Lexstat 18 usc section 1001 united states code service

170.--Cases where evidence not found sufficient

Evidence was insufficient to convict under 18 USCS §§ 2, 371, and 1001, where defendant, who ran money laundering operation and who paid cash to purchase cashier's checks from various banks, never personally purchased checks totaling more than $ 10,000 from any banking location on any given day, but on 10 different days, he and his agents purchased checks totaling in excess of $ 10,000 from same bank since 31 USCS § 5313 and its regulations do not impose duty on participant in currency transaction with bank to inform bank of nature of transaction, therefore, there could be no concealment in violation of § 1001, participant could not aid or abet under § 2 bank's failure to report currency transactions where there was no evidence that bank had knowledge of nature of transactions, and there could be no § 371 conspiracy to violate § 5313 where bank was not under duty to report currency transactions. United States v Reinis (1986, CA9 Cal) 794 F2d 506, 86-2 USTC P 9559, 58 AFTR 2d 5443.

There was no evidence of knowing misrepresentation when defendant answered that he was not "self-employed" during period for which he was claiming disability, where only work he performed was for corporation of which he was president, since he was employee of that corporation; nor could he have been guilty of concealing self-employment, since he was never asked if he was owner of any corporation. United States v Hixon (1993, CA6 Tenn) 987 F2d 1261.

Evidence was insufficient to support conviction of attorney's employee for making false statements to Immigration and Naturalization Service on aliens' applications for asylum, where evidence tending to prove that defendant prepared alien's false application consisted only of facts that alien was from Bangladesh, defendant was one of two employees who handled Bangladeshi clients, and application contained language used in other applications prepared not only by defendant but also by other employees. United States v Walker (1999, CA2 NY) 191 F3d 326, 52 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1502, cert den (2000) 529 US 1080, 146 L Ed 2d 506, 120 S Ct 1702.

Insufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction under 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2) for making false statement to federal agent about number of microwave amplifiers exported to Chinese customer; context of statement, language barrier, and ambiguity of exchange between defendant and agent undermined district court's finding that defendant's statement was material and intentional. United States v Qing Chang Jiang (2007, CA9 Cal) 472 F3d 1162, amd (2007, CA9 Cal) 2007 US App LEXIS 1639.

A FBI agent testified at trial that issue of whether emergency assistance funds were used to buy personal vehicles for tribe members was one of issues that court was originally briefed on as concern on how funds were being used in investigation, and that testimony alone would have allowed rational juror to find that defendant's false statement was material; because there was ample evidence in record for rational juror to find defendant made material misstatement to FBI, defendant's sufficiency of evidence claim regarding her conviction for making material misstatement failed. United States v Oldbear (2009, CA10 Okla) 568 F3d 814.

Under 18 USCS § 1001 Government must show that interrogation was fair in circumstances in which it was undertaken and in light of purpose of statute which authorizes inquiry and requires answer, thus in § 1001 prosecution in which underlying statute was Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act (former 31 USCS § 1101(b)) which is not concerned with oral statements to investigators but rather with reports regarding international transportation of monetary instruments, where evidence was that customs agents in interrogating prospective passenger on international flight as to whether he was carrying more than $ 5,000 in currency simply elicited defensive reaction to exigency of unexpected official questioning, violation of § 1001 was not shown even though defendant orally denied possession of more than $ 5,000 which he, allegedly, in fact possessed. United States v Gomez-Londono (1976, ED NY) 422 F Supp 519, revd on other grounds (1977, CA2 NY) 553 F2d 805 and affd without op (1978, CA2 NY) 580 F2d 1046.

Government failed to establish proof beyond reasonable doubt that attorney caused material to be concealed from IRS in violation of 18 USCS §§ 1001 and 2(b) and failed to file currency transaction reports in violation of 31 USCS § 5322(a), where (1) there is reasonable doubt that attorney participated or directed splitting of $ 19,600 into two separate $ 9,800 deposits, and (2) handwriting expert could not identify handwriting on deposit slips as that of attorney. United States v Perlmutter (1987, SD NY) 656 F Supp 782, affd without op (1987, CA2 NY) 835 F2d 1430, cert den (1988) 485 US 935, 99 L Ed 2d 271, 108 S Ct 1110.

