Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

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operations, engaged in open battle with Jamaah until its imprisoned 
leaders renounced violence and dealt with the MB through partial 
toleration followed by periodic repression, to both overcome the radical 
threat and prevent the growth of the movement.  
In parallel with the crackdown on Islamist movements, the regime 
also ‘nationalised’ the official religious institutes, most importantly the al-
Azhar University. Aware of the extensive influence of this most prestigious 
Islamic institute, Nasser’s regime started amending legislation to 
undermine al-Azhar’s autonomy. Nasser, who “wanted to send a message 
to different parties affirming he is the only strong man in the country”,
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began to restrict all civil society and non-state actors. The regime continued 
its restrictive policies, undercutting al-Azhar’s autonomy and further 
weakening the institution. Consequently, the credibility of al-Azhar 
scholars progressively diminished as they were viewed as ‘state co-opted’ 
scholars who supported or continuously turned a blind eye to the regime’s 
social policies.  
Through this strategy, the regime succeeded in containing all kinds of 
institutional Islamist movements and preventing them from getting out of 
control. It influenced the position of each movement within its ideological 
framework, sometimes delaying revisions within the Jihad  and Jamaah 
movements
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 and sometimes pushing the MB towards the less moderate 
end. In this way, Islamists were constantly used as bogeymen to threaten 
domestic non-Islamists as well as the international community.  
At the same time, this strategy also reduced the ability of 
institutionalised Islamist movements to attract more supporters. 
Meanwhile, the demand for Islamism increased with growing 
Westernisation and the disempowerment of official religious institutes, 
giving rise to post-institutional Islamists. Perhaps Wasat’s split from the 
MB is the first significant example of this phenomenon, except that Wasat, 
which bypassed the MB’s partial retreat from moderate stances owing to 
                                                      
60
 M.S. Al-Awwa, Thawret Yulio Wal Islam [July Revolution and Islam], Cairo: 
Shorouq al Dawliya, 2006, p. 37. 
61
 Jamaah leaders report several incidents in which they tried to announce their 
revisions but were prevented from doing so by the regime. They also claim that 
Jihad leaders wanted to engage in revisions but were similarly prevented by the 
regime and were moved to another prison (see Ahmed, 2003, op. cit. and Awwa, 
2005, op. cit.). 

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institutional pressures, has attempted to institutionalise itself through its 
bid for legal recognition.  
During the mid- and late 1990s, other manifestations of post-
institutional Islamism emerged. Two trends are more significant than the 
others are. The first is the phenomenon of ‘new preachers’ and the second 
is that of ‘neo-terrorism’.  
New preachers 
The phenomenon of new preachers first emerged in the late 1990s, but 
became more powerful in the first years of the 21
st
 century. The failure of 
institutionalised movements, accompanied by scepticism towards ‘official’ 
institutions – such as al-Azhar – has left two alternatives: uncritical 
Westernisation or an association with Islamist movements, involving 
confrontations with the state and perhaps endorsement of radical thinking. 
Both alternatives seemed unpleasant and a societal demand for a third 
alternative ensued. 
Independent preachers have provided a perfect third alternative: 
“safe religiosity, which entail[s] no confrontation with [the] state or 
society”.
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 Initially, Amr Khaled was the sole star preacher, but within a 
few years, an exponential increase in the number of preachers took place.  
New preachers are primarily young Islamist activists (mostly 
between their late 20s and early 40s), who did not receive a traditional 
religious education but are rather self-educated Muslims. For various 
reasons, including computer and Internet literacy, simple commercial 
discourses and modern outfits, they can better relate to the new generation 
of Muslims who are searching for spiritual elements in their lives.  
 Some of the new preachers and their audiences are part of the new 
bourgeoisie, which has achieved career and material success and wants to 
fill a spiritual vacuum, or are among those who have worked in the Gulf 
and been influenced by its tamed version of Wahhabism.  
To be sure, not all preachers have preached moderation. While not 
explicitly advocating violence or even openly criticising the regime’s 
                                                      
62
 W. Lotfy, The State of New Preachers (Dawlet Al Du’aat Al Jodod), Cairo: Dar Al 
Khayaal, 2005, p. 28. 

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policies (for obvious reasons), some preachers’ discourses “were not 
against the use of violence, but were only violence-free”.
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The popularity of each of these preachers draws on the same factors 
that sustain Islamist movements. It is for this specific reason that the Al Nas 
TV channel – presenting a predominantly Salafist–Wahhabi discourse – is 
the most popular among Islamist channels and that it hosts programmes 
for some conservative MB preachers.  
Some of these preachers are affiliated with different Islamic 
movements and have clear ideological orientations. Some openly and 
constantly criticise the regime, such as Wagdi Ghoneim, a former right-
wing MB member who enjoys high popularity among the middle and 
lower-middle classes and who presents an ultraconservative discourse 
highly critical of the West and the regime alike. Ghoneim, who lives in 
exile, appears on satellite channels and YouTube videos, preaching the ideas 
of mainstream Jamaah in a modern, less complicated manner. 
Adherence to Salafism – which is radical but not violent – is now 
“visible in many parts of Cairo” where, for instance “women wear the 
niqab…rather than the hijab”. Non-violence, though, is no synonym for 
Salafism or Wahhabism. Indeed, Khalil Al-Anani, a visiting scholar at the 
Brookings Institution, fears that “Salafism maybe transferred into Jihadi 
Salafism”.
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Overall, new preachers represent a variety of non-violent apolitical 
discourses that fill the vacuum left by institutionalised Islamist movements. 
Neo-Terrorism 
The other trend of post-institutional Islamism is ‘neo-terrorism’. While 
Egypt’s regime succeeded in disabling militant Islamist movements, it 
failed to cure the atmosphere that breeds radicalism. Young Islamists – 
critical of the inabilities of institutionalised group leaders or the 
renunciation of violence – moved forward with their ‘sacred mission’ alone. 
Leaders of Jamaah assert that some of the terrorist attacks of the 1990s were 
                                                      
63
 Ibid., p. 21. 
64
 Associated Press, “Ultraconservative Islam on Rise in Mideast”, PR-inside.com, 19 
October 2008 (retrieved from http://www.pr-inside.com/print868674.htm). 

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