David Abesadze
24
Dr. David Abesadze
The Transformation of Islamic Movement in Turkey:
Case of Nak ibendî and Nurculuk
Introduction
Significance of this study is determined by the following factors: Firstly,
Geographical: Turkey is one of the most important neighboring states, and at the
same time important trade-economic and political ally of Georgia. Due to
Geographical proximity, social, economic, and political processes in Turkey can
have significant impact on the situation in Georgia and in the Black Sea region,
in general; Secondly, Structural: Generally speaking, there are some similarities
in basic internal development factors - strengthening democratic institutions,
and market economy - and in the foreign policy orientation of Georgia and
Turkey. Therefore, in general study the experience of Turkey would have a
positive significance for Georgia.
Georgia's social-economic and political problems increase the risk for the
strengthening of religious movement in the country. Recent events in Georgia,
in particular, activation of religious groups, to some extent can be seen as the
rudiment of this danger. Further strengthening of religious movement will
significantly hinder Georgia's further development, towards the strengthening of
liberal-democratic institutions in the country.
In-depth study and analysis of the above-mentioned topic, based on the
experience of Turkey - that is a transformation of religious movement and their
inclusion into democratic political system - can have a significance for
mitigating the above-mentioned risks. In-depth knowledge of those issues would
help: 1) to asses more adequately the potential risks, coming from the religious
movement; and 2) to lead the process towards their inclusion into the liberal-
democratic political system.
In the paper I focus on one of the main actors of Islamic movement in
Turkey: Nak ibendi order and Nurculuk, using the theoretical framework
developed by one of the leading scholars of Islam and politics Professor Daniel
The Transformation of Islamic Movement in Turkey: Case of Nak ibendî and Nurculuk
25
Brumberg. Conclusions of this paper were basically drawn on the basis of the
field research in Istanbul: observations of the Islamic parties of Turkey [Justice
and Development Party - Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi; and Felicity Party - Saadet
Partisi], organisations connected to Islamic movement [Independent Industri-
alists and Businessmen’s Association - Müstakil Sanayici ve adamları
Derne i; Association for Defense of Human Rights and Support for Oppressed
People - nsan Hakları ve Mazlumlarla Dayanı ma Derne i], and in-depth in-
terviews with their representatives and supporters.
Nak ibendi Order
The Nak ibendî is one of the most famous Sufi orders, the tarikat
1
that
posed the most dangerous threat to secularism in Turkey.
2
Their strict anti-
secular activity got its roots from the ambiguous and limited secularising
policies of young Turks during the Ottoman Empire.
3
Their strict anti-secular
movement continued in the 1920s and 1930s, aiming to destroy the “sinful”
republican regime.
4
It is worth adding that the weakening of the ulema, the
formal religious teaching, and absence of alternative religious activity, made
fertile ground for the Nak ibendî to play a distinctive role in the rise of the
fundamentalist religious movement during the single-party period in Turkey.
5
1
Tarikat literally means “way.” As David Shankland broadly defines, “a tarikat is a
number of believers united by the respect that they show for a particular person or
lineage, whom they regard as different from other human beings by virtue of their
being favored by God.” Tarikat is a hierarchical, often exclusive organisation that
differs from configuration of the worship at a mosque. In a mosque, the imam is the
prayer-leader, who is not qualitatively different from other male worshippers. Tarikat
is a way of organising Islamic ideas assuming that God can be reached from within or
through a person. An orthodox position argues that, “God is transcendent, beyond the
reach or comprehension of believers.” “[In the Ottoman Empire], the orthodox clergy,
the ulema, sought to take control through their proximity to the governing power,
whilst the tarikats, with their charismatic leader and mobile followers often became a
focus for rebellion and direct assault on the center.” See Gellner (1981). For general
introduction to the brotherhoods in Islam see Trimingham (1971). In David Shankland,
“Islam and Society in Turkey,” The Eothen Press, 1999, pp. 64-64.
2
erif Mardin, “The Nak ibendî Order in Turkish History,” Richard Tapper Ed., Islam
in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State, I.B. Tauris &
Co Ltd. Publishers, London. New York, 1991, p. 121.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid., p. 122.
5
Sencer Ayata, “Patronage, Party, and State: The Politization of Islam in Turkey,” The
Middle East Journal, Winter 1996, Volume 50, Number 1, p. 48.
David Abesadze
26
Because the secular state saw them as dangerous, they were banned in
1925, along with other tarikats, by the republican government. However, the
Nak ibendî order (tarikat) did not stop functioning and tacitly always
represented a refuge for those people who opposed the state secular reforms, and
who supported the creation of a state based on Sharia (Islamic Holy Law).
6
As we have witnessed, in the early 1970s the Nak ibendî order changed its
strategy, turning from organising mass revolts to participating in the established
political system. Nak ibendî played an important role in Turkish politics by
incorporating in their list leading political actors (among their members were
leading politicians such as Turgut Özal, later the president of Turkey and
Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the NOP, NSP and WP parties, along with many
others), and creating its own Islamist political party that actively participated in
Turkey’s electoral politics (the Nak ibendî order was one of the founders of the
National Salvation, and National Order parties).
7
from the 1970s onwards,
Nak ibendîs have developed powerful and active business networks, mass
media, and social and welfare services.
8
Now, the Nak ibendîs follow a peaceful and gradualist political strategy.
They try to avoid open confrontation with secular state institutions.
9
“In the
second half of the 1990s, the leaders of the influential religious brotherhoods,
movements, and sects, and the leading Muslim intellectuals appear to be fairly
well integrated into the Turkish secular democratic state and display even more
moderate views than the RP (RP means Refah Partisi, Welfare Party).”
10
once the
leading religious brotherhoods (the Nak ibendîs and Nurcus) made a tacit pact
with secularist political parties in exchange for leaving the religious brotherhoods
alone, they would in turn support them. But later, the brotherhoods became
lobbies for those business sectors, such as textiles, construction and banking, that
6
David Shankland, “Islam and Society in Turkey,” The Eothen Press, 1999, pp. 63-64.
7
Ibid., p. 68.
8
Sencer Ayata, “Patronage, Party, and State: The Politization of Islam in Turkey,” The
Middle East Journal, Winter 1996, Volume 50, Number 1, pp. 48-49.
9
Sencer Ayata, “The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism and Its Institutional Framework,”
Atila Eralp, Muharrem Tunay, and Birol Ye ilada ed., The Political and
Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey, Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, London,
1993, p. 54. For more information on this argument see H. Algar, “Der Nak ibendî
Order in der republikanischen Turkei.” In Jochen Blaschke and Marlin van Bruinessen,
eds., Islam und Politik in der Turkei. Express edition. Berlin.
10
Metin Heper, “Islam and Democracy in Turkey: Toward a Reconciliation?” The
Middle East Journal, Volume 51, Number 1, Winter 1997, p. 38.
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