Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

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“If a foreigner occupies you – it is resistance. But not to go to attack Madrid 
or Germany…these are not our principles.”
29
 The group also repeatedly 
condemned terrorist attacks against civilians in the West and labelled them 
un-Islamic. 
Already in the very early stages of Hamas’s rise to the political stage 
in the Palestinian territories, Fatah realised that theist monopolistic control 
over Palestinian affairs was challenged by an increasingly popular Islamic 
movement. Prompted to counteract, the Fatah leadership began a campaign 
of Islamic propaganda with the use of symbols, Islamic themes and public 
prayers. Fatah also reminded people that in fact as early as 1981 it had tried 
to locate its struggle within the context of classical Islamic history as the 
rightful Islamic war.
30
 When Hamas won the elections in 2006, however, 
some of its votes were anti-Fatah votes – protest votes against an 
incompetent and corrupt leadership within the Palestinian Authority. 
Hamas utilised Fatah’s shortcomings and turned them into an election 
victory. Once the mandate to govern was secured, the Hamas leadership 
felt confident enough to remain unresponsive to external and internal 
pressure and to proceed with the gradual solidification of its power. 
When it comes to Hamas’s accomplishments since taking over the 
government, the record is difficult to assess. Although in charge in Gaza, 
Hamas still behaves like an opposition party. The events of the past few 
years in the region have never provided Hamas with a free reign to govern. 
An international boycott, the blockade, the Israeli military campaign and de 
facto division from the West Bank, have all made it almost impossible for 
Hamas to start governing Gaza. The balancing act between international 
pressure, internal Palestinian divisions and the Israeli blockade prevents 
Hamas from fully taking responsibility. The current circumstances do not 
allow the movement to alter the opposition mindset and engage in 
governing, which would also imply engaging with Israel. Hamas does not 
want to follow in Fatah’s footsteps.  
The movement would lose greatly if it were to compromise its main 
position regarding the recognition of Israel without a guarantee of 
                                                      
29
 Author interview, Hamas member, 2008. 
30
 See Alexander Flores, Intifada – Aufstand der Palaestinenser, Berlin: Rotbuch, 1988, 
p. 67. 

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substantive gains for the Palestinians.
31
 Such a compromise would become 
tantamount to political suicide. And not only that, if Hamas were to cede 
ground to Israel without respective concessions, new groups would emerge 
capitalising on the ‘sell-out’. If Hamas comes to end up where Fatah did, 
the question is what would start next. Clearly, the vicious circle of de-
radicalisation and re-radicalisation would unfold as a never-ending story. 
The respective worst-case scenario, according to Hroub (2006), is the 
instigation of a civil war.
32
 Although civil war failed to materialise even 
after the eruption of violence in 2006–07, Palestinians are now divided into 
those living in Gaza under Hamas’s rule, and those living in the West Bank, 
under Fatah’s rule. This de facto division allows the two Palestinian rivals 
to exercise their authority in a manner compatible with their ideology and 
political ambitions. From Hamas’s perspective, Fatah serves the interests of 
Israel and is corrupt; as such, it is deemed unsuitable to represent the 
interests of the Palestinian people. Fatah gave up the right to represent the 
Palestinian people when it stopped the resistance against occupation and 
signed the Oslo accords. Even direct talks with Israelis are considered an 
act of treason. Fatah is deemed too weak, and hence not immune to 
pressure.  
In the context of an Islamic resistance movement, however, weakness 
does not necessarily mean failure to implement policies owing to problems 
of a practical or strategic nature, but a notion with far more serious 
implications. In the eyes of followers and believers, weakness is interpreted 
as moving away from the divine mandate the movement claims to possess, 
resulting in God’s punishment. If liberating Palestine is God’s will, Hamas 
has embraced this idea and launched itself as the defender of faith, people 
and land, and anything other than a struggle until full victory and just 
peace as sought by Hamas is in defiance of God’s will. The end goal is the 
establishment of an Islamic state based on sharia rule. If sharia is not to be 
implemented as originally promised, a new cycle of defeat and foreign rule 
over Muslims in Muslim lands threatens to repeat itself in the near future. 
After all, the common belief is that the failure to implement sharia has led 
to the inevitable outcome that is apparent today in moral decay, disease, 
illiteracy and the spread of vices. Exemplifying the past glories of the 
                                                      
31
 See Hroub (2006), op. cit. 
32
 Ibid. 

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Islamic empire at times of conformity to sharia, many Islamists argue that 
only sharia and just leadership with a pious Muslim at its helm will raise 
Muslims to where they belong. Otherwise, all the internal and external 
setbacks are attributable to a corrupt, inept system that has intentionally 
deviated from the correct path embodied in the sharia.
33
 The creation of the 
state of Israel in the heart of Muslim lands attests to those claims. Fatah’s 
loss of legitimacy within Islamist circles when it recognised the state of 
Israel and stopped fighting reflects the same dynamic.  
Fatah’s moderation and its shift towards a mainstream political party 
marked the rise in popularity of a more radical movement. The association 
of moderation with weakness and corruption played to Hamas’s favour. 
The moderation of Fatah became the source of radicalisation as well as the 
success of Hamas. Furthermore, during one of the interviews, a Hamas 
member said that “Hamas is fighting against a mafia, and not a state”.
34
 An 
increasing number of references to financial, sex and corruption scandals 
among not only Israeli politicians but also Fatah leaders serve two distinct 
purposes. One intends to undermine the enemy by exposing its 
incompetence and ‘true face’. The other places Hamas in a legitimising 
position where it has the mandate to rid the region of ‘mafia’. Also, with 
the emphasis on its platform as an Islamic organisation, it puts itself above 
secular parties, which are susceptible to corruption for personal gain, are 
ideologically weak and void of spiritual guidance. 
Since it took over Gaza, Hamas has given no indication of moderating 
its goals. As an Islamic resistance movement on the one hand, the group 
ascribes to divine inspiration, feels accountable only to God, equates 
resistance with a divine obligation and openly strives to establish an 
Islamic state in liberated Palestine. On the other hand, Hamas’s actions in 
practice do not differ much from most mainstream political parties. Its 
leaders behave and justify their policies citing common ‘political’ language, 
and often use non-theological interpretations to explain why the movement 
acts the way it does. References to unemployment, utilities, infrastructure 
and involvement in professional trade unions show a more pragmatic and 
grounded approach to resolving daily problems.  
                                                      
33
 See Ibrahim (1996), op. cit. 
34
 Author interview, Hamas member, 2008.  

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