editor, Survival (Christian* and Jeffrey**, “Arctic Opening: Insecurity and Opportunity,” Taylor and Francis Online)BC

Whether the sensitivities of the Arctic littoral states to cooperation with the three non-littoral states, or mutual mistrust between Russia and the other states, will prevent such an architecture from being formed is the main unknown in Arctic security. For the time being, however, while there remains suspicion among some Arctic states – and occasional bouts of belligerent rhetoric and the procurement of some equipment, which suggests state-based rivalry – the reality is that the Arctic is not witnessing an uncontrolled or substantially competitive militarisation. It is a region that has inherent strategic value, given the patrols of ballistic-missile submarines, but it is also one in which operations are hampered by weather and geography. While Russian defence spending has increased rapidly, it is from a remarkably low base and investments are currently just rejuvenating an entirely dilapidated fleet. Most Nordic budgets are constrained by austerity, US defence priorities lie elsewhere and Canada’s primary Arctic-focused procurement is of vessels devoted to maritime security. There may be more military activity in the Arctic in the future, but it is currently far from being a battleground for rival states.

The Arctic is governed by multipolarity and soft power – makes Arctic conflict impossible

Misje ’12 – Geography Department, Fullerton (“RUSSIAN HEGEMONY IN THE ARCTIC SPACE? CONTESTING THE POPULAR GEOPOLITICAL DISCOURSES”, April 16th, Thesis Presented to the Faculty of California State University, Fullerton) //J.N.E

On the other hand, balanced multipolar systems are structures without a potential hegemon. As a result, there is less of a security threat than in an unbalanced system. The Arctic powers that have ratified the UNCLOS are more or less equal in power. Therefore, the Arctic region can be considered a balanced multipolar system. However, the Arctic does have a hegemonic power that has been waiting on the sidelines of the game, the US. Furthermore, Russia could be seen as having greater power in the Arctic as its use of the UNCLOS provisions has given the state an upper-hand in the fight for sovereign rights. However, the other Arctic states can also use the UNCLOS to claim sovereign rights, though being the first to submit a sizeable claim has given Russia considerably more power. Multipolarity in the Arctic needs to be defined as a system of two or more powers with one hegemonic power (United States), a potential dominant power (Russia) and several great powers (Canada, Denmark and Norway). Furthermore, illustrating the polarity of the Arctic states as a triad configuration helps to explain the forthcoming idea that perhaps the great powers are counter-balancers to Russian power in the Arctic space. Counterbalancing can be defined as an influence that balances or offsets another's power in the international system. Brooks and Wohlforth argue that counter-balancers repress excessive amounts of power by either enhancing the power of another ally in order for that state to develop into a "peer rival to the hegemon" or by combining capabilities through an alliance that roughly equals the capabilities of the hegemon (Brooks and Wohlforth 2008,25). In this sense, counterbalancing is tailored to systems that surround a hegemonic power. However, counterbalancing can also be defined as the attempt to "build up real resources and capabilities to match, check, or block another state's use of such capabilities to advance its security interests" (Brooks and Wohlforth 2008,25). By using this definition of counterbalancing, the action can be securely fitted to the Arctic triad structure of power.

The three great powers of the triad (Canada, Denmark and Norway) can be defined as counter-balancers that match, check, or block Russia's soft power, by also utilizing the provisions of the UNCLOS. Furthermore, Brooks and Wohlforth state that "balancing is a great power phenomenon, because only great powers can prevent one among them from attaining geopolitical predominance" (Brooks and Wohlforth 2008, 26). By deconstructing this sentence, one can argue that Russia, the potential dominant 45 power among the states, could also counterbalance the three great powers. If the great powers successfully impede Russia from gaining power, then does it not give the great powers the upper hand? Additionally, this could then be seen by Russia as an act of aggression and an attempt to establish geopolitical dominance. In essence, the great powers' attempts to thwart Russian power could place these states in a higher position of influence, making Russia a great power again. This would then lessen Russian power in the Arctic system. Moreover, Russia could then be persuaded to counterbalance the capabilities of Norway, Canada and Denmark.

