Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

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NDERSTANDING 
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Participation in democratic elections indicates that Hamas is ready to 
work within the legal framework of the Palestinian constitution. Strong 
criticism of the Fatah leadership for their disregard of constitutional law 
and especially the ‘illegal’ extension of the presidential mandate reveals 
that Hamas can in fact be ready to assume the responsibility to govern – 
beyond the mere purpose of resistance. People’s welfare will have to 
become Hamas’s priority. Being more responsive to people’s needs implies 
in turn moderation along the lines of the people’s will. Closely interrelated 
to representative functions, a potential future peace process would be 
essentially facilitated by the existence of Hamas as a political party. It 
would provide not only somebody to talk to without the obstacle of 
recognising a terrorist group, but also somebody who talks of behalf of an 
electorate.  
The international level 
In an interview on Al-Jazeera in March 2008, Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal 
emphasised that Hamas wants a Palestinian state. “Hamas wants a 
Palestinian state, but with sovereignty.”
35
 As previously mentioned, it is in 
the opinion of many that the Oslo accords do not provide Palestinians with 
true sovereignty, and Hamas only serves to correct the injustices previous 
Palestinian leaders agreed upon without having the legitimate mandate of 
the Palestinian people. “It is [a] war of necessity and not choice,”
36
 was the 
answer of one of the leaders to Hamas’s refusal to comply with previous 
agreements. But the blame for the current situation is not exclusively put 
on Fatah. A considerable amount of criticism for the current crisis is also 
attributed to external actors: “The number one reason for the Palestinian 
crisis is outside intervention, by Israel and the US and regrettably by some 
regional states.”
37
 Harsh treatment of Palestinians by Egypt and Jordan and 
their role in the blockade of Gaza serves the interests of these countries to 
stifle Islamic movements within their own borders. “Egyptians are afraid of 
Hamas and believe that our success in Gaza will spill over into Egypt 
through [the] Muslim Brotherhood over there. They are convinced that 
                                                      
35
 Drawn from the interview of Khaled Meshaal by the Al-Jazeera TV channel in 
March 2008. 
36
 Author interview, Hamas member in Damascus, 2008. 
37
 Interview of Khaled Meshaal by the Al-Jazeera TV channel in March 2008.  

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ASHIMI 
 
 
Hamas’s success is a disaster for Egypt, so they try to make it harder for 
us.”
38
 Despite the denial that war is self-serving, no Hamas member 
undermined the importance of violence. On the contrary, resistance was 
praised as one of the core pillars of the movement. “Resistance is like the 
head on a body…without the head, [the] body is meaningless and loses its 
soul…resistance is to get what is rightfully ours and to defend the 
nation…land cannot be liberated only through politics, talks, negotiations, 
and pens, but land can only be returned through resistance.”
39
  
Reiterating the value of continued resistance, an interviewed Hamas 
member explains the reasons for the invalidity of Oslo. “What they want us 
to do is accept defeat and surrender. There is a difference between 
surrender (istislam) and peace (salam). In surrender, the enemy rules over 
you. In peace, you are equal with the enemy. You are free to do what you 
choose.”
40
 This is why the Oslo accords cannot be accepted as a basis for 
permanent peace, because they deprive Palestinians of true sovereignty. 
“Oslo gives them control of our borders, our water underneath the earth, 
and the sky above our heads. We can barely claim sovereignty for the 
ground we walk on.”
41
  
Hamas has not been concerned with appearing legitimate in the eyes 
of Europeans and Americans. One leader refers to the West’s double 
standards when it comes to Palestinians. “There is an unjust and evil 
oppressor assisted by [what] I call a ‘one-eyed’ world that looks only 
through American interests, and which ignores the suffering of Palestinian 
people.”
42
 But “occupation must be resisted and martyrdom is one thing no 
Hamas member is afraid of”.
43
 
When the West requires that Hamas comply with its demands so as 
to engage in dialogue, it is actually demanding that the movement change 
its principles, which are what brought Hamas to where it stands today. 
Since meeting these demands would therefore imply the self-destruction of 
                                                      
38
 Author interview, Hamas member, 2008. 
39
 Author interview, Hamas member in Damascus, 2008. 
40
 Author interview, Hamas member in Homs, 2008. 
41
 Author interview, Hamas member in Damascus, 2008. 
42
 Author interview, Hamas member in Damascus, 2008. 
43
 Ibid. 

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the movement, Hamas’s defiance comes as no surprise. Hamas is the most 
popular group in the Middle East, is perceived legitimate in the eyes of the 
vast majority of Arabs and Muslims, and won free and fair democratic 
elections in 2006. So as far as Hamas is concerned, its leadership sees no 
reason to change course and tarnish the group’s credibility in order to be 
recognised by the West. They do not want to be understood as an amalgam 
of disparate and ad hoc militias, but as a movement that is rooted in all 
levels of religious and political society.
44
 Resistance will continue for as 
long as they perceive the occupation of Palestine to be unjust, illegal and 
above all anti-Islamic. Combined with the desperate political, social and 
economic situation on the ground, the movement sees no alternative but to 
use violence. Meshaal mentions that Hamas is a reaction to Israel and 
enquires: “Which came first: occupation or resistance?”
45
 
At the same time, there remains room for a more optimistic, yet 
challenging perspective. How to plan a strategy for the years to come and 
which direction Hamas will take chiefly depends on the environment in 
which it has come to act. And it is challenging, because transforming the 
movement not only entails transforming the entire conflict constellation but 
also transforming confrontation into something constructive.  
Conclusions 
This chapter has examined the interplay of Islam and politics as a catalyst 
for radicalisation on four different analytical levels in the case of Hamas. 
What does this analysis tell us about the current situation and what can we 
expect for the future? The answer is fairly straightforward. The recent 
military campaign in the Gaza Strip will further radicalise Hamas – on all 
levels. Since individual living conditions are destroyed, a revival of suicide 
missions is likely. As the radicalisation of larger segments of society is to be 
expected, Hamas can base its future strategies on a fertile recruitment 
ground. Furthermore, the military confrontation will encourage military 
means of resistance at the expense of expression through political channels. 
The rather passive stance of the international community will further 
                                                      
44
 See Beverley Milton-Edwards and Alastair Crooke, “Waving, not Drowning: 
Strategic Dimensions of Cease-fires and Islamic Movements”, Security Dialogue, 
Vol. 35, No. 3, September 2004, p. 295. 
45
 Interview of Khaled Meshaal by the Al-Jazeera TV channel in March 2008. 

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