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David Abesadze 

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Dr. David Abesadze 

The Transformation of Islamic Movement in Turkey:  

Case of Nak ibendî and Nurculuk 

Introduction

Significance of this study is determined by the following factors: Firstly, 

Geographical: Turkey is one of the most important neighboring states, and at the 

same time important trade-economic and political ally of Georgia. Due to 

Geographical proximity, social, economic, and political processes in Turkey can 

have significant impact on the situation in Georgia and in the Black Sea region, 

in general; Secondly, Structural: Generally speaking, there are some similarities 

in basic internal development factors - strengthening democratic institutions, 

and market economy - and in the foreign policy orientation of Georgia and 

Turkey. Therefore, in general study the experience of Turkey would have a 

positive significance for Georgia.  

Georgia's social-economic and political problems increase the risk for the 

strengthening of religious movement in the country. Recent events in Georgia, 

in particular, activation of religious groups, to some extent can be seen as the 

rudiment of this danger. Further strengthening of religious movement will 

significantly hinder Georgia's further development, towards the strengthening of 

liberal-democratic institutions in the country.  

In-depth study and analysis of the above-mentioned topic, based on the 

experience of Turkey - that is a transformation of religious movement and their 

inclusion into democratic political system - can have a significance for 

mitigating the above-mentioned risks. In-depth knowledge of those issues would 

help: 1) to asses more adequately the potential risks, coming from the religious 

movement; and 2) to lead the process towards their inclusion into the liberal-

democratic political system.     

In the paper I focus on one of the main actors of Islamic movement in 

Turkey: Nak ibendi order and Nurculuk, using the theoretical framework 

developed by one of the leading scholars of Islam and politics Professor Daniel 

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The Transformation of Islamic Movement in Turkey: Case of Nak ibendî and Nurculuk 

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Brumberg. Conclusions of this paper were basically drawn on the basis of the 

field research in Istanbul: observations of the Islamic parties of Turkey [Justice 

and Development Party - Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi; and Felicity Party - Saadet 

Partisi], organisations connected to Islamic movement [Independent Industri-

alists and Businessmen’s Association - Müstakil Sanayici ve  adamları

Derne i; Association for Defense of Human Rights and Support for Oppressed 

People -   nsan Hakları ve Mazlumlarla Dayanı ma Derne i], and in-depth in-

terviews with their representatives and supporters.   

Nak ibendi Order 

The Nak ibendî is one of the most famous Sufi orders, the tarikat

1

 that 

posed the most dangerous threat to secularism in Turkey.

2

 Their strict anti-

secular activity got its roots from the ambiguous and limited secularising 

policies of young Turks during the Ottoman Empire.

3

 Their strict anti-secular 

movement continued in the 1920s and 1930s, aiming to destroy the “sinful” 

republican regime.

4

 It is worth adding that the weakening of the ulema, the 

formal religious teaching, and absence of alternative religious activity, made 

fertile ground for the Nak ibendî to play a distinctive role in the rise of the 

fundamentalist religious movement during the single-party period in Turkey.

5

1

Tarikat  literally means “way.” As David Shankland broadly defines, “a tarikat  is a 

number of believers united by the respect that they show for a particular person or 

lineage, whom they regard as different from other human beings by virtue of their 

being favored by God.” Tarikat is a hierarchical, often exclusive organisation that 

differs from configuration of the worship at a mosque. In a mosque, the imam is the 

prayer-leader, who is not qualitatively different from other male worshippers. Tarikat 

is a way of organising Islamic ideas assuming that God can be reached from within or 

through a person.  An orthodox position argues that, “God is transcendent, beyond the 

reach or comprehension of believers.” “[In the Ottoman Empire], the orthodox clergy, 

the ulema,  sought to take control through their proximity to the governing power, 

whilst the tarikats, with their charismatic leader and mobile followers often became a 

focus for rebellion and direct assault on the center.” See Gellner (1981). For general 

introduction to the brotherhoods in Islam see Trimingham (1971). In David Shankland, 

“Islam and Society in Turkey,” The Eothen Press, 1999, pp. 64-64.   

2

erif Mardin, “The Nak ibendî Order in Turkish History,” Richard Tapper Ed., Islam

in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State, I.B. Tauris & 

Co Ltd. Publishers, London. New York, 1991, p. 121. 

3

   Ibid. 

4

   Ibid., p. 122. 

5

  Sencer Ayata, “Patronage, Party, and State: The Politization of Islam in Turkey,” The 

Middle East Journal, Winter 1996, Volume 50, Number 1, p. 48. 

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David Abesadze 

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Because the secular state saw them as dangerous, they were banned in 

1925, along with other tarikats, by the republican government. However, the 

Nak ibendî order (tarikat) did not stop functioning and tacitly always 

represented a refuge for those people who opposed the state secular reforms, and 

who supported the creation of a state based on Sharia (Islamic Holy Law).

6

As we have witnessed, in the early 1970s the Nak ibendî order changed its 

strategy, turning from organising mass revolts to participating in the established 

political system. Nak ibendî played an important role in Turkish politics by 

incorporating in their list leading political actors (among their members were 

leading politicians such as Turgut Özal, later the president of Turkey  and 

Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the NOP, NSP and WP parties, along with many 

others), and creating its own Islamist political party that actively participated in 

Turkey’s electoral politics (the Nak ibendî order was one of the founders of the 

National Salvation, and National Order parties).

7

 from the 1970s onwards, 

Nak ibendîs have developed powerful and active business networks, mass 

media, and social and welfare services.

8

Now, the Nak ibendîs follow a peaceful and gradualist political strategy. 

They try to avoid open confrontation with secular state institutions.

9

 “In the 

second half of the 1990s, the leaders of the influential religious brotherhoods, 

movements, and sects, and the leading Muslim intellectuals appear to be fairly 

well integrated into the Turkish secular democratic state and display even more 

moderate views than the RP (RP means Refah Partisi, Welfare Party).”

10

 once the 

leading religious brotherhoods (the Nak ibendîs and Nurcus) made a tacit pact 

with secularist political parties in exchange for leaving the religious brotherhoods 

alone, they would in turn support them. But later, the brotherhoods became 

lobbies for those business sectors, such as textiles, construction and banking, that 

6

  David Shankland, “Islam and Society in Turkey,” The Eothen Press, 1999, pp. 63-64.  

7

  Ibid., p. 68. 

8

  Sencer Ayata, “Patronage, Party, and State: The Politization of Islam in Turkey,” The 

Middle East Journal, Winter 1996, Volume 50, Number 1, pp. 48-49. 

9

  Sencer Ayata, “The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism and Its Institutional Framework,” 

Atila Eralp, Muharrem Tunay, and Birol Ye ilada ed., The Political and 

Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey, Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, London, 

1993, p. 54. For more information on this argument see H. Algar, “Der Nak ibendî

Order in der republikanischen Turkei.” In Jochen Blaschke and Marlin van Bruinessen, 

eds., Islam und Politik in der Turkei. Express edition. Berlin.    

10

 Metin Heper, “Islam and Democracy in Turkey: Toward a Reconciliation?” The

Middle East Journal, Volume 51, Number 1, Winter 1997, p. 38. 

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