Overall, this section has helped to develop the argument of this thesis by first defining power as it pertains to current Arctic geopolitics. Furthermore, by breaking down the types of opposing structures, it is possible to establish the degree of power that each Arctic state holds at a given time. Accordingly, some of the theoretical thinkers of power and politics have helped to argue that in the contemporary world, much is needed to provoke a great power to go to war with another great power; thus solidifying this 46 paper's argument that soft power instruments will be the preferred tool for the Arctic states. Ultimately, the clarifications under this section assist in further explaining the structural design of the Arctic space within the international system.

Data proves – both countries are too interdependent to fight each other

Ruby ’12 - John Gardner Fellow at the U.S. Department of State in the Office of Global Change working on adaptation measures to climate change (Byron, “Conflict or Cooperation? Arctic Geopolitics and Climate Change”, Berkeley Undergraduate Journal, 25(1), Peer Reviewed) //J.N.E

In this section, I will present the data collected concerning the ten dyads for the five Arctic littoral states. This data looks to the number and frequency of bilateral agreements as an indicator of successful interstate diplomacy, export levels to gauge the degree of economic interdependence between states, Freedom House scores to discern the degree of democratic institutions, and Correlate of War data on diplomatic exchanges to determine if diplomatic relations are normalized and if war has occurred between any of the five Arctic states in the past twenty years. I will first discuss the rationale behind studying these facets of the Arctic dyads’ relationships before presenting the data and providing an analysis of it. First, studying dyads’ recent history of conflict sheds insight on the propensity for future conflict since past conflict statistically begets future conflict. Paul Hensel, studying interstate conflicts from 1816-1992, found that adversaries “are more likely to become involved in recurrent conflict” (Hensel 1996, 43). Regardless of the issues involved, 61.2% of all militarized disputes studied in the population were followed by another dispute between the same adversaries “within fifteen years” (Hensel 1996, 62). Possible causal explanations are that there exist structural sources of misalignment between the two adversaries or, that once the leaders of at least one nation have demonstrated willingness to go to war, it makes it easier to go to war again. The inverse of the latter explanation has some empirical grounding, as Mark Crescenzi found studying dyads from 1817 to 2000 that a country’s reputation for hostility “increases” the likelihood of intra-dyadic conflict “markedly” (Crescenzi 2006, 25). Certainly, arguments abound that once war has been conducted, especially over territory, intangibles like national identity and honor Conflict or Cooperation? Arctic Geopolitics and Climate Change Byron Ruby Berkeley Undergraduate Journal: Volume 25, Issue 1 95 lead to a "sore loser syndrome" that can incur future backlash and domestic incentives to push for military confrontation (Hensel 1996, 45-47). Second, knowing whether or not two countries mutually recognize each other in diplomatic channels is a strong proxy for how tense the dyadic relationship is. Not only is the withdrawal of diplomats and emissaries a symbolic act of disapproval, but it also forces communication— if any—into back channels or third-parties (LaFeber 2008). A powerful example is that of the United States and the People’s Republic of China after the fall of the Kuomintang. For several decades, the United States refused to recognize Chinese leadership on the mainland, leading to heightened perceptions (or, perhaps, misperceptions) on both sides that the other nation was a greater threat than it actually was (LaFeber 2008, 261-263). As theorists like Jervis have noted, such misperceptions can feed into and fuel the security dilemma further, leading to volatile political situations (Jervis 1976). Third, investigating levels of bilateral trade sheds light on levels of economic and political interdependence between nations. Although the lack of trade between nations should not be viewed as a trigger for war, the converse—a high degree of bilateral trade—is often a significant damper on war and conflict. With its roots in classical liberals like Kant and Montesquieu, this perspective has gained empirical traction in recent years, the rationale being that trade reduces incentives to fight since conflict interrupts and interferes with trade, while potentially leaving the warring countries vulnerable if they are dependent on their adversary for certain raw materials, commodities, or services (Gartzke & Quan 2003; Hegre et al 2010). Empirical studies of interstate dyads have confirmed that increased bilateral trade is “associated with lower incidences of militarized interstate disputes and war, even controlling for potentially confounding, theoretically interesting influences: geographic contiguity, the balance of power, alliance bonds, and economic growth rates” (Oneal & Russett 1997, 288). Therefore, it is important to take stock of levels of bilateral trade between dyads in the Arctic, as high levels of trade may be an indicator of heightened cooperation in future relations. Fourth, a similar facet of dyadic relationships is bilateral agreement making. Bilateral agreements encompass a wide range of issues, ranging from military alliances, trade treaties, and joint scientific ventures. The prevailing wisdom is that treaties and alliances merely represent “expediency” and “nothing deeper than a temporary need of two or more states to coordinate their actions” (Bremer 1992, 315). Nonetheless, a preponderance of bilateral treaty creation and maintenance over a prolonged period of time may reflect, then, an alignment of durable (and potentially long-term) structural interests, be they economic, military, or otherwise. And fifth, drawing from literature on DPT, a final indicator worth investigating is the institutionalized levels of democracy within each Arctic nation. In the case of DPT, the empirical findings are more or less undisputed—democratic dyads rarely go to war, although mixed dyads of democracies and autocracies are still prone to the outbreak of conflict (Oneal & Russet 1997). The theoretical underpinnings for explaining why democracies resist going to war with each other, however, are less unequivocal. Explanations range from Kant’s institutionalism to notions of a democratic "culture" that impedes fighting ‘like-minded’ nations (Russett 1993). Regardless of the causal link—if we are to presuppose there even is one—that reduces militarized conflict between democracies to recherché historical anomalies, the empirical trend leans strongly in favor of democratic dyads, suggesting that the degree of democratic institutions should at least for now be left as an important indicator of the likelihood of future conflict.