Government failed to establish that attorney violated 18 USCS § 1001 in giving false statement to IRS regarding her possession of check and bank statement, where (1) special agent did not take notes contemporaneously with interview such that context of attorney's statement to agent was not fully recorded, and (2) there is reasonable doubt that attorney believed representation to be false. United States v Perlmutter (1987, SD NY) 656 F Supp 782, affd without op (1987, CA2 NY) 835 F2d 1430, cert den (1988) 485 US 935, 99 L Ed 2d 271, 108 S Ct 1110.

Unpublished Opinions

Unpublished: Defendant was entitled to reversal of his conviction for making false statements in matter within jurisdiction of federal agency in violation of 18 USCS § 1001(a), because district court violated defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights when it failed to submit issue of agency jurisdiction to jury; further, there was insufficient evidence that agency of Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) was agency of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for purposes of 42 USCS § 300g-2 because there was no evidence that agency of CNMI was authorized by EPA to receive monthly reports at issue. United States v Babauta (2006, CA9) 2006 US App LEXIS 16984.

E.Questions of Law or Fact 171. Intent, knowledge and willfulness

Question of criminal intent was one of fact to be resolved by jury. Takahashi v United States (1944, CA9 Wash) 143 F2d 118; United States v De Lorenzo (1945, CA2 NY) 151 F2d 122.

In prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001, intent of defendant in making statement is question for jury. United States v Allison (1977, CA7 Ind) 555 F2d 1385.

Defendant's intent was factual issue and specific intent may be inferred from all relevant circumstances, since direct proof of intent is rarely available, and where evidence showing defendant's actual participation in diverting bank funds demonstrated that defendant was familiar enough with bank records to know that false entries were being made and fraudulent statements submitted, there was ample evidence to warrant submission of case to jury. United States v Daileda (1964, MD Pa) 229 F Supp 148, affd (1965, CA3 Pa) 342 F2d 218, cert den (1965) 382 US 815, 15 L Ed 2d 63, 86 S Ct 35.

172. Materiality

In federal criminal case, trial judge's refusal to allow jury to determine materiality of alleged false statements made by person accused of making false statements to government agency, in violation of 18 USCS § 1001, infringes accused's right to have jury determine his guilt of every element of crime charged. United States v Gaudin (1995) 515 US 506, 132 L Ed 2d 444, 115 S Ct 2310, 95 CDOS 4634, 95 Daily Journal DAR 7952, 9 FLW Fed S 187 (criticized in United States v Copus (1997, CA10 Okla) 110 F3d 1529) and (criticized in United States v Pappert (1997, CA10 Kan) 112 F3d 1073).

Materiality under 18 USCS § 1001 is question of fact which must be submitted to jury. United States v Gaudin (1994, CA9 Mont) 28 F3d 943, 94 CDOS 4632, 94 Daily Journal DAR 8593, affd (1995) 515 US 506, 132 L Ed 2d 444, 115 S Ct 2310, 95 CDOS 4634, 95 Daily Journal DAR 7952, 9 FLW Fed S 187 (criticized in United States v Copus (1997, CA10 Okla) 110 F3d 1529) and (criticized in United States v Pappert (1997, CA10 Kan) 112 F3d 1073).

Error in court's refusal to submit issue of materiality to jury was harmless, since jury necessarily considered facts predicate to finding of materiality in reaching its verdict, where there was no evidence outside of defendant's own testimony of any other purpose for falsifying addresses of inmates on health care application other than to influence health care provider's decision to process that application. United States v McGhee (1996, CA6 Tenn) 87 F3d 184, 1996 FED App 183P, reh, en banc, gr, vacated (1996, CA6) 95 F3d 1335 and (criticized in United States v Wiles (1996, CA10 Colo) 102 F3d 1043, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 99361, 46 Fed Rules Evid Serv 151) and (criticized in United States v Tandon (1997, CA6 Ohio) 111 F3d 482, 97-1 USTC P 50373, 79 AFTR 2d 2292, 1997 FED App 136P) and subsequent app (1997, CA6 Tenn) 119 F3d 422, 1997 FED App 211P.

Although issue of materiality of Medicare provider's concealments in ledgers to matter within jurisdiction of Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) was not submitted to jury, error did not affect provider's substantial rights, since there was no reasonable argument that statements at issue were not material. United States v Calhoon (1996, CA11 Ga) 97 F3d 518, 51 Soc Sec Rep Serv 740, 45 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1081, 10 FLW Fed C 493, cert den, motion gr (1997) 522 US 806, 139 L Ed 2d 11, 118 S Ct 44, reh den, motion gr (1997) 522 US 1037, 139 L Ed 2d 626, 118 S Ct 648.

