Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

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with the society”.
33
 For this specific reason, the group was unresponsive to 
any attempts at de-radicalisation. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Jihad changed its orientation from 
that of an Egyptian, Islamist and militant opposition group to a global 
terrorist group – a change that was initially triggered by the war in 
Afghanistan.
34
 It was later intensified by the military presence of Western 
troops in the Arabian peninsula. Some of its leaders, including Zawahiri, 
fled the country, while others were imprisoned.  
Egypt’s regime continued its strict crackdown on Jihad. Eventually, 
in 1995, Zawahiri announced a “freeze of military operations in Egypt due 
to weak capacity”.
35
 The group ceased to be a threat to Egypt’s domestic 
politics, but is now a global threat. 
Jihad stands as a classic example of multi-factorial radicalisation, set 
off by cultural Westernisation, followed by assaults by the ruling regime 
and then finally Western aggression.  
In 2007, Sayyid Imam, a Jihad leader and ideologue in prison, began 
work on a series of ‘revisions’ to the group’s ideas. At best, these revisions 
de-militarise Jihad, but do not de-radicalise it. They denounce violence for 
rather pragmatic reasons, without challenging the ideological foundations 
underpinning the use of violence.  
Imam’s denunciation of the 9/11 terrorist attacks is not a stance 
against targeting civilians. He only regards the attacks as unjustified 
because they manifest “treason for the friend and the enemy” – the friend 
being the Taliban’s Mullah Umar, who ordered bin Laden not to target 
Americans because he is not powerful enough to stand up against them, 
and the enemy being the US, since the terrorists entered the US using visas. 
His renunciation of domestic violence against the regime is also tactical. 
                                                      
33
 Ahmed (2003), op. cit., p. 54. 
34
 Mady (2006), op. cit., p. 35. 
35
 H. Naseira, “Jihad Revisions: Shaking not Destructing Violent Thought” 
(Moraja’at al Jihad, Khalkhala Bila Hadm Lil Fikr Al’aneef),  IslamOnline.net, 15 
December 2007 (retrieved from 
www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=ArticleA 
_C&cid=1196786288116&page
). 

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Still describing terrorist activities as acts of “jihad”, he argues against the 
use of violence because of “incapability”.
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That is not to suggest that revisions are absolutely fruitless. Imam’s 
denunciation of targeting civilians and tourists in Muslim countries 
involved some fundamental changes. Yet, Jihad is locked in its ideological 
confines and its revisionist wing has already touched the moderate edge of 
those boundaries. Further revisions would require the group to give up its 
ideology wholesale.  
Jamaah al-Islamiyya 
The crucial difference between Jihad  and Jamaah is Jamaah’s interest in 
reaching out to society through a social role that includes preaching. A 
product of a mixed ideological orientation, Jamaah’s structure was not 
comprised of secret cells, except for its military wing.
37
 The group’s social 
activities, its strong presence in Upper Egypt, its horrifying terrorist attacks 
of the 1990s and early consensual revisions make it more significant than 
Jihad. 
Jamaah’s interest in social work does not necessarily reflect peaceful 
relations with society. Indeed, in the 1980s the movement adopted a 
version of ‘enjoining good and forbidding evil’
38
 that entailed physically 
enforcing what they viewed as good and punishing those who did what 
they saw as evil. This included, for instance, burning movie rental stores. 
‘Forbidding the evil’ harmed Jamaah’s relations with society, but its 
charity work and preaching moderated the negative impact. Awareness of 
the group’s “ideology and motives to eliminate corruption and scenes of 
non-religiosity” through its preaching, alongside widespread public 
discontent with the regime, “decreased the negative social impact of 
violence [by] the group”.
39
 Combined with the prevailing moral decay – 
partly stemming from deteriorating economic conditions and educational 
                                                      
36
 M. Salah, “Sayyid Imam: 9/11 Attacks Disastrous for Muslims” (Sayyid Imam: 
Ahdath 911 Karitheyya Lil Muslimeen),  IslamOnline.net, 9 December 2007 (retrieved 
from www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=ArticleA_c&cid=1196786084584). 
37
 Ahmed (2003), op. cit., p. 54. 
38
 This is an Islamic concept closely associated with believers in both the Quran and 
Sunna. 
39
 Awwa (2005), op. cit. p. 86. 

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standards and partly from what was viewed as Westernisation – Egyptians 
still had sympathy with Jamaah’s assassins. They would compare the 
“pious” youth of the Jamaah with others of their age, “who smoke and 
waste their time in cafes”.
40
 Hence, the regime’s failure not only radicalised 
Jamaah, but also enabled its extreme stance to be viewed as less than such 
by society. 
Jamaah’s reaching out to the people has never meant recognising the 
regime and attempting gradually to change it. According to Birry, the 
group’s manifesto, entitled The Inevitability of Confrontation,  speaks of 
“military confrontation with the secular, infidel Egyptian regime as the 
only way to bring about Islamic rule”, using the MB’s political setbacks as 
proof of the futility of peaceful politics. 
 Jamaah’s attempts to reach out to society have involved efforts to 
save members of society from infidelity and recruit more members to 
empower the group to topple the regime. This integration could best be 
understood in light of Qutb’s notion of “mental detachment” – uzla 
shu’ouriyya – as expressed in his milestones, which has been an integral part 
of Jamaah thought.  
Jamaah’s ideological roots are not only found in Qutbism, but also in 
Wahhabism. Hostile attitudes towards non-Muslims are perhaps the 
clearest manifestation of it. Ex-members of the group narrate the way in 
which Jamaah’s ideologues justified physical assaults on Copts and 
confiscation of their property, arguing that Copts are traitors who 
“cooperated with British occupation, and were a reason why Britain 
continued to occupy our Muslim country”.
41
  
Security campaigns have included raids on mosques where Jamaah 
had a strong presence, sometimes killing some of its members. If anything, 
these raids have tarnished the regime’s image and affirmed Jamaah’s 
claims of defending Islam. As an ex-member of Jamaah notes, when he saw 
one of those raids, “it was a proof to me and to many others that the regime 
does not respect Islam...I remembered the movies of Muslims defending 
their religion against [the] injustice of pagans”.
42
  
                                                      
40
 Birry (2002), op. cit, p. 32. 
41
 Ibid., p. 19 and pp. 33-34. 
42
 Ibid., p. 22. 

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