Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

18 | R
OBERT 
S
PRINGBORG
 
fundamental overhaul of those institutions (e.g. shrinking their size, 
reorganising them or reconfiguring them so as to change the logic that 
underpins them and their operations), and such reforms are bound to 
undermine the very political forces that sustain authoritarian states. 
Making government institutions more transparent and accountable 
ultimately would reduce the grip of power holders on key areas of 
decision-making, so they will be resisted by those incumbents. Ultimately, 
better governance requires profound institutional change, which by the 
very nature of their core interests and the manner in which they maintain 
control, Arab ‘deep’ or ‘shadow’ states are unwilling to allow. So while 
macroeconomic policies, laws and regulations all may become more 
‘market friendly’, the governmental institutions – from ministries to 
regulatory and audit agencies – charged with the implementation and 
monitoring of those policies, laws and regulations cannot be changed for 
political reasons. Consequently, these institutions will be unable to deliver 
good governance or contribute to sustained economic improvements 
because to do so would require relaxation or removal of the mechanisms of 
control and the patronage networks around which they are built – the 
maintenance of which (even in an attenuated form) is critical to the shadow 
state’s survival.  
Economic reform eventually will need to entail deeper and more 
structural, comprehensive changes than those that have taken place so far. 
In other words, it will have to move from a focus on macroeconomic 
policies to a focus on institutions. Only by enhancing the capacity of the 
relevant institutions to design, implement and monitor these reforms can 
the latter have a genuine chance to succeed. But such institutional changes 
are hard to envisage unless the political dynamics and interests that sustain 
existing institutions are altered in a more democratic direction. In sum, the 
EU strategy of providing indirect support for democratisation is predicated 
on false assumptions and unlikely to achieve either its tactical or strategic 
objectives.  
A final deterrent to the formulation of a more proactive EU policy to 
support democratisation in the MENA with the participation of moderate 
Islamists is the obvious risks involved. The status quo is deemed by the EU 
to be preferable to a variety of scenarios that could eventuate were an 
adventuresome EU engagement to contribute to destabilisation. While the 
most obvious and alarming scenarios involve radical Islamism coming to 
power, a breakdown into political chaos or a retrenchment into a truly 
bloodthirsty authoritarianism, there are less cataclysmic ones that also 
suggest caution is advisable. Mention was made above of the likelihood 

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I
S THE 
EU
 CONTRIBUTING TO RE
-
RADICALISATION
?
 
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19 
that the Egyptian MB and its ‘affiliates’ in other Arab countries act as 
firewalls against re-radicalisation, firewalls that are crumbling in the face of 
de-democratisation by regimes and growing re-radicalisation of Islamism. 
Clumsy EU efforts that might be perceived as attempts to shore up such 
firewalls would likely be counterproductive. The growing power of 
Salafism at a social level has yet to be translated into political power in 
most Arab countries, and it may never be. But again, ill-advised EU 
engagements could conceivably spark Salafist reactions including 
widespread politicisation. Such risks are made all the more worrying by the 
complexity and opacity of Islamism in the Arab world, conditions unlikely 
to change so long as human and civil rights are not guaranteed and 
democratic practices are not enshrined. So in these circumstances, it is 
hardly surprising that the EU prefers to be largely inactive, defending its 
passivity in the face of authoritarianism and the threat of Islamist re-
radicalisation on the grounds that it really does have a strategy to promote 
democratisation that is based on economic development and improvements 
in governance. Unfortunately, this head-in-the-sand approach also has 
obvious dangers. What, if anything, might be done in these challenging 
circumstances? 
Towards a real EU strategy 
The starting point for the construction of a new, more effective strategy is 
the recognition that the status quo carries serious risks, that there are limits 
to what the EU can do to improve it, but that a judicious engagement has 
the potential to reduce those risks. The primary risk is intensification of 
confrontation between authoritarian regimes and re- or newly radicalised 
Islamism. At present, both sides are digging further into their entrenched 
positions, with the moderate forces in both camps in danger of losing 
influence. Therefore, time is of the essence as trends are moving in negative 
directions. The context that contributes to shaping these domestic political 
developments is similarly unfavourable. The global financial crisis will 
inevitably exacerbate politically relevant economic pressures throughout 
the MENA. The unresolved Israeli–Palestinian and Hamas–Fatah conflicts, 
the resurgence of Hizbullah and rearming by the US of the Lebanese army 
in apparent preparation for another attempt to destroy the former, and the 
intensification of fighting in Afghanistan associated with a resurgence there 
of the Taliban and its al-Qaeda allies, all signal that there will be plenty of 
evidence for those Islamists looking for it to prove that Islam is under 
threat, locked into mortal combat with the West and its Israeli allies.  
 

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