Although district court erred in ruling as matter of law that immigrant violated 18 USCS § 1001 when he presented fictitious health insurance application and forged lease renewal agreement to INS to support his claim that his marriage was not entered into to evade immigration laws, error did not require reversal, since documents in question were material as circumstantial evidence of initial fraud, and evidence of materiality was overwhelming. United States v Dedhia (1998, CA6 Ohio) 134 F3d 802, 1998 FED App 26P, cert den, motion gr (1998) 523 US 1145, 140 L Ed 2d 1105, 118 S Ct 1844.

Zirconium exporter was not prejudiced by court's failure to submit materiality issue to jury, where false statements which he made to government about purpose for which he was exporting zirconium were clearly material, as their plain meaning would influence Commerce Department in deciding whether or not to grant export licenses. United States v Johnson (1998, CA11 Fla) 139 F3d 1359, 11 FLW C 1272, reh, en banc, den (1998, CA11 Fla) 149 F3d 1197 and cert den (1999) 527 US 1021, 144 L Ed 2d 770, 119 S Ct 2365.

Court's failure to submit materiality to jury was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant habeas relief or to establish miscarriage of justice, where he did not challenge materiality on direct appeal, and there was no basis for finding that his withholding of information on Defense Department forms was not material. United States v Dale (1998, App DC) 140 F3d 1054, cert den (1999) 525 US 1067, 142 L Ed 2d 657, 119 S Ct 794.

173. Miscellaneous

Question of whether statement made by defendant is one within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001 is one which must be decided by court. Tzantarmas v United States (1968, CA9 Or) 402 F2d 163, cert den (1969) 394 US 966, 22 L Ed 2d 569, 89 S Ct 1312.

No prejudice results from failure of trial judge to submit issues of law to jury. United States v Jones (1972, CA8 Ark) 464 F2d 1118, cert den (1973) 409 US 1111, 34 L Ed 2d 692, 93 S Ct 920.

Defendant's understanding and interpretation of questions to him by federal agency are questions for jury when prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001 results from such questioning. United States v Corr (1976, CA2 NY) 543 F2d 1042, 1 Fed Rules Evid Serv 376.

Whether criminal defendant who gives false name to magistrate can be indicted and prosecuted under 18 USCS § 1001 is question of law subject to de novo review on appeal. United States v Plascencia-Orozco (1985, CA9 Cal) 768 F2d 1074.

Trial court's failure to allow jury to decide whether defendant's false statements arose in connection with matter "within jurisdiction of any department or agency" of United States did not prejudice his trial under plain error standard, where jury was clearly informed that statements were made to Department of Labor. United States v Winstead (1996, App DC) 316 US App DC 52, 74 F3d 1313.

Because under 18 USCS § 1001 it is offense for anyone to do any fraudulent act which is calculated to or does obstruct or impair governmental agencies and/or value of their operations, documents, and reports, question of whether accused's conduct obstructs or impairs governmental function is matter for triers of fact, and in absence of instructions submitting this issue to court-martial, it would be error to affirm accused's conviction as violation of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Addye (1957) 7 USCMA 643, 23 CMR 107; United States v Dazier (1958) 9 USCMA 443, 26 CMR 223.

F.Instructions to Jury 174. Generally

Court must instruct jury on all essential elements of offense charged under 18 USCS § 1001. Peterson v United States (1965, CA5 Tex) 344 F2d 419, 65-1 USTC P 9348, 15 AFTR 2d 913.

175. Evidence

Instructing jury that government must prove that defendant intended to commit offense is quite different from explaining to jury how defendant can legitimately counter government's proof of this essential element of crime and is therefore inappropriate instruction in trial for making fraudulent representation to agency of government. United States v Miller (1981, CA4 SC) 658 F2d 235.

It was reversible error of court to instruct jury that proof of ownership of free airline ticket, for which defendant submitted voucher against funds already advanced him by government, was irrelevant, since if defendant owned ticket, his "statement" made by submitting voucher to government was not false. United States v Duncan (1987, CA4 Va) 816 F2d 153.

