Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

T
URKEY
:
 
A
 SUSTAINABLE CASE OF DE
-
RADICALISATION
?
 
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107 
 
argued that Hizbullah has viable prospects for the future in the sense that it 
can become an influential power in south-eastern Turkey in the mould of 
Lebanon’s Hizbullah and Hamas.  
The rise of Hizbullah would likely result in a less stable south-eastern 
Turkey, a region that already requires far-reaching reforms on Turkey’s 
road to EU accession. This necessitates careful scrutiny of Hizbullah’s 
actions, including its use of media and other means of propaganda. 
Cooperation with European governments is crucial since the organisation is 
reported to have growing financial and social networks in Europe. 
Furthermore, possible networks and connections between Hizbullah and 
other radical groups with which it has strong potential to enjoy closer links 
– such as al-Qaeda – also need to be carefully observed for the wider 
interests of the West. The brutal Hizbullah atrocities of the 1990s and their 
denial by the present organisation should serve as a warning that the 
possibility of its further radicalisation remains serious. Even if violence is 
dropped for good, there are grave doubts over the compatibility of 
Hizbullah’s ideology with democracy and fundamental freedoms. 
Conclusions 
Political Islam in Turkey has given rise to cases of de-radicalisation at two 
different but related levels. One concerns the political party system, where 
there has been a significant moderation of ideology and policy from the 
Welfare Party to the AKP. The second one concerns the revival of Turkey’s 
radical and violent Islamist group, Hizbullah, which now employs the legal 
means to increase its grassroots support in south-east Turkey. Neither 
instance nor kind of moderation should be taken for granted, however. The 
sustained moderation of the AKP will depend on the emergence of a strong 
secularist and democratic opposition, economic performance, progress in 
democratic consolidation and a strong EU anchor. The future course of 
Hizbullah is harder to tell. So far, the organisation has not dealt with its 
violent past nor officially renounced violence in any of its recent 
propaganda tools. Moreover, its ideology, discernable mainly from the 
variety of publications it currently produces, still espouses the 
establishment of an Islamic state, with weak democratic credentials. This 
situation requires caution and closer inspection by both Turkey and the EU, 
not only because the organisation is expanding among Kurds in Europe, 
but also because of its suspected operational links with other radical 
groups, notably al-Qaeda.  

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108 | 
 
 
6.
 
T
HE RADICALISATION OF MODERATE 
I
SLAMIST PARTIES
:
 
R
EALITY OR 
CHIMERA
? 
A
NA 
E
CHAGÜE
 
arnings about the impending radicalisation of moderate Islamist 
parties have become commonplace. Islamist parties are 
disappointed by their experience of playing by the ‘rules of the 
game’. They have come to realise that participation in only partially 
liberalised political systems does not translate into influence in decision-
making. Many observers argue that consequently they are ready to take a 
more radical approach to achieve change.  
In contrast to other contributions in this volume, this chapter argues 
that there is little evidence that mainstream Islamist parties are moving in 
this direction. The threat of radicalisation is used by incumbent regimes to 
justify their clampdown on these parties, while moderate Islamist parties 
actually continue to emphasise their commitment to the political process. 
They have certainly become frustrated with the limits placed on their 
political participation. And voters have become disengaged. But the 
moderate parties themselves remain committed to the political process and 
they have not adopted more extreme positions. Suggestions that the EU’s 
support for partial processes of liberalisation is fomenting re-radicalisation 
are not convincing. 
W 

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R
ADICALISATION OF MODERATE 
I
SLAMIST PARTIES
:
 
R
EALITY OR CHIMERA
?
 
|
 
109 
 
Towards participation 
Moderate Islamists have been increasingly willing to participate in the 
political system and renounce the use of violence.
1
 They seek gradual 
reform within the constraints of existing political institutions rather than a 
radical overthrow of the system as a whole.
2
 Yet a fear persists that 
“commitment to the procedural rules of democratic elections is not the 
same as commitment to democratic politics or governance” and that some 
groups may not “themselves engage in violence but…condone, justify, or 
even actively support the violence of others”.
3
 Proponents of this view fear 
that Islamists are only feigning moderation.
4
  That  is  why  much  of  the 
debate about Islamist movements has focused on whether their 
participation in elections is only a strategy to seize power or whether they 
are truly committed to the values of democracy.  
Some authors advocate focusing on parties’ “core beliefs” and 
attitudes towards specific issues such as minorities and women.
5
 But 
shifting the debate from an emphasis on political behaviour to the plane of 
values, and possibly culture and identity, risks opening the door to the 
stigmatisation of political actors on the bases of normative judgments. 
Where these actors are seen as opposed to European values, they are more 
likely to be labelled ‘radical’. In any case, Islamist parties do not have a 
monopoly on illiberal views, which are often widespread across all parties 
and frequently a reflection of the beliefs widely held by society. Use of a 
common, political and procedural framework as a standard for 
engagement would avoid singling out Islamists as ideological actors and 
would be more practical. The EU should encourage participation across the 
board rather than try to pick winners based on their beliefs.  
                                                      
1
 M. Asseburg (ed.), Moderate Islamists as Reform Actors: Conditions and Programmatic 
Change, SWP Research Paper No. 4, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, April 
2007, p. 9. 
2
 J. Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 8. 
3
 T. Cofman Wittes, “Islamist Parties: Three Kinds of Movements”, Journal of 
Democracy, Vol. 19, No. 3, July 2008. 
4
 Schwedler (2006), op. cit., p. 120. 
5
 Wittes (2008), op. cit., pp. 9-10. 

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