Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

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process.
12
 Opportunities for de-radicalisation are also to be found in a 
statement by a senior member of Hamas in Damascus: “Hamas cannot be 
narrowed down to suicide bombers; that is only one aspect of resistance.”
13
 
It  is  easy  to  derive  from  such  a  statement a conclusion that members are 
encouraged to seek alternative ways of resistance, hopefully non-violent 
ones.  
The social level 
At times of war and occupation, recruitment into the ranks of militant 
groups becomes a relatively simple task. Prior to winning the elections, 
Hamas had already filled the void where the Palestinian leadership had 
been unable or unwilling to act. Through its Islamic charity network, the 
group provides education, health care and security. It is an important 
employer but also a religious organisation deeply entrenched in Palestinian 
society. As such, it succeeds in recruiting those who want to be inspired 
religiously and politically. Hamas’s unique position in society as well as its 
social–political–religious–military structure allows it quickly to adapt to the 
situation on the ground. At the same time, however, Hamas’s unchallenged 
role as an Islamic organisation places it in a position of defender of not only 
Palestine as a territory, but also Palestine as a holy Islamic land. Equating 
the resistance against occupation with defence of Islam on behalf of the 
entire Islamic umma  introduces a new component into the pattern of 
radicalisation. The genuine belief that not only is Palestine under threat but 
also Islam as a whole makes it the responsibility of those on the front line to 
act on behalf of the entire Islamic umma, and Hamas is ready to undertake 
that responsibility.  
                                                      
12
 Being vastly outnumbered, Khaled Bin Walid ordered his army to retreat and 
head back home. When they returned home, people called Khaled Bin Walid a 
coward and a traitor, and they wanted to punish him. The Prophet Muhammad 
intervened, however, and called him a hero, because he saved 3,000 lives from a 
certain but futile death without accomplishing anything. This same story was used 
by the leadership of Egypt’s Jamaa Islamia when they renounced violence in 1997. 
For more on that, see Alli Mohamed Alli Al-Sharif et al., Tasslit al-Addwaa ala ma 
Waqaa fi al-Jihad min al-Akhtaa, Cairo: Islamic Turath Book Shop, 2002, p. 11. 
13
 Author interview, Hamas member, 2008. 

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U
NDERSTANDING 
H
AMAS
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S RADICALISATION 
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Arguing that religion is under threat, recruitment and resistance 
become justified and accepted within Palestinian society no matter the cost. 
An emphasis on the importance of land, and above all Jerusalem, becomes 
tantamount to connecting religious identity to an obligation of every 
Palestinian to resist the occupation. The more extreme elements within 
Hamas and in the Islamic world often cite radical scholars like Abdur-
Rahman Abdul-Khaliq to explain why accepting the Oslo treaty is un-
Islamic. Abdul-Khaliq says accordingly “that there is no doubt that these 
treaties do not bind any Muslim in the world; because these have been 
concluded in the names of regional nationalisms that are basically invalid 
because these create divisions among the members of one [u]mmah”.
14
 A 
junior member of Hamas in Syria also explains why his group cannot back 
down on its core principles: “Our issue with Jews is one of existence, and 
not borders.”
15
 Land is existence. In the simplest terms, defending land 
equates to defending Islam, and as mentioned previously, according to 
certain interpretations of the Quran it is the duty of every Muslim to stand 
up and resist when Islam and the umma  are under threat. Following 
Hamas’s electoral victory in 2006, its leaders felt vindicated, because the 
Palestinian people chose resistance rather than a settlement based on the 
Oslo accords. Apart from being seen as disadvantageous, the Oslo accords 
are also considered un-Islamic. They must be revoked because they deprive 
Palestinians of their ancestral land, and that land represents what and who 
they are: “Land to us is part of our origin, our religion. We cannot negotiate 
about our identity. We cannot negotiate about our principles. We 
absolutely cannot negotiate about the rights of Palestinian people, which 
are land, holy places, the right of return, the right of resistance.”
16
 
Even though the views of many Islamists throughout the world vis-à-
vis Palestine, Israel, Jews and Zionism vary, there is a common uniting 
factor upon which all agree: the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine 
is an act of aggression and a direct threat against Muslims and Islam.
17
 
Hamas capitalises on the theological reasoning and sympathies it receives 
                                                      
14
 See Abdur-Rahman Abdul-Khaliq, Peace treaties with the Jews according to the 
Shariah, Birmingham: Makktabah (undated)
.
 
15
 Author interview, Hamas member in Homs, 2008.  
16
 Author interview, Hamas member in Damascus, 2008. 
17
 See Jansen (1997), op. cit.  

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from a number of prominent figures in the Muslim world. And when 
religion is perceived to be under threat, theological reasoning is utilised for 
the recruitment of new members and growing popular support. Until the 
status of Jews living in Muslim lands is brought into compliance with the 
holy book, jihad becomes a duty of every able Palestinian man and woman. 
The interaction of religion and politics at the level of Palestinian 
society shows how land and identity are utilised as catalysts for 
radicalisation. Through its all-reaching social network, Hamas manages 
directly to communicate its agenda to a large segment of the Palestinian 
population. The impression that the loss of Palestine would spell the 
beginning of the end for Islam is a powerful mobilising tool that eventually 
creates one collective identity: Muslims under threat. The outcome is that 
from then on, every role, whether private or public, is geared towards 
resistance. “I have eleven children, and will do all in my power to have 
them join the movement,”
18
 a Hamas spokesperson told this author in 
Damascus. “Clearly, I am a religious man, I am a political man, and I am a 
resistance man,”
19
 was a reply by another senior member. It is apparent 
that the whole mindset within the Hamas membership is calibrated 
towards recruiting more resistance members from all strata of Palestinian 
society until everyone is part of the struggle. That task is made easier if war 
against Israel is presented as a war between those willing to destroy Islam 
and those defending it.  
The common line of argument in most interviews carried out for this 
chapter for continuing the violence was that Palestinians have suffered for 
decades, so a few more years do not make much difference. In spite of 
Hamas’s stance towards Israel and the subsequent consequences, support 
for the group seems unaffected. “People are used to suffering. [A] few days 
without water or electricity make no difference any longer. If liberation 
takes place tomorrow or in one hundred years [it] is not too important. But 
it will happen. After all, Prophet Muhammad returned to Mecca from exile 
after many years.” 
But just as the language of religion is used to instigate violence, the 
language of religion can also offer a face-saving exit strategy and a 
                                                      
18
 Author interview, Hamas member in Damascus, 2008. 
19
 Author interview, Hamas member in Damascus, 2008. 

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