Microsoft Word orenovani sarchevi doc
Yüklə 2,53 Mb. Pdf görüntüsü
|
The Transformation of Islamic Movement in Turkey: Case of Nak ibendî and Nurculuk 31 one of them, is the Alarko Group, run with Jewish co-founders. 45 As Turkish scholars conclude, the process of economic liberalisation in the 1980s resulted in openings for several organisations to play crucial roles in the moderation of Islamic groups, such as the neo-Nurcus movement. 46 Duty to the community and obedience plays important role in hierarchical ma- nagement of the movement’s day-to-day activity. 47 G len is well aware of the power of the market and the opportunities available in a free market economy. As Turkish scholars assert, the neo-Nurcu movement upheld the Western values of free market capitalism and liberal democracy, even more than did the state bureaucratic establi- shment.
48 For the neo-Nurcu movement, free market leads to producing economic wealth that will support and improve a modern educational system, and empower Muslims in Turkey. By improving the free market and modern education, Islam’s face changes as well). G len’s philosophy, therefore, is very much in tune with this growing business community. He stresses education and engagement in the market economy. G len’s activities are aimed at molding a cohesive and disciplined com- munity through education, mass media, and financial networks. G len’s movement sees Islam as subordinate to Ottoman culture and Turkish nationalism. 49 The movement has a special interest in spreading Turkey’s influence in Turkic republics, by trying to promote Turkish business and establish schools that would promote philosophical ideas on Turkish nationalism rather than on Islam. G len is very cautious towards the military establishment of Turkey. Instead of antagonising the relationship with them, he does his best to persuade the military that his movement’s interest is not in conflict with the existing political order, but rather maintains the status quo. 50 He has said that, if necessary, he would grant his schools to the state. 51 There are strained relations between G len’s movement and the Welfare Party. Erbakan accuses G len’s community of cooperating with the government against the Welfare Party. G len as well often criticises the Welfare Party’s 45 B lent Aras, “Turkish Islam’s Moderate Face,” Middle East Quarterly, September 1998, Volume V: Number 3, p. 26. 46 M. Hakan Yavuz, “Search for a New Social Contract in Turkey: Fethullah G len, the Virtue Party and the Kurds,” SAIS Review, A Journal of International Affairs, Winter- Spring 1999, Volume XIX, Number one, p. 119. 47 Ibid., p. 123. 48 Ibid., pp. 118-119. 49 Ibid., pp. 123-125. 50 Ibid., p. 27. 51
David Abesadze 32 policies and activities. G len’s antagonistic attitude towards the Welfare Party even pushed him to support the Welfare Party’s removal from office and closure by the military in 1998. Because of such disputed relations between G len’s movement and Welfare Party, the former usually gave their support to the secular party instead of Welfare Party. 52 The same strategy was continued after the Virtue Party replaced the Welfare Party. G len did not support the Virtue Party, criticising their demand to “instrumentalise” religion in politics. 53 Here,
in order to see clearly the transformation of the old Nurcu movement, we can recall the completely antagonistic attitude of the old Nurcu group, when it sharply criticised Islamist, National Salvation Party’s leader, Erbakan, for making coalition governments with the center-left, and center-right political parties, and leaving the Islamist party in 1970’s. 54 G len has good relations with liberal intellectuals, who state that by reaching consensus with G len’s “soft” Islamic movement they see a solution to Turkey’s problems. 55 As Turkish scholar Ru en Çakır asserts, “The [secular] parties are promoting him as an alternative to Welfare. They’re using their enemy’s weapon against their enemy.” 56
link between state and religion, emphasize democracy and tolerance, and encourage links with the Turkic republics.” 57 As it seems, the Nurcu movement is more interested in involving in the fields of spirituality, education, stability, and developing its business activities, rather than seeking political power, and creating its own political party. 58 The neo-Nurcu group was more imaginative in regard to societal transformation than the Virtue Party. “G len’s group is better organised and more in tune with Turkish statism than the Virtue-led Islamic forces. When the 52 Bülent Aras, “Turkish Islam’s Moderate Face,” Middle East Quarterly, September 1998, Volume V: Number 3, pp. 27-28. 53 M. Hakan Yavuz, “Search for a New Social Contract in Turkey: Fethullah G len, the Virtue Party and the Kurds,” SAIS Review, A Journal of International Affairs, Winter- Spring 1999, Volume XIX, Number one, p. 126. 54 Birol A. Ye ilada, “The Virtue Party,” Turkish Studies, Volume 3, Number 1, Spring 2002, p. 67. 55 Bülent Aras, “Turkish Islam’s Moderate Face,” Middle East Quarterly, September 1998, Volume V: Number 3, p. 28. 56 Alistair Bell, “Turkish Islamic leader defies radical label,” Reuters, August 7, 1995. In Bülent Aras, “Turkish Islam’s Moderate Face,” Middle East Quarterly, September 1998, Volume V: Number 3, p. 28. 57 Bülent Aras, “Turkish Islam’s Moderate Face,” Middle East Quarterly, September 1998, Volume V: Number 3, p. 29. 58 Ibid. Yüklə 2,53 Mb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
|