Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

30
 
|
 
I
BRAHIM 
E
L 
H
OUDAIBY
 
This statement echoes a conviction shared by a majority of Muslims. 
When asked about one thing the West could do to improve the quality of 
life of Middle Eastern Muslims, one of the most frequent answers given by 
the Gallup poll respondents was “stop imposing your beliefs and policies”. 
Furthermore, “Westoxification” is condemned “for robbing Muslims of 
their source of identity and values, and thus their unity and strength”.
13
 
Culture and religion have profound significance for Egyptians: 98% 
say religion is an important part of their daily life and 87% consider their 
customs and traditions to be important. Bishry (2005) argues that 
“radicalisation will continue to exist with different degrees and [in] various 
forms…as long as Westernisation continues to prevail”,
14
 since the 
phenomenon of Islamism is itself a reaction to Westernisation.  
That is not to say that Egyptians reject Western values wholesale. 
They do accept Western ideas with a contextualisation that fits them into 
the Egyptian culture and value system. They accept a version of democracy 
that is different from Western democracy; it incorporates sharia as a source 
of legislation – indeed the only source for a majority of Egyptians. Needless 
to say, “when Muslims support the application of Shariah, what that means 
can drastically vary from one person to another”,
15
 yet it all reflects the 
importance of religion, culture and heritage, and explains why increased 
Westernisation would only lead to increasing radicalisation. 
A third reason for hostility is the general feeling that ‘the West’ does 
not respect Islam. As a Gallup poll indicates, only 12% of politically 
radicalised Muslims – and 17% of moderates – associate “respecting Islamic 
values” with Western nations. This statistic reflects reality in some Western 
countries. When Americans were asked what they most admire about 
Muslim societies, the most frequent responses were “nothing” and “I don’t 
know”. 
What are viewed by Muslims as cultural assaults by Europeans also 
contribute to empowering radicalisation. The Jyllands-Posten  cartoons and 
“Fitna”  film are the most recent controversies. They provoked moderate 
and radical Islamists alike, providing a fertile atmosphere for recruitment  
 
                                                      
13
 Esposito & Mogahed (2007), op. cit., p. 42. 
14
 Bishry (2005),  op. cit. 
15
 Esposito & Mogahed (2007), op. cit., p. 54. 

---

T
RENDS IN POLITICAL 
I
SLAM IN 
E
GYPT 
|
 
31 
by radicals. Following the Jyllands-Posten cartoons, bin Laden appeared in a 
taped message asserting that retaliation to this insult will be something to 
remember.
16
 
2.3
 
Convergence of trends 
These two trends of radicalism are not mutually exclusive – they converge 
more than diverge. The backing of Egypt’s regime by Western governments 
presents a pretext for linking them to one another. For many radicals, 
Western governments are the distant enemy, while Egypt’s regime is the 
near one.  
Radicals highlight this relationship between regimes and Western 
backers to justify their hostility and violent acts against all. On several 
occasions, Zawahiri has underlined this relationship, sometimes calling the 
Egyptian regime and others in the region “Condoleezza Rice’s boys”,
17
 and 
sometimes calling upon Egyptians to “attack the regime that has allied with 
the West, and target Western and Israeli interests”.
18
  
3.
 
Islamist movements 
3.1
 
The roots of radicalism 
In the early 1970s, within a very few years, Islamist students organised 
themselves and started coordinating their activities under the name of 
Jamaah al-Islamiyya. While newly released MB members were recovering 
from long periods of imprisonment under President Abdel Nasser, 
independent Islamist students took the stage with activities that attracted 
more students. 
                                                      
16
 H. Yahmed, “Bin Laden Threatens Europe over Offensive Cartoon” (Bin Laden 
Yatawa’ad Oroppa ‘ala al Rusoum al Mosei’a),  IslamOnline.net, 20 March 2006 
(retrieved from http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=ArticleA_C&cid= 
1203758242508&pagename=Zone-Arabic-News/NWALayout). 
17
 M. Scheuer, “Al-Qaeda Message Aimed at US Living Room”, Asia Times Online, 
10 May 2007 (retrieved from http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/ 
IE10Ak08.html). 
18
 IslamOnline.net, “Zawahiri: We Will Fight against Israel When We’re Done with 
Iraq” (Zawahiri: Sa Nuqatil Israel Ba’d al Intisar Fin Iraq), IslamOnline.net, 3 April 2008 
(retrieved from http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=ArticleA_C&cid= 
1203758655590&pagename=Zone-Arabic-News/NWALayout). 

---

32
 
|
 
I
BRAHIM 
E
L 
H
OUDAIBY
 
What type of Islamism did Jamaah advocate? Key figures in the 
movement assert that “Islamic trends and schools of thought from which 
the movement has drawn ideas were to a great extent variant and 
diverse”
19
 and that it “did not have a single source of intellect, but rather 
diverse sources, including Salafist (Wahhabi), Ikhwani, Tablighi
20
 and 
Azhari ones”.
21
 
Newly released members of the MB were highly regarded by Jamaah 
members and were regularly invited to preach among the group. Sayyid 
Qutb’s legacy and prolific writing had some minor influence on the group, 
which only moved to the centre of its ideology a few years later.
22
 
In a context of political freedom and toleration, the Wahhabi 
influence was not enough to radicalise Jamaah. With the exception of some 
marginal groups (such as the Saleh Sereyya and Yahia Hashem groups, 
which had no ties to Jamaah), the mainstream movement had no record of 
violence. 
The Wahhabi influence was limited to shaping Jamaah’s priorities. Its 
members focused on socio-religious activities, calling on men to grow 
beards
23
 and women to wear the niqab, considering the prevalence of such 
features indicators of its success.
24
 With its broad ideological orientation, 
the Jamaah still invited and welcomed moderate, non-Wahhabi, al-Azhar 
University scholars to lecture at its events.  
Between 1977 and 1981, several contextual changes took place, 
leading to the radicalisation of Jamaah and its split into several groups. 
                                                      
19
 M.S. Al-Awwa, The Militant Jamaah Islamiyya in Egypt: 1974-2004 (Al Jamaah al 
Islamiyya al Mosallaha fi Masr: 1974-2004), Cairo: Maktabet al-Shorouq el Dawliya, 
2005, p. 78. 
20
 An example is the school of thought of the Tablighi Jamaat, an Indian reformist 
movement focusing primarily on reforming religious practices. For more about the 
movement, see J.L. Esposito, Oxford Dictionary of Islam, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003. 
21
 Mady (2006), op. cit., p. 16. 
22
 For more on Sayyid Qutb and his relation with the MB, see I. El Houdaiby, “Four 
Decades after Sayyid Qutb’s Execution”, Daily Star Egypt, July 2008(b). 
23
 Mady (2006), op. cit., p. 13. 
24
 Awwa (2005), op. cit., p. 70. 

---