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The Transformation of Islamic Movement in Turkey: Case of Nak ibendî and Nurculuk 29 each other. 26 Nevertheless, he did not aim to give up his idea of an Islamic state, asking the new Grand National Assembly of Republican Turkey to obey Islamic precepts, and strictly opposing Kemalist reforms. 27 He was offering a bridge from traditional to modern society. 28 He had a gradual transformation program that included three steps: (a) raising individual Muslim consciousness; (b) the implementation of faith in everyday life; (c) the restoration of the shari’a. 29 As we see, Nursi’s whole strategy was directed towards a Sharia ruled society . 30 Nevertheless, the Nurcu movement expressed a positive attitude towards Turkey’s membership in NATO, and supported the idea of Turkey’s integration into the European Union. 31 After Said Nursi’s death, the movement divided into several groups. 32 Among them the most powerful is the neo-Nurcu movement, or the so-called Fethullah G len community. This and other neo-Nurcu movements are far from positioned as anti-state; they all pursue a statist position. 33 The leader of the most powerful neo-Nurcu movement, Fethullah G len, began his career in 1953. In the beginning, he was a preacher. In 1958, he became a teacher at one of the mosques. In 1971 he was accused of clandestine religious activities (organising summer camps to disseminate Islamic ideas) and was arrested in a 1971 military intervention. Because of the military’s relative tolerant attitudes towards Islam in the 1980s, G len. regardless of police prosecution, avoided arrest. 34 In those days, his activity was basically focused on writing about religious philosophy. 35 26 Ibid., pp. 586-587. 27 Ibid., p. 588. 28 Ibid., p. 591. 29 Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, “Kastamonu Lâhikası,” RNK II, p. 1641. In M. Hakan Ya- vuz, “Towards an Islamic Liberalism?: The Nurcu Movement and Fethullah G len,” Middle East Journal, Volume 53, Number 4, Autumn 1999, p. 591. 30 Ibid. 31 Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, “Lem’alar,” RNK I, p. 643. In M. Hakan Yavuz, “Towards an Islamic Liberalism?: The Nurcu Movement and Fethullah G len,” Middle East
32 M. Hakan Yavuz, “The Construction of Islamic Identity in Turkey, 1960-1997,” (Unpublished Dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1998,) pp. 347-364. In M. Hakan Yavuz, “Towards an Islamic Liberalism?: The Nurcu Movement and Fethu- llah G len,” Middle East Journal, Volume 53, Number 4, Autumn 1999, p. 592. 33 Ibid. 34 Bülent Aras, “Turkish Islam’s Moderate Face,” Middle East Quarterly, September 1998, Volume V: Number 3, p. 23. 35 Ibid., p. 24. David Abesadze 30 G len’s movement is mainly made up of young urban men – especially doctors, academics, 36 journalists, businessmen (Anatolian entrepreneurs), and students, who’s estimated number varies from 2 to 4 million. 37 The movement opposes political Islam and is involved in sponsoring summer camps, universities, cultural facilities, colleges, student dormitories, classrooms, and communication organisations. The movement set up several organisations to propagate G len’s ideas, including the Turkish Teachers Foundation that publishes several monthly and academic journals. 38 The economic liberalisation of the 1980s created spaces for the neo-Nurcu movement, 39 which established a large media empire network including a TV channel, Samanyolu, a radio station, Burc FM, the daily new- spaper, Zaman; the movement also produced a lot of videos and cassettes to propagate G len’s ideas. 40 As well as the scientific journal Sızıntı, Ekoloji (an environment-related magazine), the movement also founded Fountain (an English-language newspaper). 41 Among frequent guests to their media outlets are well-known intellectuals from the elite secular universities of Turkey: Bosphorus and Bilkent universities. 42 As Turkish scholars argue, the Nurcus media network is more democratic than most other Islamist, and even Kemalist groups, in the sense that it allows more freedom for debate and criticism. 43 Besides, the community owns several business organisations (among them is the powerful, non-interest bearing bank Asya Finans, that has over half of a billion dollars in capital 44 ); and
36 B lent Aras, “Turkish Islam’s Moderate Face,” Middle East Quarterly, September 1998, Volume V: Number 3, p. 25. 37
Middle East Quarterly, September 1998, Volume V: Number 3, p. 25. 38 Ibid., p. 26. 39 M. Hakan Yavuz, “Search for a New Social Contract in Turkey: Fethullah G len, the Virtue Party and the Kurds,” SAIS Review, A Journal of International Affairs, Winter- Spring 1999, Volume XIX, Number one, p. 119. 40 B lent Aras, “Turkish Islam’s Moderate Face,” Middle East Quarterly, September 1998, Volume V: Number 3, p. 26. 41 M. Hakan Yavuz, “Search for a New Social Contract in Turkey: Fethullah G len, the Virtue Party and the Kurds,” SAIS Review, A Journal of International Affairs, Winter- Spring 1999, Volume XIX, Number one, p. 123. 42 B lent Aras, “Turkish Islam’s Moderate Face,” Middle East Quarterly, September 1998, Volume V: Number 3, p. 26. 43 M. Hakan Yavuz, “Search for a New Social Contract in Turkey: Fethullah G len, the Virtue Party and the Kurds,” SAIS Review, A Journal of International Affairs, Winter- Spring 1999, Volume XIX, Number one, p. 123. 44 Ibid.
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