Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

22 | R
OBERT 
S
PRINGBORG
 
share liberal values whether Islamist or not, into more coherent, effective 
political forces. That in turn requires prying open political space, as well as 
assisting coalition-building efforts among these components, Islamist and 
non-Islamist and including regime moderates.  
A strategy based on these calculations is necessarily more overtly 
political than the present EU one, and accordingly requires more backbone 
and nuance on its part. Moreover, it is not a strategy that provides for 
immediate success. Indeed, if the Turkish case is any guide, one could not 
expect dramatic results within a decade. But in the meantime, the critical 
contribution of instilling political hope might be reasonably anticipated. 
And that is vital. Presently, the strategies of both regime hardliners and 
entrenched MB leaders are based on hopelessness and widespread despair 
that there will be any fundamental change in authoritarian political orders. 
The path to power by these actors is seen as lying not through democracy, 
which they believe they will never see, but through forging alliances with 
other powerful actors. Participation in the trappings of democracy is for the 
purposes of maintaining organisational solidarity, demonstrating powers 
and capacities, heading off retribution, earning kudos in the West and even 
preparing for the day when by some miracle democracy might arrive. Still, 
given modern Arab history, one can easily forgive them for being cynical 
about that possibility. And at present, it is this cynicism and despair that 
fosters non-democratic thinking and possibly action, including re-
radicalisation by Islamists who were prepared to give democracy a go 
when it appeared as if it might eventuate. 
So the task at hand now is to restore some faith that a 
democratisation process is indeed possible, even if it is not proceeding 
rapidly or even discernibly at present. Since incumbent regimes no longer 
feel compelled to even pay much lip service to democratic commitments, to 
say nothing of taking real action, it is left to outsiders, such as the EU, to try 
to induce them to mend their ways while also indicating through other 
interventions the outside world’s commitment to providing democratic 
freedoms to subject Arab populations. Although admittedly it is going to 
be difficult to kindle much hope, that is not an impossible task, nor is it a 
hugely risky one. Moreover, the negative consequences of political 
hopelessness and despair, which definitely include political violence and 
breakdown, are potentially so threatening to the EU that it is vital to seek to 
head them off.  
 

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P
ART 
II. 
C
ASE STUDIES IN
 
I
SLAMIST RADICALISATION 
 

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25 
 
 
2.
 
T
RENDS IN POLITICAL 
I
SLAM IN 
E
GYPT
 
I
BRAHIM 
E
L 
H
OUDAIBY
*
 
he Muslim Brotherhood (MB)  made more use of Egypt’s limited 
political opening in 2005 than other opposition groups. The year 
witnessed a long marathon of demonstrations, elections and 
referendums and was concluded by the parliamentary elections in which 
the MB scored 88 seats – more than four times the number of seats it had 
won in the previous elections, and more than ten times the number of seats 
won collectively by other opposition groups. 
This success sparked an intensive debate among Egypt’s intelligentsia 
about how moderate Islamists should be integrated into formal politics, 
with the central question being whether the MB is  a moderate group. 
Intensive engagement with political opposition groups in organising rallies 
and demonstrations, a tolerant political discourse and pragmatic 
manoeuvres in the political system suggested that the group – which had 
renounced violence in the 1950s – had taken a step further towards 
moderation.  
Advocates of integration were disappointed a couple of years later 
when the MB distributed the first draft of its political manifesto to a 
number of intellectuals and political activists, parts of which were leaked to 
the media. Highly controversial within MB ranks – as revealed by the 
internal debates that followed – the less-than-moderate draft was reported 
to have restricted the eligibility of women and Copts’ to run for the 
presidency, and established a supreme advisory council of scholars to 
provide advice to the parliament. 
                                                      
*
 The author would like to thank Dr Emad Shahin, a former instructor and an 
inspiring mentor for his invaluable support in the preparation of this chapter. 
T 

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26
 
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I
BRAHIM 
E
L 
H
OUDAIBY
 
While most merely criticised the MB, a few scholars took the 
responsibility of scrutinising the contextual changes between 2005 and 2007 
that had led to a strengthening of the less moderate ideas within the group. 
This chapter looks at the evolution of different trends of political Islam in 
Egypt, with a view to understanding their discourses and the flexible 
elements these contain, along with the reasons and rationale behind shifts 
in orientation. 
1.
 
What causes radicalism?  
Radicalism is caused by a complex assortment of social, political, economic 
and ideological factors, some of which are more important than others are. 
According to a Gallup World Poll,
1
 the link between economic 
hardship and political radicalisation hardly exists. For example, 64% of 
politically radicalised Muslims (compared with 55% of moderates) “believe 
their standard of living is getting better” and 65% of them (versus 55% of 
moderates) say they have “average or above average incomes”. This goes 
against the conventional wisdom that ties radicalisation to deteriorating 
economic conditions. 
Conventional wisdom also implies a correlation between observance 
and radicalisation. Empirical evidence suggests otherwise. According to 
Esposito & Mogahed (2007), “many of the 9/11 hijackers themselves 
exhibited behaviours hardly practised by a religious Muslim”.
2
 Most of al-
Qaeda’s leaders are not graduates of madrasahs, but rather of modern 
schools and hold esteemed degrees. Osama bin Laden has a degree in 
management and engineering, and Ayman Al-Zawahiri has a degree in 
medicine.  
That is not to suggest the absolute absence of links between religious 
education and radicalisation – it merely points out that it is rather a specific 
form of religiosity that is associated with radicalisation. One should 
therefore search for reasons that explain the decision of some Muslims to 
adopt a radical line of thinking and interpretations of Islam. Although the 
ideological foundations of radicalism can be traced back to the early 
                                                      
1
 Unless otherwise stated, the statistics and figures in this chapter are based on the 
Gallup World Poll reported in J.L. Esposito and D. Mogahed, Who Speaks for Islam?, 
New York: Gallup Press, 2007. 
2
 Ibid.., p. 69. 

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