Erroneous jury instruction which allowed jury to find that defendants violated 18 USCS § 1001 by concealing material fact by "trick, scheme, or devise" merely by failing to file CTR's, without proof of any affirmative act of concealment, was not harmless, where it was uncertain that jury must have found all elements of crime. United States v St. Michael's Credit Union (1989, CA1 Mass) 880 F2d 579, 28 Fed Rules Evid Serv 840.

In prosecution of defendant for causing election campaign treasurers to submit false reports to Federal Election Commission, in violation of 18 USCS §§ 1001, 2(b), jury instruction that defendant had legal duty to disclose name of actual contributors to Federal Election Commission was clear error of law and required new trial, since it relieved government of proving its case under § 2(b) and was contrary to indictment. United States v Curran (1994, CA3 Pa) 20 F3d 560, reh den (1994, CA3) 1994 US App LEXIS 14937 and (criticized in United States v Khalife (1997, CA6 Mich) 106 F3d 1300, 79 AFTR 2d 1026, 1997 FED App 60P) and (criticized in United States v Gabriel (1997, CA2 NY) 125 F3d 89, 47 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1307) and (criticized in United States v Hsia (1999, App DC) 336 US App DC 91, 176 F3d 517).

176.--Character evidence

In prosecution for making false statements to United States, trial court's failure to instruct jury that testimony of defendant's good character may alone create reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt, and court's instruction that defendant's character witness did not testify about facts and circumstances of the case, was reversible error. Greer v United States (1955, CA10 Utah) 227 F2d 546.

In prosecution of co-conspirators in scheme to defraud banks in violation of 18 USCS §§ 371, 1001, and 1343, it was prejudicial error for court to refuse to give instruction as to character evidence, where case was complex, resting largely on evidence of coconspirator's fraudulent activity, and jury found its decision-making process difficult, since evidence of good character might have generated reasonable doubt. United States v Daily (1990, CA10 Kan) 921 F2d 994, reh den, en banc (1991, CA10) 1991 US App LEXIS 3271 and cert den (1991) 502 US 952, 116 L Ed 2d 354, 112 S Ct 405 and (criticized in United States v McGuire (1996, CA5 Miss) 96-1 USTC P 50163) and (ovrld on other grounds as stated in United States v Wiles (1996, CA10 Colo) 102 F3d 1043, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 99361, 46 Fed Rules Evid Serv 151) and (ovrld in part on other grounds as stated in United States v Vaziri (1999, CA10 Wyo) 164 F3d 556, 1999 Colo J C A R 1397).

177. Intent, knowledge and willfulness

Instruction was insufficient where law officer failed to instruct court that "knowing and willful" falsification was essential element of acts proscribed by 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Perdelwitz (1953, US) 14 CMR 423.

In prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001, failure of court to define "willfulness" or charge as to presumption of innocence was not error in absence of requests to do so. United States v Private Brands, Inc. (1957, CA2 NY) 250 F2d 554, cert den (1958) 355 US 957, 2 L Ed 2d 532, 78 S Ct 542.

In prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001 involving fraudulent submission of claims under Medicare program, charge that "the term knowingly and willfully as used in relation to making of a statement means the statement must have been made voluntarily, deliberately, and intentionally, and with knowledge of its contents and falsity," was proper. United States v Evans (1977, CA5 Fla) 559 F2d 244, reh den (1977, CA5 Fla) 562 F2d 1257 and reh den (1977, CA5 Fla) 565 F2d 1215 and cert den (1978) 434 US 1015, 54 L Ed 2d 759, 98 S Ct 731 and cert den (1978) 435 US 945, 55 L Ed 2d 542, 98 S Ct 1528.

Although instruction in prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 which stated that jury could find defendant guilty of statements were made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless indifference as to their falsity may have been improper, since there was considerable evidence of defendant's actual knowledge of falsity of statements and jury would presumably have reached same verdict if conscious avoidance of truth had been added to charge, no prejudice occurred. United States v Schaffer (1979, CA5 Fla) 600 F2d 1120.

Jury instruction that indictment alleges conspirators agreed to make false statements on loan guarantee application and that defendant denied knowledge of these false statements is sufficient to inform jury that to find defendant guilty it must find knowledge of false statements before loan was closed. United States v Hutcher (1980, CA2 NY) 622 F2d 1083, 5 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1146, cert den (1980) 449 US 875, 66 L Ed 2d 96, 101 S Ct 218.