Their conception of a conflict is too reductive to be useful – scholars inflate definitions

Ruby ’12 - John Gardner Fellow at the U.S. Department of State in the Office of Global Change working on adaptation measures to climate change (Byron, “Conflict or Cooperation? Arctic Geopolitics and Climate Change”, Berkeley Undergraduate Journal, 25(1), Peer Reviewed) //J.N.E

Prior to delving into the results of the research, it important to define the parameters of the research, namely in terms of the definition of "conflict," the scope of the research, and the merits of a "methodologically eclectic" approach. Within the existing literature on Arctic geopolitics and climate change, few authors explicitly define what they mean by "conflict." In fact, the term is often thrown around loosely, sometimes referring to a state of armed warfare or at other times to conflict of the political or diplomatic kind. While these uses are certainly legitimate and within the established meaning of the word, it makes for fuzzy boundaries and ambiguous projections: the chance or likelihood of future diplomatic "conflict," whatever that is intended to mean, most certainly differs—and probably differs starkly—from the chances of total war between two Arctic nations. Thus, for the purposes of this research, unless otherwise specified, conflict is defined as a militarized confrontation between at least two countries. No shots need be fired, nor do casualties need to be suffered. A formal declaration of war would also be too high of a standard for "conflict," as that would exclude such prominent wars like those in Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf on the basis of what has become in many respects a dispensable procedural formality. Rather, the mere formal invocation of some form of coercive force is sufficient to qualify an event as a form of conflict (e.g. ordering a ship to fire across the bow of another ship belonging to another nation). A baseline example of what would constitute a conflict, then, is the Turbot War of 1995 between Canada and Spain, where the Canadian Navy boarded a Spanish fishing vessel and arrested its crew for fishing in Canada’s Exclusive Economic Zone off the coast of Newfoundland (Nordås & Gleditsch 2007, 631). In this respect, this definition of conflict differs slightly from the typical notion of "war," which tends to connote much greater military mobilization and the number of causalities being greater than zero (Bremer 1992, 310). The logic for narrowing the scope of conflict in this respect is twofold. First, while there has certainly been a history of diplomatic dispute in the Arctic, there has yet to be any form of armed brinksmanship or militarized conflict to date—at least not since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. This leaves such future-facing projections on armed conflict—such as this research— still a relevant exercise. Second, it creates a clear distinction between what does constitute "conflict" and what does not. Definitions of conflict seeking to make qualitative judgments on the degree, size, or escalation of conflict inevitably invite criticism in terms of the arbitrariness of the line that renders some conflicts authentic and others as something else altogether. That said, the methodology used further narrows and limits the scope of the question and the explanatory output it produces, since the extent and explanatory power of the projection cannot be separated from the method used. This recognizes that different methods have both strengths and merits in forecasting future trends. Hence, I will be combining a qualitative and quantitative method, pursuing a strategy known as “methodological eclecticism,” so as to hedge against the weaknesses of a purely quantitative or qualitative research approach (Yanchar & Williams 2006, 3). This eclectic approach—comprised jointly by a historic dyadic analysis and a statistical simulation—is examined in the following sections

