R. H. Coase
1 3
passion against any person in whose
breast we suspected or believed such
designs or affections were harboured,
though they had never broken out into
any actions. Sentiments, thoughts, in-
tentions, would become the objects of
punishment; and if the indignation of
mankind run as high against them as
against actions; if the baseness of the
thought which had given birth to no
action, seemed in the eyes of the world
as much to call aloud for vengeance
as the baseness of the action, every
court of judicature would become a
real inquisition. There would be no
safety for the most innocent and cir-
cumspect conduct. . . . Actions, there-
fore, which either produce actual evil,
or attempt to produce it, and thereby
put us in the immediate fear of it, are
by the Author of nature rendered the
only proper and approved objects of
human punishment and resentment.
Sentiments, designs, affections, though
it is from these that according to cool
r e a s o n h u m a n a c t i o n s d e r i v e t h e i r
whole merit or demerit, are placed by
the great Judge of hearts beyond the
limits of every human jurisdiction, and
are reserved for the cognizance of his
own unerring tribunal. That necessary
rule of justice, therefore, that men in
this life are liable to punishment for
their actions only, not for their designs
and intentions, is founded upon this
salutary and useful irregularity in
human sentiments concerning merit or
demerit, which at first sight appears so
absurd and unaccountable. But every
part of nature, when attentively sur-
veyed, equally demonstrates the provi-
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Selected Papers No. 50
dential care of its Author; and we may
admire the wisdom and goodness of
God even in the weakness and folly
of men.19
Adam Smith also explains that this “irreg-
ularity of sentiment” is not without its
positive utility :
M a n w a s m a d e f o r a c t i o n , a n d t o
promote by the exertion of his faculties
such changes in the external circum-
stances both of himself and others, as
may seem most favourable to the
h a p p i n e s s o f a l l . H e m u s t n o t b e
satisfied with indolent benevolence, nor
fancy himself the friend of mankind,
because in his heart he wishes well to
the prosperity of the world. That he
may call forth the whole vigour of his
soul, and strain every nerve, in order
to produce those ends which it is the
purpose of his being to advance, Nature
has taught him, that neither himself
nor mankind can be fully satisfied with
his conduct, nor bestow upon it the full
measure of applause, unless he has
actually produced them. He is made
to know, that the praise of good inten-
tions, without the merit of good offices,
will be but of little avail to excite either
the loudest acclamations of the world,
or even the highest degree of self-
applause.20
Adam Smith on many occasions observes
that aspects of human nature which seem
reprehensible to us, in fact serve a useful
social purpose. “Nature. . . even in the present
depraved state of mankind, does not seem
to have dealt so unkindly with us, as to
have endowed us with any principle which
is wholly and in every respect evil, or which,
R. H. Coase
1 5
in no degree and in no direction, can be the
proper object of praise and approbation.“*’
Consider his discussion of pride and vanity:
Our dislike to pride and vanity gen-
erally disposes us to rank the persons
whom we accuse of those vices rather
below than above the common level.
In this judgment, however, I think we
are most frequently in the wrong, and
that both the proud and the vain man
are often (perhaps for the most part)
a good deal above it; though not near
so much as either the one really thinks
himself, or as the other wishes you to
think him. If we compare them with
their own pretensions, they may appear
the just objects of contempt. But when
we compare them with what the
greater part of their rivals and com-
petitors really are, they may appear
quite otherwise, and very much above
the common level. Where there is this
real superiority, pride is frequently
attended with many respectable virtues
-with truth, with integrity, with a
high sense of honour, with cordial and
steady friendship, with the most in-
flexible firmness and resolution; vanity
with many amiable ones-with human-
ity, with politeness, with a desire to
oblige in all little matters, and some-
times with a real generosity in great
ones-a generosity, however, which it
often wishes to display in the most
splendid colours that it can.22
Of more interest to those of us concerned
with the working of the economic system
is Adam Smith’s discussion of the view, to
which his teacher Dr. Hutcheson subscribed,
that virtue consists wholly of benevolence
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Selected Papers No. 50
or love and that any admixture of a selfish
motive detracts from that virtue. Hutcheson,
according to Smith, argued that if “an
action, supposed to proceed from gratitude,
should be discovered to have arisen from an
expectation of some new favour, or if what
was apprehended to proceed from public
spirit should be found out to have taken its
origin from the hope of a pecuniary reward,
such a discovery would entirely destroy all
notion of merit or praiseworthiness in either
of these actions. . . . The most virtuous of
all affections. . . was that which embraced
as its objects the happiness of all intelligent
beings. The least virtuous . . . was that
which aimed no further than at the happiness
of an individual, such as a son, a brother,
a friend."23
Adam Smith, as we have seen,
did not deny the existence of benevolence
nor that it contributed to human welfare.
But he regarded this doctrine of Hutcheson’s
as being too extreme: “Regard to our own
private happiness and interest . . . appear
upon many occasions very laudable prin-
ciples of action. The habits of economy,
industry, discretion, attention and application
of thought, are generally supposed to be
cultivated from self-interested motives, and
at the same time are apprehended to be very
praiseworthy qualities, which deserve the
esteem and approbation of every body."24
Adam Smith adds:
Benevolence may, perhaps be the sole
principle of action in the Deity, and
there are several not improbable argu-
ments which tend to persuade us that
it is so. . . . But whatever may be the
case with the Deity, so imperfect a
creature as man, the support of whose
existence requires so many things ex-
ternal to him, must often act from
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