Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

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39 
As members of Jamaah lost their lives in confrontations, others 
sought revenge, leading to a vicious cycle of violence. As Zuhdy describes 
it, “it was an action and a reaction, it started with arrests and then violence 
and responding to it violently”.
43
 The group targeted tourists only as part 
of this revenge – they wanted to hit the regime where it hurt most.  
Jamaah’s record includes the most violent terrorist attacks of the 
1990s: assassinations of Parliament Speaker Refaat Mahjoub and writer 
Farag Fouda; attempts on President Mubarak and on the ministers of 
information and the interior as well as Nobel laureate Naguib Mahfouz; 
and a handful of terrorist attacks targeting tourists, most importantly the 
gunfire at the Europa Hotel and the Luxor attacks of 1997.  
Jamaah has had a potential for de-radicalisation that has been 
overlooked by the regime’s security-based policies. If anything, the politics 
of repression and disintegration have led to a “history of missed 
opportunities”.
44
 An imprisoned Jamaah leader facing a death sentence 
illustrates the point: 
I was an A student ever since I was a freshman…I think it is 
legitimate to expect that when I adopt a line of thought [that] I 
don’t find influential figures in the regime accusing me [of] 
backwardness, extremism or ignorance. [I faced these accusations] 
with no one coming to ask me about my cause: where do I come 
from and why am I going down this road…had the regime 
adopted dialogue since the beginning, all problems and violence 
wouldn’t have taken place. 
45
 
Over the course of 16 years since 1981, Jamaah has gone down a path 
of de-radicalisation.
46
 Lack of communication among leaders inside prison 
and activists on the outside has undermined the effect of these revisions. In 
1997, Jamaah leaders behind bars declared an unconditional renunciation 
of violence. Shortly afterwards, a terrorist attack was executed in the name 
of Jamaah, resulting in scepticism that delayed the regime’s acceptance of 
the revisions for a few years. 
                                                      
43
 Ahmed (2003), op. cit., p. 52. 
44
 Awwa (2005), op. cit., p. 199. 
45
 Ahmed (2003), op. cit., p. 41. 
46
 See the table of Jamaah’s attempts to renounce violence in Awwa’s book (2005), 
op. cit., p. 225. 

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The following months witnessed intensive internal debates, until 
Jamaah’s  shura  council came to a consensus in March 1999, declaring its 
“full support for the initiative”. Since then, not a single operation or attack 
has taken place in the name of the Jamaah.  The regime subsequently 
facilitated the renunciation of violence by releasing large numbers of 
detainees who had been in custody. 
Jamaah’s revisions are the most important for an Egyptian radical 
movement. After the 1997 initiative, Jamaah’s leaders issued four books 
institutionalising the revisions. Similar to those of Jihad, Jamaah’s revisions 
illustrate an attempt to de-militarise the group and move it towards the 
moderate end of its ideological boundaries. 
Jamaah had had a radical stance against the president, calling him an 
infidel who “diverted from sharia and refuses to implement it” and 
therefore had to be replaced.
47
 In its revisions, Jamaah retreated from this 
stance, yet still viewed faith and adherence to Islam as the regime’s sole 
source of legitimacy. 
Jamaah’s views on Copts changed dramatically, but only up to the 
limit of the group’s ideological boundaries. They quit associating Copts 
with crusades and renounced attacks on their lives and property. They 
asserted that “Copts are peoples of the book: they have equal social rights 
to ours, and have equal responsibilities”.
48
 This stance coincides with the 
least moderate stance of the MB, even using the same words. Still, it is 
because of ideological boundaries that it has been impossible for Jamaah to 
“adopt the notion of citizenship that was adopted by reputable Islamic 
thinkers”.
49
  
In addition, ideological limitations can easily be discerned in the 
group’s pragmatic renunciation of violence. Revision documents “use the 
term[s] interest and harm as a sole justification” for the renunciation, 
highlighting the regime’s power as the obstacle that prevents them from 
toppling it. Jamaah has also continued to use the terms ‘combat’ and ‘jihad’ 
to describe its operations and ‘mistakes’ that have happened therein, hence 
                                                      
47
 H.A. Aziz, “Fourth: Jamaah’s Stances and Views before and after Revisions” 
(Rabi’an: Mawqif Wa Ru’a alJama’a Qabl alMuraja’at wa Ba’diha),  IslamOnline.net,  
28 October 2007 (retrieved from www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c= 
ArticleA_C&cid=1193049192027). 
48
 Ahmed (2003), op. cit., p. 34. 
49
 Mady (2006), op. cit., p. 57. 

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partially legitimising them. Their revisionist literature is characterised by 
hostile stances towards secularists, regarding them as the enemy.  
As noted earlier, Jamaah has never had secret organisations, but had 
a military wing that was dissolved after the revisions. Its group leaders 
have asserted that they want to operate as a ‘civil society organisation’ that 
promotes righteousness, educates people and helps them socially. Seeking 
to work with state recognition is a significant retreat from Jamaah’s earlier 
stances.  
Another major step away from radicalisation has been Jamaah’s 
denunciation on moral grounds of the 9/11 attacks. Jamaah has argued that 
“Islam forbids targeting traders…women, children or old men…these are 
all innocent souls [whom] bin Laden will be held accountable for [on the 
Day of Judgment]”.
50
 Distancing themselves from bin Laden’s line of 
thinking and renouncing violence is the furthest Jamaah can go within its 
existing ideology. 
Muslim Brotherhood 
As the most popular non-violent Islamist movement, the MB grew rapidly 
during the 1980s and 1990s. In 1984, the group took its split with the 
Jamaah a step further by contesting in parliamentary elections. Forging an 
electoral alliance with the Wafd party, it established its first parliamentary 
presence.  
This success provoked different reactions among the Islamist 
movements. While more supporters joined lines of integration and peaceful 
politics, radicals became more critical. Jamaah argued that the MB violated 
hakimiyya  [governorship by God]  by accepting the people’s judgment. 
“Their participation also beautified the image of the secular Egyptian 
regime, and portrayed it as a moderate regime that accepts Islamists, and 
therefore provides it with justification to crack down on Islamists who 
refuse to engage in its fake democracy”.
51
 Groups that were more radical, 
including Jihad offshoots, considered participation in elections to be a 
violation of tawhid [monotheism], the most important pillar of Islam.  
In 1987, the MB integrated deeper into formal politics as it negotiated 
a strategic alliance with the Al’amal and Alahrar parties, winning scores of 
                                                      
50
 Ibid., p. 50. 
51
 Birry (2002), op. cit., p. 25. 

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