Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

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New economic and media policies adopted by President Anwar 
Sadat were viewed as ‘too liberal’, provoking socialists economically and 
Islamists culturally.
25
 Signing the peace treaty with Israel was another 
cause of Jamaah’s radicalisation. Young Islamists, perceiving their social 
power and influential role, believed they could not remain silent while “a 
peace treaty with the Muslims’ largest enemy of the time was being 
signed”. This led to a “major transformation changing the Jamaah from a 
social group into a strong political opposition group”. This transformation 
was socially triggered by pictures of Egypt’s first lady kissing and dancing 
with US President Jimmy Carter on the day the treaty was signed, 
“provoking the religious and conservative public…and [was] harshly 
criticised by students and [the] Islamist movement in general”.
26
 
A further cause for Jamaah’s radicalisation was the regime’s 
crackdown on the student movement. Opposition to the regime’s policies 
and president triggered the regime to intervene in student activities, 
postpone student union elections, freeze union funds and introduce the 
1979 law that undermined students’ freedom. 
Tensions grew between two wings of Jamaah: one advocating violent 
change, calling for strict Jamaah institutionalisation and partial detachment 
from society, and the other calling for gradual peaceful change and further 
integration into society. As leaders of the latter trend joined the MB,
27
 the 
advocates of violence split into a new militant organisation. Mady holds 
that “from this point onwards, Jamaah Islamiyya  meant a new thing, a 
well-structured organisation that adopts violence – or power as they call it 
– as a means of change”.
28
  
                                                      
25
 During Sadat’s meeting with student leaders, a Jamaah student leader took the 
floor and criticised Sadat for upholding the slogan of “the state of science and 
faith” while promoting a media discourse that makes one question whether the 
state wants its youth to be “Muslims, communists, heretics or cow worshippers”. 
He also criticised the ban of some scholars from lecturing, thus forcing them to 
leave the country: “This way, all sincere scholars leave, and only hypocrits stay.” 
26
 Awwa (2005), op. cit., pp. 80-81. 
27
 The most important of these leaders were Abdel Monem Aboul Fotouh, Khayrat 
El Shater, Essam el Erian, Hemly el Jazzar, Aboul El-Ela Mady, Anwar Shehata, 
Sayyid Abdel Sattar and Ibrahim El Zafarany. Mady (2006, op. cit.) has a more 
comprehensive list in his book (p. 36). 
28
 Mady (2006), op. cit., p. 21. 

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With ‘moderates’ withdrawing from Jamaah,  Karam Zuhdy, a 
prominent leader and a backer of violence, started implementing his plan. 
Jamaah members began training with guns and weapons. Zuhdy met with 
Mohamed Abdel Salam Farag, another Islamist proponent of violence, 
whose group Jamaat al-Jihad had a stronger presence in northern Egypt. 
They both went to meet Sheikh Umar Abdul Rahman, an al-Azhar scholar 
and another advocate of violence, who became their ideologue.
29
  
These groups allied and started working on plans to topple the 
regime. When Sadat stepped up his onslaught on the opposition in 
September 1981, a military officer belonging to Jamaah – whose members 
found themselves on the detention lists – proposed killing Sadat during a 
military parade. Although the majority were against the decision, arms had 
the final word and Sadat was assassinated on 6 October 1981. 
The decision to assassinate Sadat was not rooted in religion. 
According to Awwa, “the Islamic legitimisation of [the assassination] was 
not an issue that was brought up during the discussions [that] preceded it”. 
Religion was only ushered in to justify the assassination after it had already 
happened. Jamaah’s conduct was always “in this order: acting then 
thinking [of justifications]”.
 30
 Like other Islamic movements of the time, it 
was a movement driven primarily by political reality and not ideology. 
Literature justifying the assassination was only written later when Jamaah 
leaders were facing trial, and awaiting or serving their sentences behind 
bars. 
3.2
 
Institutionalising movements: 1980s onwards 
Sadat’s assassination closed one chapter and opened another. As Hosni 
Mubarak took over the presidency, violence was making its way into the 
literature of radical Islamist groups, clearer lines were being drawn 
between different orientations of Islamists and higher levels of 
institutionalisation were emerging.  
                                                      
29
 Umar Abdul Rahman is now serving a life sentence in the US. Several view him 
as the amir [commander] of the Jamaah, but Mady argues otherwise. He says the 
sheikh is heavily influenced by those surrounding him, and that Karam Zuhdy 
was always the real amir, although he preferred to work in the background. This 
section draws from Mady (2003), op. cit., pp. 21-23. 
30
 Awwa (2005), op. cit., pp. 98-100. 

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While the split between violent and non-violent movements had 
already been established, internal divisions within these broad groups were 
further institutionalised. During the course of the 1980s, the ideological 
boundaries of different movements became more distinct. The contextual 
impact was thus limited to empowering or disempowering various groups 
and incrementally shifting movements back and forth on the radical–
moderate continuum, within defined ideological limits.  
Jamaat al-Jihad 
One of the most radical movements that existed at the time was Jamaat al-
Jihad. Upon forming an alliance with Jamaah in 1979,  both movements 
collaborated in assassinating Sadat. Shortly after the trials, the groups split 
once again.  
Once released from prison, Jihad  members reorganised themselves 
and  launched a series of terrorist attacks primarily targeting Egyptian 
officials. They were known for using bombs in these attacks (unlike 
Jamaah, known for using guns), and their record includes assassination 
attempts on the prime minister and ministers of interior and information.  
Already an offshoot of the larger Jamaah group, Jihad was racked by 
organisational disputes leading to further internal splits. Indeed, Jamaah 
leaders argue that there is no single Jihad  group, but rather highly 
fragmented groups.
31
 One of its splinter groups was Talaia al-Fateh, a 
group led by Zawahiri.  
The group adopted an isolationist attitude towards society, not 
opting to move from the margins to the centre of Egyptian politics. This 
strategy was a natural outcome of its extremist views, which detached it 
from society. Jihad’s line of thinking also distanced it from other Islamist 
movements and scholars, as it denounced most scholars as “regime 
affiliated”.
32
  
Jihad developed a “structure comprised of small secret cells, with the 
primary focus on [violent] action and not preaching, they had no relation 
                                                      
31
 M.M. Ahmed, Conspiracy or Revision: Dialogue with Extremist Leaders in Aqrab 
Prison  (Mo’amara Am Muraja’a: Hiwar Ma’ Qadit al Tataruf fi Sijn al Aqrab), Cairo: 
Dar al-Shorouq, 2003, p. 46. 
32
 Awwa (2005), op. cit., p. 70. 

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