In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001, it is not error for court to instruct jury that defendant had to knowingly and willfully make false statement to government officials before they could find him in violation of § 1001. United States v Duncan (1982, CA9 Cal) 693 F2d 971, 12 Fed Rules Evid Serv 82, cert den (1983) 461 US 961, 77 L Ed 2d 1321, 103 S Ct 2436.

In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001, instruction is sufficient where it is given in effort to explain what element of "knowingly" means in that element of knowingly requires jury to attempt to assess whether defendant subjectively knew that information he was providing was false. United States v Cox (1983, CA11 Ga) 696 F2d 1294, 12 Fed Rules Evid Serv 539, cert den (1983) 464 US 827, 78 L Ed 2d 104, 104 S Ct 99.

No culpable mental state must be proved with respect to federal agency jurisdiction in order to establish violation of 18 USCS § 1001, and trial judge does not his discretion in refusing to give instruction on jurisdictional knowledge. United States v Green (1984, CA9 Cal) 745 F2d 1205, cert den (1985) 474 US 925, 88 L Ed 2d 266, 106 S Ct 259 and (criticized in United States v Falkowitz (2002, SD NY) 214 F Supp 2d 365).

There was no error in jury instruction stating that government need not prove company manager's knowledge that falsely-dated bill of lading for shipment of hazardous waste was within jurisdiction of EPA, for purposes of 18 USCS § 1001, even though document was internal and not on preprinted government form--from which agency jurisdiction could be inferred--since there is no mental state required for jurisdictional element. United States v Heuer (1993, CA9 Nev) 4 F3d 723, 93 CDOS 6519, 93 Daily Journal DAR 11177, 23 ELR 21357, cert den (1994) 510 US 1164, 127 L Ed 2d 540, 114 S Ct 1190.

Although evidence failed to establish requisite factual predicate for jury instruction on conscious avoidance, error was harmless, where there was overwhelming evidence of business analyst for underwriting firm's actual knowledge of fraudulent nature of loans, and jury was properly instructed on actual knowledge. United States v Ferrarini (2000, CA2) 219 F3d 145, subsequent app (2000, CA2 NY) 225 F3d 647, reported in full (2000, CA2 NY) 2000 US App LEXIS 18048 and cert den (2001) 532 US 1037, 149 L Ed 2d 1001, 121 S Ct 1997 and cert den (2001) 532 US 1037, 149 L Ed 2d 1001, 121 S Ct 1998 and post-conviction relief den (2002, SD NY) 2002 US Dist LEXIS 9463.

District court did not commit plain error when it failed to carve out exception, under 18 USCS § 1001, to principle that ignorance of law is no excuse by failing to instruct jury that "willfully" under § 1001 required something more than that defendant had been aware of generally unlawful nature of his conduct. United States v Whab (2004, CA2 NY) 355 F3d 155, cert den (2004) 541 US 1004, 158 L Ed 2d 519, 124 S Ct 2055.

Defendant's argument that "intent to deceive" instruction should have been given in connection with false statement counts under 18 USCS § 1001 was without merit where U.S. Supreme Court has itself rejected claim that "intent to deceive" is required. United States v Gonsalves (2006, CA1 RI) 435 F3d 64.

District court did not plainly err in defining intent element of 18 USCS § 1001 in its jury instructions when it omitted "knowingly" and "willfully' elements on verdict form; its instruction, which followed caselaw interpreting term willfulness as meaning nothing more in context than that defendant knew that his statement was false when he made it, was proper, and § 1001 did not require intent to deceive; additionally, defendant did not object to verdict form and, as district court properly instructed jury, it was not required to reiterate all elements of § 1001 violation in form. United States v Riccio (2008, CA1 RI) 529 F3d 40.

"False statements" conviction under 18 USCS § 1001 will not be disturbed, despite complaint that jury should have been instructed that man could not be found guilty of § 1001 violation in absence of proof that he understood that statements he made were false, because jury was indeed instructed that, in order to convict, it must find that man acted knowingly--"with awareness and comprehension"--and willfully--"deliberately, voluntarily, and intentionally." United States v Williams (1998, DC Dist Col) 29 F Supp 2d 1, vacated in part on other grounds, remanded sub nom United States v Schaffer (2001, App DC) 345 US App DC 111, 240 F3d 35.