Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

U
NDERSTANDING 
H
AMAS
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S RADICALISATION 
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59 
 
roadmap towards de-radicalisation. The past few years and the early 2009 
war in Gaza have shown that resistance comes at a very high price. 
The refusal of both Hamas and the Israelis to sit at the negotiating 
table requires mediators to step in. One of only a few topics open for 
discussion is the possibility of a temporary cease-fire agreement. When 
asked why Hamas calls for a cease-fire when its entire identity and purpose 
is dedicated to liberating the Palestinian territories and destroying Israel, 
an interviewee refers to examples of previous Islamic leaders: “The cease-
fire [hudna] is in the interest of Palestinian people. We agreed to it as it is 
also mentioned in the Quran. Salah Al-Din Ayoube made more than 30 
cease-fire agreements with crusaders. Hudna is permitted and encouraged 
in our religion so people can take a break from violence, to reorganise.”
20
 
Still, the vagueness and lack of clearly defined guidelines for cease-fire 
agreements within the Islamic context opens up perhaps the most viable 
opportunity to the solution of the Palestinian–Israeli problem. A cease-fire 
agreement notably does not need to be short term, but can be extended to 
last several decades, even a century. Those in Israel suspicious of accepting 
hudna  offers are fearful that it is just an excuse providing Hamas with 
enough time to rearm, regroup and launch attacks once ready. While some 
consider hudna to be a deviation, a retreat from Hamas’s intent to continue 
waging jihad until total liberation, Hamas justifies hudna strictly as an 
agreement for a temporary cessation of hostilities, and not a permanent 
peace treaty,
21
 thus allowing it to defend itself against claims of selling out 
on its principles. Nevertheless, any deal with the enemy must be presented 
through Islamic terminology, as a benefit for all Muslims, and in 
accordance with Islamic principles. 
Moreover, despite Hamas’s powerful rhetoric and strong 
commitment to its goals, certain elements within the movement are more 
pragmatic vis-à-vis Israel as a reality. Following the 2006 election victory, 
some expected Hamas to soften its stance and accept Western demands in 
order to engage in dialogue. The group’s leadership decided to remain 
loyal to the original ideology, however, which in their opinion had brought 
Hamas into government in the first place:  
                                                      
20
 Author interview, Hamas member in Damascus, 2008. 
21
 See Khaled Hroub, Hamas – A Beginner’s Guide, London: Pluto Press, 2006, pp. 55-
58. 

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They put conditions upon us, but that is impossible. Israel wants 
us to recognise their right to our land. Hamas can accept Israel as a 
fact, but will never recognise their claim to what is ours. Accepting 
defeat means accepting permanent occupation, and that will never 
happen. The generations to come will not forgive us.
22
  
Yet accepting reality is the first step, and if it entails a temporary 
cease-fire that can last up to a century, it provides all the parties involved 
with enough time to seek out a permanent solution to the problem without 
deadlines, and most importantly, without violence. In the words of Hamas 
members, accepting reality on the ground as a fact does not necessarily 
translate into recognition of Israel. The 1967 borders are the priority for 
Hamas at the moment, but not the end goal. Ambitions are much higher, 
and settling at the 1967 borders is only an interim solution prior to setting 
out for the full liberation of Palestine, no matter what that entails. Scaling 
down over-ambitious targets that first strove directly towards liberating the 
whole of Palestine could be interpreted as a moderation of the group.  
Since hudna can be temporary – up to a century – the question arises 
of whether temporarily accepting Israel as a fact would also imply a period 
of several decades. So far, there is no indication that accepting Israel as a 
temporary fact does not comply with hudna, thus opening up a window of 
opportunity for finding a long-term solution in compliance with Islamic 
principles and suitable to Israel’s interests. And when a senior Hamas 
member says that “Jerusalem is the capital city of the entire world,”
23
 the 
possibility of reaching common ground appears closer. After all, if certain 
legitimate grievances were addressed, the potential for the de-
radicalisation of Palestinian society would be considerable. Some of these 
grievances are simple to resolve, like freedom of movement and cessation 
of the blockade.
24
 Propping up the local economy would provide young 
people with jobs and eventually preoccupy their minds with issues not 
limited to Hamas’s communiqués of war for Palestine and Islam. Providing 
alternatives to the war economy opens up the prospects for a sustainable 
peace, in which militants would have a much harder time finding new 
recruits.  
                                                      
22
 Author interview, Hamas member in Homs, 2008. 
23
 Author interview, Hamas member in Damascus, 2008. 
24
 Since 2006, the Israeli government has maintained a total blockade of Gaza. 

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U
NDERSTANDING 
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AMAS
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61 
 
The government level  
The Hamas charter published in summer 1988 describes Palestine as a 
country founded by Islam.
25
 As an Islamic movement, it is present in every 
aspect of life, whether political, financial, military, cultural or educational. 
The group’s spokesperson in Damascus attributed Hamas’s fast rise from a 
small charitable organisation to a key regional player to the intellect and 
strategy of its pious leadership:  
Our leadership derives its wisdom from the holy book and 
Prophet Muhammad’s words. It is an Islamic resistance movement 
that understands the reality very well, tries to deal with 
Palestinian problems, and with all issues of concern to Palestinian 
people without compromising its values and principles. It’s not 
anyone’s tool, but an Islamic movement defending great religion.
26
  
Although branded as an Islamic terrorist group, in an interview with 
the author of this chapter one of Hamas’s senior leaders based in Damascus 
denies that Hamas is a radical organisation as presented in the West: 
Hamas is not radical. Believe me. We have relations [with] any 
country who respects our right in Palestine. Hamas is in control in 
Gaza, and we want to have Islamic rule there, but we do not 
implement it because people are not ready for that. We do not cut 
off hands of thieves, but send them to prison. We even have 
Christian members in Hamas.
27
  
Highly critical even of the Iranian sharia system, the Hamas 
leadership believes that there is a need to develop a legal and judicial 
system based on sharia that is not seen as the law, but more like a code of 
values and inspiration.
28
 Hamas has also distanced itself from other 
regional and international jihadist groups, despite their open support for 
Hamas. Al-Qaeda even issued public condemnation of Hamas for taking 
part in the elections. When asked for an opinion about al-Qaeda, a Hamas 
leader explained the difference between terrorism and justified resistance: 
                                                      
25
 See Reinhard Schulze, A Modern History of the Islamic World, New York: New 
York University Press, 2002, pp. 250-253.  
26
 Author interview, Hamas member in Damascus, 2008. 
27
 The interview with Mr Yasser was conducted in Damascus in July/August 2008. 
28
 See Schulze (2002), op. cit.  

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