Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

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fostering of closer relations with the European Union.
4
 Nevertheless, the 
Virtue Party was also closed down by the Constitutional Court in 2001 for 
being the ‘centre of anti-secular activities’, after which the movement 
formally split into two parties: the Felicity Party of the ‘traditionalists’, led 
by Erbakan’s closest associate, Recai Kutan, and the AKP of the reformists, 
led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan.  
The Felicity Party remains strongly committed to the Welfare Party 
line in its goals of establishing a society based on an understanding of 
ethics and morality that rests on Islam and in its anti-Western outlook that 
also entails a strong belief in the incompatibility of Islam with Western 
values. It is explicitly against the United States and is strongly opposed to 
Turkey’s accession to the EU. Western civilisation is perceived as unjust 
and corrupt, where Europe is presented as an enemy of Islam whose 
ultimate aim is to divide and partition the country. It advocates that Turkey 
should instead turn to the Muslim world and lead the Islamic states 
towards a ‘more just world order’. This discourse, which is reminiscent of 
the Welfare Party, has not fared well in the general elections. The party 
only managed to win 2.5% of the votes in the 2002 elections and obtained a 
slightly lower 2.3% in the 2007 elections, failing to qualify for 
representation in the parliament for two consecutive electoral periods.
5
 In 
the face of decline, in October 2008, the party elected Numan Kurtulmuş as 
its new leader, a younger political figure with a Western education. It 
remains to be seen whether this will translate into any substantial 
moderation of the party’s policy line. 
In contrast to the Felicity Party, the AKP quickly disassociated itself 
from the old leadership and ideology. The party came to power in the 2002 
general elections, obtaining 34% of the votes. It expanded its support base 
further in the 2007 general elections, in which it received 46.6% of the votes 
and formed its second round of single-party government. The party’s 
performance in government so far is a major example of de-radicalisation 
in the sense that a shift has occurred from reformist fundamentalism, in 
which an Islamic state is pursued within a democratic order, to strategic 
modernism, in which the party espouses liberal democracy and a global 
                                                      
4
 Z. Öniş, “Political Islam at the Crossroads: From Hegemony to Co-Existence”, 
Contemporary Politics, Vol. 7, No. 4, 2001. 
5
 There is a 10% electoral threshold for representation in the Turkish parliament. 

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liberal economy. The party has undertaken fundamental reforms in the 
field of democratisation, started accession talks with the EU and achieved 
economic stability. Nevertheless, towards the end of its first term in 
government and particularly in its second round in office, significant 
segments of Turkish society, the judiciary and the military expressed deep 
concerns regarding the AKP’s commitment to secularism and democracy, 
which culminated in the closure case against the party in March 2008.  
1.2
 
The AKP in power: Prospects for sustainable moderation 
It can be argued that the AKP has not yet made any major legal changes 
that challenge the secular order in Turkey. Yet, as the recent closure case 
indicates, this helps little in alleviating the secularists’ fears of the party. 
Secularists in the country are aware that radical Islamist movements 
seeking to establish a state based on sharia have low chances of survival in 
the Turkish context. Both the Turkish military and the judiciary are known 
to be strong opponents of radical Islamic movements. Furthermore, public 
opinion polls suggest that radical Islamism is also opposed by the vast 
majority of Turkish society. A recent survey undertaken by the Turkish 
Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) found that 76% of the 
population is against the implementation of sharia, while only 9% favour it. 
Even among the AKP voters, 70% were found to oppose sharia. The survey 
also found that even those Turks who define themselves as “religious” do 
not perceive a contradiction between being a Muslim and being modern 
and secular.
6
  
It is not just domestic constraints that are perceived to set limits on 
radical Islamism in Turkey.
 
It can also be contended that the country’s 
external context pushes it towards moderation since Turkey is strongly 
embedded in the West in economic, strategic and institutional terms. It is in 
the course of EU membership and is a long-standing member of NATO, the 
Council of Europe, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe. Moreover, the extent to which the Turkish economy is integrated  
 
                                                      
6
 A. Çarkoğlu and B. Toprak, Değişen Türkiye’de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset [Religion, 
Society, and Politics in a Changing Turkey], TESEV, Istanbul, 2006. 

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into the global economy would make it very costly for any political 
movement in power to adopt an anti-Western and anti-globalisation 
discourse. 
Still, it is also a fact that religiosity is on the increase in Turkey. In the 
same TESEV survey, 44.6% of the respondents were found to identify 
themselves primarily as a “Muslim” (compared with 36% in 1999), while 
only 29.9% identified themselves as a “citizen of the Turkish Republic” and 
19.4% as a “Turk”.
7
 What the secularists fear is that this growing religiosity 
in Turkish society, mainly through the medium of social pressure, may lead 
to the gradual Islamisation of social life in Turkey. The TESEV survey 
found that around one-third of the population is concerned about the rise 
of Islamism and the erosion of secularism in Turkey.
8
 This segment holds 
that rather than major “legal–political changes”, the government’s 
“piecemeal administrative decisions” and “social influence” will promote 
religiosity in Turkey to the extent that the advances of the secular republic 
in areas such as gender equality will ultimately be eroded.
9
  
One of the key examples of this view given by the secularists is the 
party’s public-sector recruitment policies. The secularists are particularly 
worried that the AKP is Islamising the education system and the judiciary 
through favouring individuals with Islamic backgrounds, such as 
graduates of İmam Hatip religious schools, in its appointments.
10
 While 
there is little empirical data to substantiate this claim,
11
 the appointment of 
the governor of the central bank and more recently the head of the High 
Education Board (YÖK) from among those close to the party have helped 
little in dispelling such concerns. The government has also been accused of 
turning a blind eye to illegal Quran courses, promoting Islamic 
conservatism through school textbooks and taking a permissive approach 
                                                      
7
 Ibid., p. 41.  
8
 Ibid., p. 94. 
9
 M. Somer, “Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition in Turkey: Implications for 
the World, Muslims and Secular Democracy”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 7, 
2007, p. 1278.  
10
 See for example, “AKP’nin Egitimde Kadrolasma Inadi Yargiya Carpti” [AKP’s 
Recruitment Policies in Education Blocked by the Judiciary], Radikal, 12 August 
2008. 
11
 Somer (2007), op. cit., p. 1279. 

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