ing out of the dive .O n ly now did I fe e l
the full force of the G-load, p u s h -
ing me back in my seat. “You feel no
G-load in a bank,” La n g ew i e s che said.
“T h e re’s
nothing more confusing for
the uninitiated.”
I asked La n g ew i e s che how mu ch
l onger we could have fall e n .“Within five
s e c on d s , we would have exceeded the
limits of the airp l a n e, ” he re p l i e d , b y
w h i ch he meant that the force of t ry -
ing to pull out of the dive would have
b roken the plane into pieces. I look e d
a w ay from the instruments and asked
La n g ew i e s che to spira l - d i ve again, t h i s
time without telling me. I sat and waited.
I was about to tell La n g ew i e s che that
he could
start diving anyt i m e, w h e n ,
s u d d e n ly, I was thrown back in my
ch a i r. “We just lost a thousand fe e t , ”
he said.
This inability to sense, e x p e ri e n t i a lly,
what your plane is doing is what makes
night flying so stre s s f u l . And this was
the stress that Kennedy must have fe l t
when he turned out across the water at
We s t e rly, leaving the guiding lights of
the Connecticut coastline behind him.
A pilot who flew into Na n t u cket that
night told the Na t i onal Tra n s p o rt a t i on
Sa fe ty Board that when he descended
over Mart h a’s Vi
n ey a rd he looked dow n
and there was “nothing to see. T h e re
was no hori zon and no light. . . . I
thought the island might [have] suf-
fe red a power failure . ” Kennedy was
n ow blind, in eve ry sense, and he mu s t
h a ve known the danger he was in. H e
had ve ry little experience in flyi n g
s t ri c t ly by instru m e n t s . Most of t h e
time when he had flown up to the
Vi n ey a rd the hori zon or lights had
s t i ll been visible. T h a t s t ra n g e, final se-
quence of m a n e u vers was Kennedy’s
f rantic search for a cl e a ring in the haze .
He was trying to pick up the lights of
M a rt h a’s Vi n ey a rd , to re
s t o re the lost
h o ri zon . B e tween the lines of the Na-
t i onal Tra n s p o rt a t i on Sa fe ty Board’s re-
p o rt on the cra s h , you can almost fe e l
his despera t i on :
About 2138 the target began a right turn
in a southerly direction. About 30 seconds
l a t e r, the target stopped its descent at 2200
feet and began a climb that lasted another 30
seconds. During this period of time, the targ e t
stopped the turn, and the airspeed decre a s e d
to about 153 KIAS. About 2139, the targ e t
leveled off at 2500 feet and flew in a south-
easterly direction. About 50 seconds later,
the target entered a left turn and climbed to
2600 feet. As the target continued in the left
t u rn, it began a descent that reached a rate of
about 900 fpm.
But was he ch oking or panick i n g ?
H e re the distinction between those tw o
states is cri t i ca l . Had he ch ok e d , he would
h a ve reve rted to
the mode of e x p l i c i t
l e a rn i n g. His movements in the cock -
pit would have become mark e dly slow e r
and less flu i d . He would have gone back
to the mech a n i ca l ,s e l f - c onscious appli-
ca t i on of the lessons he had first re c e i ve d
as a pilot—and that might have been
a good thing. Kennedy
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