David Abesadze
36
on the transformation of Islam. A new generation of Islamists who did not
obtain a competent Islamic education was more vulnerable
to structural changes
imposed by the secular Turkish state. The post-1980, neo-liberal era created
favourable conditions for the significant rise in Islamic capital or Islamic
bourgeoisie in Turkey.
64
Considering the fact that the secular state still retained
powerful means in economic relationships, confrontation with the state was
disastrous for Islamic business. Thus, rationally, it made more sense for
Islamists to choose a conciliatory relationship with the secular state, that was
more focused on their economic activities and gaining profit, than taking care of
the Islamic resurgence. These factors played a crucial role in the gradual
transformation of Islam’s identity to market Islam, and required moderate
fundamentalists to take up a more moderate, strategic modernism posture.
65
Thirdly, another factor that played a decisive role in the moderation process
of the Islamic orders, was the pressure imposed on Islamists by means of
institutional constaints. They included the possibility of military intervention
and triggered a fear of legal closure by order of the courts.
66
As to the fourth factor
, external context played an instrumental role. Today,
as Öni argues, domestic politics of the nation states are more dependent on
external global norms than they were before. In this respect, norms of the
European Union played an important role in the moderation of anti-state, anti-
democratic religious orders that look at the EU as a natural source of protection
from the secular state establishment. Looking at the EU as an actor who has
power to defend the rights of Islamic groups, forced the latter to quit the
fundamentalist stance and instead act according to the rules of the EU, that is
democracy.
67
Considering the transformation of religious-political movement of Turkey
the following conclusions can be drawn.
As we saw in the Turkish case, the
sponsor organisations (religious orders) played an instrumental role in the
moderation process. It is worth mentioning that in Turkey moderation of religious-
64
Ziya Öni , “The political economy of Islamic resurgence in Turkey: the rise of the
Welfare Party in perspective,”
Third World Quarterly, Volume 18, Number 4, 1997.
65
Ibid., See See Hakan Yavuz, “Search for a New Social Contract in Turkey: Fethullah
Gulen, the Virtue Party and the Kurds,”
SAIS Review,
A Journal of International
Affairs, Volume 19, Number 1, Winter-Spring 1999; B. Aras, “Turkish Islam’s
Moderate Face,” Middle East Quarterly, Volume 5, Number 3, September 1998.
66
Ziya Öni , “Political Islam at the Crossroads: From Hegemony to co-existence” (Sep-
tember 2001). Website: http://home.ku.edu.tr/~zonis/polislam.PDF. p. 21.
67
Ibid.
The Transformation of Islamic Movement in Turkey: Case of Nak ibendî and Nurculuk
37
political movements was the result of a long, two-step learning process, that
involved several external constraints from the secular state establishment, and
systemic changes in the Turkish economic and social systems (here I mean
liberalisation of the Turkish economy, and abolishment of the religious
educational system). In turkey the main actors more or less were informed about
the outcome and the democratic legitimacy was generated exogenously.
Bibliography
I am particularly grateful to Dr Zsolt Eneydi, my research supervisor, for
his extremely valuable and constructive suggestions during the planning and
development of this research work. I would like to offer my special thanks to Dr
Revaz Gachechiladze, my teacher and supervisor, for his professional guidance
and valuable advices and support. His willingness to give his time so generously
has been very much appreciated. I would also like to extend my special thanks
to Dr Marine Shonia, my long time teacher for her enthusiastic encouragement
and useful contribution and critique of this research work. My grateful thanks
are also extended to Dr Miklos Sukosd, Dr Ziya Oni , Dr Huricihan Islamo lu,
Dr Ersin Kalaycio lu, and Dr Ali Çarko lu for their useful recommendations
and time sincerely devoted to my research.
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