Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

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secular game’. In 1997, this radical stance and rejection turned into silence – 
or what could be referred to as ‘implicit consent’ – as an outcome of the 
revision process.
5
  
3.3
 
Traditional and reformist strains in Egypt 
Egypt’s Salafists have gone through a different experience. They are a mix 
of traditional and reformist Salafists. The bulk of their work is focused on 
educational and proselytising activities within the mosques. They target the 
individual with a view to making a better Muslim out of him/her and they 
are most active on university campuses. Unlike other Egyptian Islamists, 
the Salafists have no hierarchical structures or organised entity. They refer 
to the words ‘collective action’, the most important condition of which is 
‘not to confront governments’ and not to resort to underground or violent 
activities. They nonetheless point out that not condoning violence does not 
mean that they do not recognise jihad by force. They have taken a clear 
position on jihad in the Muslim countries they regard as being occupied by 
enemies, such as Bosnia, Iraq, Palestine and Chechnya. 
Their tools of influence include seminars and religious courses as 
well as medical and educational support for poor families. Despite being a 
pacifist movement that has not been involved in any violent activities, 
Salafists have had their difficult times with the security apparatus. During 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, security forces sought to put an end to their 
activities and institutions. Alexandria, the Mediterranean governorate that 
is host to the most influential Salafist movement in the country, witnessed a 
number of security strikes against Salafists. These resulted in the arrest of 
key leaders in 1994, a ban on the publication Sawt al-dawaa and the closure 
of the Al-Furqan Institute (the first Salafist institute from which Salafist 
preachers graduated). From 1994–2002, Salafist activities continued on 
university campuses but then these also came to a standstill.  
Egypt’s Salafists do not have a specific political project or vision for 
the country. In spite of the political turmoil that the country has been going 
through and the many issues that have caused political and social 
polarisation, Salafists have kept their heads above the murky water of 
politics and have rejected any attempts to be dragged into it. There was one 
                                                      
5
 “Interview with Ahmed al-Daghsi”, Islamonline.net, 5 June 2007 (op. cit.). 

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incident, however, in which they flexed their muscle – in support of the 
nomination of the first woman candidate on the Muslim Brotherhood’s list 
in the year 2000 in Alexandria. This was an unprecedented move for the 
Salafists, and Jihan Al-Halafawy spoke clearly about the support and 
encouragement she received from the Salafist base during her electoral 
campaign.  
Nevertheless, Salafist leaders still dismiss any involvement in the 
political game. The reason, Burhami suggests, is that being part of the 
political game of today means that one has to compromise one’s ideals and 
principles. He argues that “[t]he experiences of Islamist movements in 
politics is not encouraging at all as we have seen how they have given up 
their Islamic ideals and identity for a position here or an opportunity 
there”.
6
 Thus, “Islamists cannot be allowed to participate in elections and 
use the tools of democracy except after they make compromises at the 
expense of their Islamic values”.  
Burhami also believes that avoiding political participation in its 
present form of organising protests, participating in elections and setting 
up political parties is in itself an act of political protest. “Not being part of 
this political scene is one way to delegitimise it.” Yet the Salafists have 
taken a clear stand regarding the different crises facing the umma. 
4.
 
The stance on violence 
The legitimacy of the use of violence with its two levels – symbolic violence 
and physical violence – has also been at the heart of much of the debate 
among Salafists. Traditional Salafist figures have held an unambiguous 
position on the issue. 
Burhami rejects the notion that jihadist Salafists are the military wing 
of the Salafist movement. He criticises what he describes as “jihadi 
Salafists” who are not committed to the “jurisprudential restrictions and 
conditions for jihad”.
7
 He points out that they have gone too far in acts 
involving bloodshed, such as planting explosives in public places including 
                                                      
6
 Y. Burhami, “Political participation and the balance of power” (in Arabic), Sawt 
al-salaf, 20 March 2007 (retrieved from http://www.salafvoice.com/article.php? 
a=664).  
7
 Ibid. 

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streets, markets and even mosques, and in calling other Muslims apostates. 
He does not condemn these acts outright but says, “Muslims should be 
committed to the rulings of jihad as ordained by Islam”. He also explains 
that jihad is “an act in which people should find mercy and not a means to 
vindication”. This sums up the traditional Salafist school of thought in 
relation to current actions conducted by those who call themselves jihadist 
Salafists.  
Such criticism should not be taken to mean that traditional Salafists 
renounce the concept of jihad altogether. They remain firm believers in the 
concept of jihad and despite their condemning some of the operations 
committed in its name, to them it remains ‘a sacred duty’. Some Salafist 
figures have spoken about the need to ‘rationalise jihad’ in accordance with 
the general interests of both Islam and jihad, and in a manner that could 
render the concept an unquestioned consensus of the umma. One of the key 
conditions set by Abu Hafs Rafiki (who is known to be a staunch Moroccan 
Salafist) is that jihad should obtain the support of both scholars and the 
umma, thus preventing it from being a divisive issue. He has said that 
scholars’ acceptance and support is what legitimises jihad and makes it 
significant. Traditional Salafists have implicitly criticised what they 
describe as the operations that do not target the real enemy because these 
allow the opponents of jihad to call it terrorism and extremism and scare 
off Muslims. Echoing the view of many traditional Salafist figures on the 
issue, Rafiki has explained that “[e]ven the jihad against the occupiers in 
Palestine and Iraq should not lead to bloodshed. Public places should not 
be targeted. …[P]eople understand jihad to be fighting but the more 
important meaning of jihad is the call for God.”
8
 He has also spoken about 
the need to have a political platform parallel to military activity and has 
said that the most important conditions for a successful jihad is to increase 
the number of supporters of the concept among Muslims and non-Muslims 
alike.  
                                                      
8
 “Interview with Abu Hafs Rafiki”, Islamonline.net, 10 May 2007 (retrieved from 
http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=ArticleA_C&cid=1178193317702
&pagename=Zone-Arabic-Daawa%2FDWALayout). 

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