Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

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incomplete democratic consolidation and an absence of strong secularist 
rivals who would help keep the party in check and pressure it to follow a 
moderate course.  
2.
 
The violent fringe 
Radical/militant Islamic fundamentalism with recourse to violence has 
generally remained a marginal force in Turkey. There are two main 
radical/militant Islamic fundamentalist groups currently present in the 
country, namely al-Qaeda and the Turkish Hizbullah.  
2.1
 
Al-Qaeda
33
 
A Turkish al-Qaeda cell was responsible for the consecutive bombing of 
two synagogues as well as the British Consulate General and the HSBC 
Bank headquarters in Istanbul in November 2003. The perpetrator was 
arrested by the Turkish police in August 2005, after which 33 suspects were 
arrested in 2007.
34
 Further investigations revealed that Turkish militants in 
al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan had organised a cell before 11 
September 2001, that the Istanbul bombings were ordered directly by 
Osama bin Laden and that preparations for these bombings were carried 
out under the guidance of Muhammad Atef – also known as Abu Hafs al-
Misri – then leader of al-Qaeda’s military wing. Initially, Atef assigned two 
targets for the Turkish militants: the Incirlik Air Base in Adana and an 
Israeli tourist ship travelling to the southern port of Antalya. The militants 
decided that it was impossible to stage an assault on Incirlik, and 
postponed an attack on the Israeli cruise ship because of a lack of 
intelligence. 
This attack came as a shock to Turkey given the widespread belief in 
the country that al-Qaeda would not perpetrate crimes in a Muslim 
country. Yet, there were already sufficient grounds for concern about the 
possibility of al-Qaeda attacks in Turkey. It is well known that many 
Turkish radical Islamists, who had earlier fought in Afghanistan, Bosnia, 
Chechnya and Kashmir, had later joined the international network of al-
                                                      
33
 Some parts of this section draw from R. Çakir, “Turkey in Denial of al-Qaeda”, 
Terrorism Focus, Vol. 5, No. 2, Jamestown Foundation, January 2008. 
34
 Rabasa and Larrabee (2008), p. 27. 

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Qaeda. It is also known that hundreds of Turkish radical Islamists have 
been trained in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It can be 
reasoned that Turkey constitutes an obvious target as a Muslim country 
with close ties to the West. Its secular political system, which (albeit with its 
problems) has managed to incorporate the Islamists, presents an alternative 
model where Islam and democracy coexist. On top of that, although Turkey 
has recently experienced some setbacks in its relations with the US, it has 
generally supported US actions in both Afghanistan and Iraq.  
As part of its global strategy, Turkey has long been used by al-Qaeda 
as a transit country that provided key logistics such as international money 
transfers and a base for international travel for its members. It can be 
argued that Turkey’s importance for al-Qaeda significantly increased with 
the war in Iraq, where it became a crucial route for the transmission of 
weapons, members and money to Iraq via Syria. Following the US 
occupation of Iraq, there was also a steady outflow of Turkish volunteers 
ready to fight in the Iraqi insurgency. Newspapers often report stories of 
Turkish nationals who die in suicide attacks or in armed combat. For 
instance, Habib Akdas – the ringleader of the Istanbul bombings – was 
reportedly killed in a US bombardment of al-Anbar province in September 
2004. Similarly, it is claimed that Gurcan Bac, another leading member of 
al-Qaeda, died in a clash in Fallujah in 2005.
35
  
The 2003 attacks confirmed fears that Turkey is now a major target 
country for al-Qaeda attacks. Two years after the Istanbul bombings, Louai 
Muhammad Hajj Bakr al-Saqa – an al-Qaeda operative of Syrian origin – 
was arrested after a failed plot to attack an Israeli cruise ship near Antalya. 
Even though al-Qaeda has so far never staged an attack on Turkish soil 
using non-Turkish operatives, the al-Saqa incident shows that it would be 
possible. The latest al-Qaeda attack in Turkey was directed at the US 
consulate in Istanbul in July 2008. Three Turkish policemen were killed in 
the attack, which was described by the Turkish security forces as al-
Qaeda’s retaliatory response to the recent effective operations carried out 
by the Turkish security forces.
36
 
                                                      
35
 Hürriyet, 15 February 2005. 
36
 Taraf, 10 July 2008. 

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In fact, in the wake of the Istanbul bombings, groups linked to or 
inspired by al-Qaeda have been the target of greater scrutiny by the 
Turkish intelligence services and the security forces. As is the case in many 
parts of the world, however, it is much harder to trace small groups that 
have no direct link to al-Qaeda than larger movements that are better 
organised. For example, on 9 March 2004, two Islamist youths 
independently sought to bomb 40 Freemasons congregating at the Masonic 
Lodge in Istanbul’s Kartal district.
37
 Security prevented the two from 
deploying the bomb properly. The activists had no direct connection with 
al-Qaeda, but were clearly inspired by the network.
38
 Far from being 
professional militants, Turks influenced by al-Qaeda are generally ordinary 
citizens. One of the suspects arrested as part of a major operation in the 
central Anatolian city of Aksaray in December 2007 was a high school 
English teacher, and four others were likewise employed and socially 
integrated individuals. Al-Qaeda style militancy in Turkey continues to 
attract individuals outside the usual profile of young, single, 
unemployed/underemployed youths.  
Turkish intelligence services and security forces are well equipped 
and experienced in counter-terrorism. Yet for several reasons, Turkey is ill 
prepared for a potential fight against al-Qaeda. One of the main reasons is 
that Turkish counter-terrorism is overwhelmingly focused on the PKK. 
Furthermore, Turkish public opinion remains unconvinced of the threat 
posed by al-Qaeda. Some believe that this organisation does not exist, 
having been fabricated for manipulative purposes by countries such as the 
US and Israel. Others accept that al-Qaeda is real, although they do not 
view it as an organisation countering US and Israeli hegemony, but rather 
as a tool used by these countries to colonise the Middle East. With Turkish–
US relations strained as never before, a larger number of Turks are also 
inclined to sympathise – or at least empathise – with al-Qaeda’s stated goal 
of combating US policies. Many Turks continue to believe that it is 
impossible for al-Qaeda to target Turkey, especially as the country is run by 
a party with Islamist roots. Others subscribe to the theory that al-Qaeda did 
not, in fact, target Turkey in November 2003. According to this view, the 
intended victims of the synagogue bombings were Jews, and therefore a 
                                                      
37
 Freemasons are considered pro-Zionist by many Turkish Islamists. 
38
 Hürriyet, 12 March 2004. 

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