Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

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BRAHIM 
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OUDAIBY
 
seats in parliament – 36 of which were won by MB members. The alliance 
opened a window through which MB members were able to get their 
message across, namely through Ashaab, the Al’amal party’s newspaper.  
The MB further integrated with opposition groups when they 
collectively decided to boycott the 1991 elections, protesting new election 
laws. A couple of years later, it started institutionalising its ideas by issuing 
a “declaration to the people”, which included its stances on political 
pluralism, women and democracy. Institutionalising the stance on Copts 
came a few years later, when an MB spokesperson wrote that Copts are 
“citizens in the Muslim State [and] should enjoy safety and security”.
52
 This 
came only a few months after controversial comments made by MB leader 
Mustafa Mashhour, arguing that Copts could be exempted from military 
service and pay jizya  [tax] in exchange.  The group’s position on the 
absolute equality of Copts, however, remained vague.  
During the early 1990s, Egypt’s regime allowed more space for the 
MB, hoping their discourse would overshadow that of violent groups. 
President Mubarak made a distinction between two trends of Islamism: a 
peaceful one that tries to work from within the system and a violent one 
that plots assassinations and attacks.  
Civil society facilitated the growth of moderation as intellectuals and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) called for dialogue with moderate 
Islamists to overcome the radical threat. The MB welcomed this initiative 
and some of its responses were published in the Ahram newspaper, where 
El-Hudaibi was quoted as follows: “I followed with great interest the series 
of articles...under the title ‘a call for dialogue’. …We are ready for dialogue 
to clarify issues…here I am again calling for this dialogue.”
53
  
This tolerance facilitated the Brotherhood’s institutionalisation of 
moderate positions, but also catalysed the emergence of a new faction 
within the movement that grew more attached to political engagement. The 
new faction would find it hard to retreat from such stances as the political 
context changed, and would eventually split to form the Hizb al-Wasat 
party.  
The Brotherhood arranged internal elections in 1994, taking 
institutional moderation a step further. This step was not welcomed by the 
                                                      
52
 M.M. El-Hudaibi, Politics in Islam, Cairo: Islamic Inc., 1997. 
53
 A. Bahgat, “Welcome Dialogue” (Marhaban Bil Hiwar), Ahram, 9 April 1993, p. 2. 

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T
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I
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regime, which feared the revival of the group and thus cracked down on it, 
sending 80 MB members to military tribunals that subsequently sentenced 
them to three to five years of imprisonment; only one MB member beat the 
manipulation and made it to the parliament. It was clear that toleration was 
over and that the MB was to face another period of harsh repression.  
This repression only served to enhance radical sentiment. Shutting 
down MB discourse and excluding its peaceful political activities led to a 
vacuum in the Islamist atmosphere that was filled by radicals. The next 
couple of years witnessed a series of terrorist attacks by Jamaah members, 
finally leading to the 1997 Luxor attacks. 
A new minister of interior was appointed following the attacks. He 
allowed for another period of toleration, during which the MB developed 
its political discourse and stood in the 2000 parliamentary elections, 
winning 17 seats and forming the largest parliamentary opposition bloc. 
Within a few months, however, the regime retaliated by shutting down the 
Al’amal  party and Ashaab  newspaper. Tens of members stood before a 
military tribunal to be sentenced to three to five years in prison. The group 
moved towards attitudes that are more anti-Western in 2003, when US 
troops invaded Iraq and when France banned the hijab in public schools. 
This hostility was manifested in statements by group leaders as well as the 
weekly messages by the head of the MB. 
With the US pressure for reform in the Middle East, the MB again 
engaged with political groups in calls for democratisation. In 2005, they 
participated in demonstrations and rallies, and they were welcomed by 
most opposition groups as a strong political ally. 
Following the electoral success of 2005, the regime launched a harsh 
campaign against the Brotherhood. Within 18 months, the regime had 
completely reversed the attempt to integrate moderates into the system. 
Scores of members were arrested including senior ones. Municipal elections 
were postponed to avoid another MB success. Constitutional amendments 
were passed restricting freedom, judicial supervision over elections and the 
ability to integrate Islamists – moderate and radical alike – into politics.
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The MB’s ‘unofficial’ newspaper was shut down. Numerous senior leaders 
                                                      
54
 I. El Houdaiby, “Egypt’s Constitutional Amendments: Everybody Loses”, 
IslamOnline.net, 25 March 2007(a) (retrieved from http://www.islamonline.net/ 
servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1173695326596&pagename=Zone-English-
Muslim_Affairs%2FMAELayout). 

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