Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

50
 
|
 
I
BRAHIM 
E
L 
H
OUDAIBY
 
not carried out by the movement, but rather by “youth activists who are 
close to Jamaah” and who lack “sufficient understanding of Islam”.
65
 
Neo-terrorism has been growing stronger over the years. With a 
“rapid boom in technology and communication, it takes no more than a 
connection to the Internet and a few dollars to develop a bomb and 
threaten the security and lives of innocents anywhere”.
66
 As long as the 
causes of radicalism exist, neo-terrorism will continue its ascent and will 
remain impossible to control and monitor using security measures.  
A series of terrorist attacks shocked Cairo in 2005. Analysts argued 
that the attacks were carried out by a “third generation of Islamist 
movements, which has not lived the developments of the 1970s and 1980s 
movements and has no organisational ties with them”.
67
 Although Egypt’s 
regime has succeeded in pre-empting some attacks and has arrested cells of 
neo-terrorists (often said to have affiliations with al-Qaeda), the nature of 
these movements undermines the possibility of dealing with them using 
security measures alone. 
The emergence of post-institutional Islamists only stresses the 
importance of integrating Islamists and addressing the causes of 
radicalisation. Such an emergence also reflects the partial failure of 
institutionalised Islamist movements, as well as the absolute failure of the 
regime’s policies towards Islamism. 
Conclusions  
Egyptians are sceptical towards any interventionist attempts by Western 
countries, yet scepticism towards the US is higher than that towards 
Europe. It is therefore recommended that the EU distance itself from US 
foreign policy.  
While recognising the importance of working with the current 
regimes of the Middle East, the EU should also forge direct, consistent 
relations with moderate Islamists. This requires both sides to make top-
                                                      
65
 Ahmed (2003), op. cit., p. 37. 
66
 El Houdaiby, “Your Best Friend Hates You”, Conflicts Forum, 30 September 
2007(b) (retrieved from http://conflictsforum.org/2007/your-best-friend-hates-
you/). 
67
 Arafa (2005), op. cit. 

---

T
RENDS IN POLITICAL 
I
SLAM IN 
E
GYPT 
|
 
51 
level decisions to “maintain their engagement as a proper policy for 
interaction and not yield to pressure and suspend it”.
68
 
Yet before undertaking such engagements, EU policy-makers should 
determine the actors with whom they want to talk. This requires 
developing clear criteria for engagement, which should be based on the 
level and potential for moderation among the different groups and 
individuals.  
To overcome mutual mistrust, the EU could start by interacting with 
Islamist NGOs that are affiliated with those groups the EU decides to 
engage in talks. Apolitical engagement would be less sensitive for both 
parties as well as the regime, and would help build bridges of trust 
between the EU and Islamists. Although financial assistance would not be 
welcomed by Islamists, logistical assistance and training would serve this 
purpose for this phase of the engagement. 
Whereas direct political engagement seems unlikely at present, 
decreasing hostility towards the West could be promoted through being 
“moderately vocal but firm and consistent with the ruling regimes, and 
urg[ing] them to allow immediate structural changes”.
69
 Adopting robust 
stances on issues of human rights and the rule of law would help in the 
engagement process, and would further facilitate the moderation of 
Islamists and their integration in politics. 
A final component in a successful strategy that would contribute to 
the moderation of political Islam in Egypt would be the pursuit of better 
cultural relations. Cultural exchange – demonstrating openness to dialogue 
and an appreciation of cultural diversity – together with economic 
integration and a principled stance on human rights and the rule of law 
will contribute to the emergence of moderate Islamist discourses that could 
overshadow radical ones. 
 
                                                      
68
 E. El-Din Shahin, Political Islam: Ready for Engagement, Working Paper, FRIDE, 
Madrid, February 2005. 
69
 Ibid. 

---

52 | 
 
 
3.
 
U
NDERSTANDING 
H
AMAS
’
S 
RADICALISATION
 
K
HALED 
A
L
-H
ASHIMI
 
amas has become probably the most emblematic case of 
radicalisation. It is one that the EU has singularly failed to deal 
with. Hamas’s leadership shows no signs of softening its attitude 
despite the political, economic and military pressure exerted upon it. A 
group that genuinely believes it is accountable only to God does not yield 
easily to pressure. Policies designed to diminish its support have backfired 
because they fail to understand the factors that trigger Hamas’s defiant 
stance.  
This chapter explains the four different dimensions of Hamas’s 
radicalisation – the individual, social, governmental and international.
1
 In 
breaking down the factors driving radicalisation in this way, it is suggested 
that light can be shed on how the EU can better foster the de-radicalisation 
of Hamas. The prospects for de-radicalisation can be found in militant 
resistance being viewed as only one component of individual resistance, 
the increasing social acceptability of the hudna [cease-fire] concept, the 
focus on issues of practical governance and the group’s evolving 
relationship with the international community. Each of these dimensions 
holds important policy implications for the EU.  
                                                      
1
 The analysis in this chapter is based primarily on seven interviews with senior 
members of Hamas in Syria in summer 2008. The interviewees agreed to be quoted 
as part of this research in exchange for anonymity. 
H 

---