Diplomacy solves escalation

Lackenbauer 10 - Assistant Professor of Modern Canadian History, PhD and an MA in history from the University of Calgary, and a BA from the University of Waterloo. (Whitney, “ An Arctic conflict is unlikely”,Lexis) zabd

Climate change, the receding ice cap, potentially feasible transportation routes, and newly accessible resources have prompted unprecedented interest in the Arctic. Some commentators perpetuate the idea that a "showdown" is looming between Canada and Russia over Arctic resources, playing on the political rhetoric of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev promising to protect Russia's Arctic resources. I agree that Medvedev's comments are not helpful, and his vague references to other countries' attempts to deny Russians access to their mineral resources are peculiar. They are also unsurprising, and do not forecast an inevitable "clash" over the Arctic. Russian foreign policy is notoriously difficult to interpret. Winston Churchill once called it "a puzzle inside a riddle wrapped in an enigma, and the key is Russian nationalism." As much as Canada proclaims itself to be an "Arctic superpower," the Russians really are. They derive roughly 20 per cent of their GDP and 22 per cent of their exports north of the Arctic circle. Up to 90 per cent of Russian hydrocarbon reserves on the continental shelf are in the Arctic, as well as strategic reserves of metals and minerals such as copper, cobalt, nickel, gold, and diamonds. The stakes are high for the Russians, and they have a proven track record of actually exploiting these resources, and their economy is deplorably dependent on energy extraction. It is understandable that they are concerned about the process of defining the limits of their continental shelf. Canada, of course, also talks of its Arctic resource frontier. In contrast to the Russians, however, we have a poor record of actually investing in resource development in the region. We cannot claim to derive even one per cent of our GDP from the region. But as quick as we and our Western allies are to point accusatory fingers at Russian politicians who resolve to protect what is theirs, we are just as guilty of hyperbolic rhetoric and political chest-pounding. Prime Minister Stephen Harper's messages of "use it or lose it," "stand up for Canada," and talk of Canada as an "Arctic superpower" might be designed for domestic audience, but they also register outside of Canada. The irony, of course, is that Canada's behaviour mirrors that of Russia. We have broadcast to the world our intentions to beef up our military presence as if this will somehow bolster our sovereignty position. As my new book with Peter Kikkert suggests, this logic is problematic. Our legal sovereignty over the territory, waters, and continental shelf in our Arctic is well-established. Our rights are protected by international law, and will not be strengthened by a stronger military presence. There is no risk of the Russians stealing away Ellesmere Island, or the Danes using Hans Island as a stepping stone to claim other parts of our archipelago. We have not even submitted our claim to the extended continental shelf, which will be based upon ongoing scientific research. When we do, our rights are clearly established. There is no "scramble" for territory, and "use it or lose it" is a misnomer. We already have the sovereignty that we need. The Russians stand to benefit most of all if Arctic boundaries are sorted out according to international law. Indeed, beside every provocative Russian statement about its resolve to defend its claims is another that reiterates Russia's commitment to legal processes.

