Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

U
NDERSTANDING 
H
AMAS
’
S RADICALISATION 
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53 
 
The individual level 
Hamas brought itself into the international headlines with a campaign of 
suicide bombings in the first half of the 1990s. Although the group’s charity 
and social work in the Palestinian territories allows it to enjoy strong 
support throughout the Arab and Muslim world, the campaign of suicide 
bombings led the international community officially to declare it a terrorist 
organisation. Despite international condemnation of suicide bombers, 
deterrent measures have failed to have an impact on the numbers of those 
willing to sacrifice their lives. One interviewee said that the size of Hamas’s 
list of individuals willing to die fighting Israel is beyond the group’s 
capacity to cope.  
The current literature on suicide bombers concludes that today’s 
suicide bomber has no single profile.
2
 Nevertheless, the vast majority of 
acts are committed as part of a liberation struggle.
3
 Severe hardship and an 
absence of prospects for a better future are prime motivators of violence. 
Still, Islam forbids suicide, and Muslims committing suicide are to be 
deprived of the privilege of entering paradise. But in order to bypass the 
‘suicide’ obstacle, the Arabic term for suicide bomber does not mention 
suicide, and instead refers to ‘martyr’ or ‘martyrdom’. 
With the desperate political, economic and social situation combined 
with religious interpretations of jihad, Hamas finds plenty of arguments 
that support its use of violence. Members of Hamas recount with delight 
stories in which Islamic heroes of the past attained victories against 
superior forces. After all, “a great man wants to end his life by a great 
part”.
4
 The immediate fight for the liberation of Palestine becomes an 
obligation, a duty of every individual, with some of them opting for suicide 
bombings. Contradictory interpretations of the term ‘defence’ in Islamic 
                                                      
2
 For more on the topic and motivations of suicide bombers, see Diego Gambetta 
(ed.),  Making Sense of Suicide Missions, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006; 
Farhad Khosrokhavar, Suicide Bombers – Allah’s New Martyrs, London: Pluto Press, 
2005, pp. 28-41; and Talal Asad, On Suicide Bombing,  New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2007. 
3
 See Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, New York: 
Random House, 2005. 
4
 Author interview, Hamas member, 2008. 

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54
 
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K
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-H
ASHIMI 
 
 
texts are easily manipulated and adapted to serve personal interests, hence 
the continual discourse within the Islamic community on the religious 
validity of suicide bombings. According to religious texts, a martyr who 
sacrifices his/her own life to defend religion will enjoy a privileged status 
in the next life alongside the Prophet.
5
  
On this point, we can see the interaction of religion and politics at an 
individual level. Clearly, martyrdom with all its perceived benefits in the 
afterlife is a purely religious aspiration, while the liberation of the 
Palestinian territories is more of a geo-political objective. The two 
complement one another and together can serve as a catalyst for 
radicalisation. Up to now, martyrdom remains a face-saving way out of a 
humiliating defeat. Defeat, in turn, is seen as resulting from an incomplete 
realisation of sharia rule. It is not uncommon to read in Islamist literature 
that problems throughout the Muslim world today are attributed to the 
lack of faith and failure to implement sharia. In failing to implement 
Islamic sharia laws in Muslim nations, regimes have suffered humiliating 
defeats by their external enemies.
6
 According to some Islamist authors, 
secularisation, Westernisation and deviation from the true path of Islam 
has brought about the problems Palestinians must cope with. The only way 
to reverse the situation is to return to religion. More militant scholars 
appeal “for violent jihad becoming an individual duty”.
7
 The appeal to 
arms draws from Mohamed al-Faraj’s book, The Neglected Duty, which 
argues that jihad has become a duty of every Muslim.
8
 Islamic militants 
argue that the righteous Muslim cannot exist individually; s/he must strive 
to build and maintain a righteous community of the faithful, the umma. 
Struggling to bring that about is a duty of every Muslim.
9
  
                                                      
5
 Ibid. 
6
 See Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Egypt, Islam and Democracy, Cairo: The American 
University in Cairo Press, 1996, pp. 8-23. 
7
 For more on jihad being an individual obligation, see Mohamed Abd Salam 
Faraj’s booklet, The Neglected Duty, Amman, 1982 or Johannes Jansen, The Dual 
Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1997. 
8
 Faraj was a member of the Egyptian jihadist group that took part in the 
assassination of former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. He also published The 
Neglected Duty, in which he elaborates why leaders are legitimate targets. 
9
 See Ibrahim (1996), op. cit.  

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U
NDERSTANDING 
H
AMAS
’
S RADICALISATION 
|
 
55 
 
And Hamas manages to capitalise on an army of angry young people 
who have nothing to lose. “It relies on honest individuals, strongly 
condemns corruption, and is above all an Islamic organisation resisting 
illegal occupation, where defeat is not an option.”
10
 Apart from providing 
spiritual and ideological support to those seeking alternatives to Fatah, 
Hamas through its military branch is also the biggest employer in the Gaza 
Strip, providing thousands of Palestinians with a source of income.
11
 
Although some members have joined the group for financial benefits, the 
vast majority does so out of genuine belief in what the group stands for: the 
way to victory with God’s blessing. And if being a member entails 
receiving a monthly allowance, dedication to the cause can only grow 
stronger. 
Understanding this personal-level dynamic provides clues on what is 
required for de-radicalisation to begin. An individual willing to sacrifice 
life now for liberating Palestine so to be privileged in the next life needs to 
be provided with a strong motivation to live. The situation on the ground 
must be improved in a manner that allows individuals to have options 
from which to choose. Yet, for de-radicalisation to take place, alongside 
tangible improvements, religious motivations equally need consideration. 
Individuals willing to engage in acts of violence and die in the process rely 
on interpretations of certain religious texts that promise a better afterlife. 
But these same stories can also promise a dignifying exit from the violent 
path. Among many stories from the history of Islam, one stands out as a 
primary example of why violence is not always the answer, even when 
deemed necessary. Many members of Hamas fear being labelled cowards if 
they back down from the original oath to fight until the full liberation of 
Palestine is achieved, and it is probably the key motivator for not backing 
down. After all, death does not seem to deter them. In an attempt to 
dismiss all hints of cowardice if cessation of violence is declared, the 
example of Khaled Bin Walid, who led a troop of Muslim men to fight 
infidels but decided to save his soldiers from certain death when facing a 
stronger enemy, may be one way to help support the de-radicalisation 
                                                      
10
 Derived from a Hamas pamphlet. 
11
 For more information on that, see http://www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/ 
gaza.html. 

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