Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

44
 
|
 
I
BRAHIM 
E
L 
H
OUDAIBY
 
were arrested, their assets were confiscated and they stood before a 
military tribunal that sentenced them to three to ten years in prison, despite 
decisions by four civilian courts to drop all charges put forward by the state 
security apparatus.  
In that context, the MB issued the first draft of its less-than-moderate 
manifesto, mentioned earlier in this chapter. Hamed Quwaisi points out 
that the manifesto is part of a “larger crisis in Egyptian political life, where 
the regime has marginalised the people’s influence in public matter[s], and 
forced them to resign from politics”.
55
 That is not to suggest that he does 
not blame the group. Indeed, he blames the “absence of a political reformist 
mentality” for the poor quality of the draft.  
Given its institutional moderation, the regime’s onslaught did not 
push the MB all the way back to radicalism. The Brotherhood’s distribution 
of the draft to intellectuals and politicians reflected a willingness to accept 
criticism, while the debate that followed reflected internal diversity, a sign 
of political maturity.  
The draft manifesto should be assessed in the light of mainstream 
political trends in Egypt. Political movements relying on grassroots support 
need to keep an eye on their supporters’ preferences, even if they believe in 
the ‘mission’ of social change and reform. While the majority of Egyptians 
emphasise the importance of sharia as the only source of legislation, the 
draft manifesto only emphasises it as the ‘main’ source. The group’s stance 
against women or Copts holding the presidency reflects a cultural deficit 
within society that is an outcome of the Wahhabi heritage carried by the 
1970s movement into contemporary Islamist movements. According to a 
Gallup poll, only 50% of Egyptians support the right of women to hold 
leadership positions. This could only compare well with Saudi Arabia’s 
40%. Statistics from other Muslim countries are significantly higher. The 
Brotherhood – consciously or not – keeps itself just one step ahead of 
society, trying to strike a balance between ideological purity, intellectuals’ 
fears and grassroots support. 
                                                      
55
 H.A.M. Quwaisi, “Political Significance of the MB Party Manifesto Crisis” 
(Aldalalat Alsiyasiyya Li Azmit Barnamij Hizb al Ikhwan),  IslamOnline.net, 22 
November 2007 (retrieved from www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c= 
ArticleA_C&cid=1195032526684). 

---

T
RENDS IN POLITICAL 
I
SLAM IN 
E
GYPT 
|
 
45 
Wasat 
The Wasat party was founded by a group of middle-generation leaders 
who broke off from the Brotherhood in 1996. Although their attempts to 
acquire legal recognition failed three times (in 1996, 1998 and 2004), Wasat 
leaders are still struggling for this recognition and are applying for legal 
recognition again in 2009.  
They have every reason to believe they are entitled to it. They have 
the support of “prominent secular journalists, intellectuals and political 
figures who see them as representing a moderate and enlightened form of 
political Islam”.
56
 In addition, they also have the report by the Coptic-led, 
State Representatives Committee of the Administrative Court, which 
acknowledges their manifesto as “unique” – a condition for new political 
parties that had previously been used by the Parties Committee to deny 
them legal recognition.  
The group has developed three different platforms, the third of which 
(published in 2004) is currently being revisited in order to present it to the 
Parties Committee. Although membership of the Wasat party is still under 
1,000, it has the potential to attract large numbers of Egypt’s Islamic 
bourgeoisie class when it acquires legal recognition.  
The Wasat membership records are highly revealing in themselves: 
2% of the ‘Islamist’ party members are Copts, a significantly high 
percentage compared with the Coptic presence in other parties.
57
 Over 35% 
of members are women, 25% are workers and 60% hold university degrees. 
In many ways, Wasat has succeeded in reaching out to supporters beyond 
the traditional Islamist base. It has accomplished the development of a 
mainstream national discourse with Islamic roots. 
The party’s manifesto reflects moderate views. Its agenda for political 
reform stresses the following principles: freedom of speech; freedom of 
belief and religious practice for “all Abrahamic religions”; respect of 
human rights; “complete equality” between all citizens – men and women, 
Muslims and non-Muslims – in legal and political rights; judicial 
independence; and (most significantly) separation between religious and 
political institutes, along with the financial and administrative 
                                                      
56
 C.R. Wickham, Mobilizing Islam, New York: Columbia University Press, 2002. 
57
 Membership statistics have been provided by al-Wasat. 

---

46
 
|
 
I
BRAHIM 
E
L 
H
OUDAIBY
 
independence of al-Azhar from state bureaucracy.
58
 It adopts a balanced 
international relations agenda by which it does not “completely accept – in 
a way close to surrender – the West, nor does it completely reject it”.
59
  
Ever since its establishment, Wasat has been closer to the moderate 
end of its ideological boundaries (with its position in relation to other 
groups shown in Figure 1). In many ways, it manifests the ideological 
purity of its school. Detachment from a grassroots support base (compared 
with the MB), endorsement of intellectuals (secular and Islamist alike) and 
relative toleration (although not recognition) by the state have kept Wasat 
away from the pressure that often leads to radicalisation. This has also 
given its members the space to detach themselves from the impacts of other 
schools such as Wahhabism and Qutbism. The group’s insistence on legal 
recognition, despite being repeatedly  turned  down  by  the  regime,  is 
remarkable.  
Figure 1. Continuum of Islamist movement ideologies in Egypt  
 
 
3.3
 
Post-institutional Islamist movements 
In many ways,  Wasat was the first manifestation of the post-institutional 
trend in Islamic movements that began in the late 1990s. Egypt’s regime 
had focused on security measures while dealing with Islamist movements. 
It continuously repressed Jihad until a freeze was declared on its 
                                                      
58
 Al-Wasat New Party Papers (Awraq Hizb Al-Wasat Al Jadeid), Cairo: Dar Al Tiba’a 
Al Mutamayiza, 2004, pp. 21-23. 
59
 Ibid., p. 9. 

---