Defer negative – their impacts are all hype – resource protection disincentivizes conflict

Mahoney, 13 – reporter for the EUObserver (Honor, EUObserver, “Fears of Arctic conflict are 'overblown'”, March 19th, http://euobserver.com/foreign/119479) //J.N.E

BRUSSELS - The Arctic has become a new frontier in international relations, but fear of potential conflict in the resource-rich region is overblown, say experts. For long a mystery because of its general impenetrability, melting ice caps are revealing more and more of the Arctic region to scientists, researchers and industry. Climate change experts can take a more precise look at a what global warming is doing to the planet, shipping trade routes once considered unthinkable are now possible, and governments and businesses are in thrall to the potential exploitation of coal, iron, rare earths and oil. The interest is reflected in the growing list of those wanting to have a foot in the Arctic council, a forum of eight countries with territory in the polar region. While the US, Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Russia and Canada form the council, the EU commission, China, India, South Korea and Japan have all expressed an interest in having a permanent observer status. "The Arctic has become a new meeting place for America, Europe and the Asia Pacific," says Damien Degeorges, founder of the Arctic Policy and Economic Forum. During a recent conference on Arctic shipping routes in the European Parliament, Degeorges noted that "China has been the most active by far in the last years." He points to its red-carpet treatment of politicians from Greenland, a territory that recently got full control over its wealth of natural resources. Bejing also cosied up to Iceland after the island's financial meltdown. The two undertook a joint expedition to the North Pole and the Chinese have the largest foreign embassy in Reykjavik. Meanwhile, South Korea's president visited Greenland last year and shipping hubs like Singapore are holding Arctic conferences. The interest is being spurred by melting icebergs. Last year saw a record low of multi-year ice - permanent ice - in the polar sea. This means greater shipping and mineral exploitation potential. There were 37 transits of the North East Passage (NEP), running from the Atlantic to the Pacific along the top of Russia, in 2011. This rose to 47 in 2012. For a ship travelling from the Netherlands to China, the route around 40 percent shorter than using the traditional Suez Canal. A huge saving for China, where 50 percent of its GDP is connected to shipping. Russia is also keen to exploit the route as the rise in temperatures is melting the permafrost in its northern territory, playing havoc with its roads and railways. According to Jan Fritz Hansen, deputy director of the Danish shipowners’ association, the real breakthrough will come when there is a cross polar route. At the moment there are are two options - the North East Passge for which Russia asks high fees for transiting ships - or the much-less developed North West Passage along Canada. His chief concern is that "trade up there is free. We don't want protectionism. Everyone should be allowed to compete up there." And he believes the biggest story of the Arctic is not how it is traversed but what will be taken out of it. According to the US Geological Survey (2009), the Arctic holds 13 percent of undiscovered oil and 30 percent of undiscovered gas supplies. Greenland is already at the centre of political tussle between the EU and China over future exploitation of its rare earths - used in a range of technologies such as hybrid cars or smart phones. "The biggest adventure will be the Arctic destination. There is a lot of valuable goods that should be taken out of nature up there," he said. This resource potential - although tempered by the fact that much of it is not economically viable to exploit - has led to fears that the Arctic region is ripe for conflict. But this is nonsense, says Nil Wang, a former Danish admiral and Arctic expert. Most resources have an owner "There is a general public perception that the Arctic region holds great potential for conflict because it is an ungoverned region where all these resources are waiting to be picked up by the one who gets there first. That is completely false," he said. He notes that it is an "extremely well-regulated region," with international rules saying that coastal states have territorial jurisdiction up to 12 nautical miles off their coast. On top of that is a further 200 nautical miles of exclusive economic zone "where you own every value in the water and under the seabed." "Up to 97 percent of energy resources is actually belonging to someone already," says Wang. He suggest the actors in the region all want to create a business environment, which requires stable politics and security. But he concedes there are "risk factors." These include "ambiguous communication" (so that there is an impression of a security conflict), and possible fishing wars as fish stocks move further north because of rising temperatures into areas with no fishing rules. A fall-out in relations between the China and the US could also impact the Arctic region but the "Arctic itself will not create conflict." As for the EU, it has been seeking to gain a foothold in the region. It spends millions of euros each year on research, environmental and social programmes in the Arctic area. A European Commission strategy paper last year noted that giving the commission permanent observer status - it applied in 2008 - in the Arctic Council would allow the EU "to gain detailed understanding of the concerns of Arctic partners." But Wang reckons it has little chance for now. "Russia is the biggest boy in the school yard. And in this case you don't normally invite anyone from a neighbouring school yard that is bigger than you. And Canada is more or less of the same opinion," he noted.