Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

104 | S
ENEM 
A
YDIN 
D
ÜZGIT 
&
 
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UŞEN 
Ç
AKIR
 
 
Revival of Hizbullah 
Despite the massive clampdown, Hizbullah is still alive in Turkey. The 
resurgence of the organisation was confirmed in a 2007 briefing to a group 
of parliamentarians by the head of the National Intelligence Organisation, 
in which it was stated that Hizbullah was awakening after a long period of 
silence.
46
 Following this assessment, the National Security Council reached 
the same conclusion in November 2006 during a meeting that dealt with 
the organisation. This revival has come with a fundamental change in 
strategy, however, which involves a shift from violence to grassroots 
support. Firat News Agency, known for its close relations with the PKK, 
claimed in December 2006 that Hizbullah had become ‘civilianised’ and 
had begun to raise funds and organise social activities through institutions, 
primarily through an association known as Mustazaflar Dernegi 
[Association of the Oppressed]. The most striking example of its new 
strategy, which includes being more visible, was a gathering held in 
February 2006 in Diyarbakir, where tens of thousands of people protested 
about the cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in the “Respect to the 
Prophet” rally. The second major example came during another rally in 
Diyarbakir, called “Love to the Prophet”, which took place in April 2006 
and was similarly attended by tens of thousands. 
Hizbullah now functions legally, through existing associations and by 
publishing periodicals, books and a weekly newspaper. This can be 
deemed a radical change, given that the organisation had in the past not 
published a single pamphlet or organised a single public meeting for 
propaganda purposes. It now argues that Muslims have to make use of 
communication and information technology in “serving the aims and 
targets of the Islamist case” as a platform for “education, invitation and 
communication”.
47
 In line with this, the organisation’s members and 
sympathisers within and outside Turkey have also begun to communicate 
through the Internet.
48
 Social connections among its members have 
intensified.  
                                                      
46
 Çakır (2007), op. cit., p. 13. 
47
 “From the Editor”, Intizar, November 2008.  
48
 The most popular website is www.yesrip.com. 

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 SUSTAINABLE CASE OF DE
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These developments suggest that, unlike in the past, the new version 
of Hizbullah wants neither to entrap itself in an all out war with the state 
nor to be washed away by a spiral of violence. Thus, one may be tempted 
to define this transformation as a case of ‘de-radicalisation’ of the Turkish 
Hizbullah, in the sense that the organisation no longer resorts to violence. 
Nevertheless, given the organisation’s history of atrocities and brutality, its 
full abandonment of violence is difficult to imagine. The members of the 
organisation have so far not acknowledged their violence in any of their 
publications. Instead, they view past deeds as acts of “self-defence” 
committed in response to the attacks of the “enemies of Islam”, such as the 
Turkish state.
49
 Furthermore, the members’ continued praise of former 
leader Velioğlu as the ‘martyr guide’ lends credence to the organisation’s 
respect for violence. Hence, it can be argued that once it feels securely 
grounded, a now-docile Hizbullah could indeed turn violent. 
Hizbullah, Europe and the al-Qaeda connection 
It is reported that since 2002, Hizbullah has intensified its actions among 
Kurds in Europe, mainly through the similar strategy of establishing 
associations, organising discussion groups and socialising at activities such 
as weddings.
50
 In fact, its new leader, Isa Altsoy, was a former member 
who took refuge in Germany after the major clampdown by the Turkish 
security forces. One of the fundamental strategies of the new leader is to 
firmly establish Hizbullah in Europe by expanding its support base among 
the Kurdish expatriates on the continent and by profiting from the 
freedoms in the EU.  
Some political analysts have also hinted at a connection between 
Hizbullah and al-Qaeda, suggesting that Hizbullah might be a bridge 
between Europe and Iraq for foreign fighters. Through their Internet 
statements, Hizbullah members fiercely deny any connection with al-
Qaeda. Indeed, drawing similarities between the radicalism of an Iranian 
revolution-inspired Hizbullah and that of al-Qaeda would be a serious 
                                                      
49
 M. Zeki Güney, “Şehit Rehber Hüseyin Velioglu’nun Mücadelesi Üzerine” [On 
the Struggle of the Martyr Guide, Hüseyin Velioglu], İntizar, No. 2, April/May 
/June 2008.  
50
 S. Cagaptay and E. Uslu, “Hizballah in Turkey Revives”, PolicyWatch No. 946, 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., 2005 

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106 | S
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A
YDIN 
D
ÜZGIT 
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R
UŞEN 
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mistake. There is no substantial evidence to confirm such a connection. 
Even so, although it can be held that the current disarmament of Hizbullah 
makes tactical cooperation unlikely, one cannot rule out the possibility that 
Hizbullah may work with al-Qaeda operationally. 
Countering Hizbullah 
Hizbullah is currently thriving in Turkey’s south-east. Turkish security 
forces have clearly underestimated its resurgence after a major clampdown 
on the organisation. While the PKK’s status among the Kurds in the south-
east is declining, Hizbullah has been developing projects to fight poverty 
and to increase its social status in the region.
51
 It seems to be attracting 
significantly more supporters than the PKK to take part in the 
demonstrations held by its legal organisations. Developments in Iraq and 
in the region as well as the PKK’s stagnating political crisis have favoured 
Hizbullah’s emergence as an alternative to the PKK in south-eastern 
Turkey. The AKP’s single party rule is also believed to have facilitated the 
actions of the organisation. The AKP’s rise has further legitimated various 
political interpretations of Islam and has consequently created room for 
organisations like Hizbullah to exist. It can even be contended that the 
moderation of political Islamist parties operating at the legal level have 
actually increased the attractiveness of Hizbullah in the post-11 September 
context.  
An exhaustive analysis of the present and future of Hizbullah would 
require scrutinising Lebanon’s Hizbullah, Hamas, Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr 
movement and Afghanistan’s Taliban, in that order. All these organisations 
emerged as second fiddles to violent nationalist or traditionalist groups and 
remained so for a long time. Yet, with the exhaustion and degeneration of 
the main structures (leftist movements and Amal in Lebanon, Fatah and the 
PLO in Gaza and the West Bank, all of the traditional mujahidin 
organisations in Afghanistan, and SCIRI and Dawa in Iraq), these ‘second 
fiddles’ reached out to large audiences that viewed them as both fresh 
blood and the only hope. This state of exhaustion is somewhat present in 
south-eastern Turkey (regarding the PKK) and currently throughout the 
rest of the country (regarding the AKP). That being the case, it can be 
                                                      
51
 S. Öztürk, “İste MGK’da Ele Alinan Hizbullah Dosyasi” [Here is the Hizbullah 
File Assessed at the National Security Council], Hürriyet, 16 April 2007. 

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