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INTRODUCTION: SECTION TWO
account of experience, correlation with brain cells is a limited activ-
ity. Understanding neurology, therefore, depends on the unpre-
dictable accounts of experience and thus remains a fragile human
endeavour. In order to establish a correlation between neurological
processes and religious or paranormal activity Persinger, and his
colleague Katherine Makarec, had to construct a way of framing
the experience.
To study the existence of temporal lobe signs within the normal popula-
tion, the Personal Philosophy Inventory (PPI) was developed.
85
The correlation between a neurological activity and an “experience”
(as if experience is a measurable unit separable from the stream of
consciousness) depends on the nature of a “report” of an experience.
James documented 214 accounts of religious experience from
across different cultures and historical periods and attempted some
kind of ordering of the experiences according to his own cultural
bias — according to Niebuhr they reflected the pattern of evangeli-
cal Protestant religious experience.
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From the 140 items of their
Personal Philosophy Inventory, documenting anything from hand
preference to church attendance, Persinger and Makarec developed
“clusters” (34 items) that reflected “types of experience that are
most frequently associated with either surgical stimulation or
biogenic focal (epileptic) stimulation of the temporal lobe”.
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The
“clusters” are named as “normal psychological references”, “mun-
dane proprioceptions”, “oddity items”, the general temporal lobe
cluster and paranormal experiences, with subclusters of the “feeling
of presence” and “depersonalization”. There were also two belief
clusters, “dogmatic religious beliefs” and “exotic fantasy-related
beliefs.” This ordering of religious experiences is arbitrary and
artificial and, more importantly, shows no greater organisation of
experience than James’s arrangement according to healthy and sick
souls. In fact the “feeling of presence” is a key part of James’s
phenomenological account of “the reality of the unseen”.
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Persinger
and Makarec also made judgements about “relevant
personal history
and beliefs”, but give no criteria for their own assessment of what
85
Persinger & Makarec, “Temporal Lobe Epileptic Signs”.
86
Niebuhr, “William James on Religious Experience”, p. 225.
87
Makarec & Persinger, “Temporal Lobe Signs”, p. 832.
88
James, The Varieties, pp. 46–65.
INTRODUCTION: SECTION TWO
lxi
was “relevant”. As James was aware: “Every
way of classifying a thing
is but a way of handling it for some particular purpose”.
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The aims
of neuroscientific classifications of religious experience always need
to be read critically in the light of James’s methodological account
and the different orders of discourse.
There is no escaping James’s method of accounting for human
experience according to the simple gathering of experiences from
personal accounts. If scholars of the psychology of religion wish to
understand the problems of such data gathering they have to return
to the foundational texts of the subject. James used biographical
accounts, classic texts from religious history and questionnaires from
his colleague Edwin Starbuck. These methods reveal all the prob-
lems of data collection, the difficulties with the type of questions
used and the nature of the selection criteria in the psychology of
religion — science is a fragile animal. Unlike natural science, which
has a stable object, psychology, and especially the psychology of
religion, does not have the tools to measure its data with any pre-
cision. As Danziger made clear, with reference to Kant, the “inner
sense was . . . resistant to mathematization”.
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These tensions with
psychology show how human experience is not easily translated
into neurology without solidifying the imprecisions of language and
culture.
To recognise the importance of narrative accounts of experience
does, of course, take the authority of interpreting such experience
away from the scientist. The scientist is at least dependent on the
“account” of the experience with all the shifting signs that make
up human understanding. This places great weight on the narra-
tive of “religious experience” and opens up crucial issues about
the hermeneutics and politics of our representation of experience.
Language, culture and society play important roles in the way we
organise and report our experience, for the scientific as much as the
“religious” community. The attempt by neuroscience to forget James’s
approach can only lead to greater confusion and misunderstanding
as to what “experience” can offer the scientist. The errors of logic,
the desire to provide inaccurate abbreviations and the social factors
that determined the ordering of things is crucial. Neuroscience
does not so much document experience as document the fragile
89
James, The Will to Believe, p. 70.
90
Danziger, Constructing the Subject, p. 19.