Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

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5.
 
Lebanon and its brands of Salafism 
One notable example of Salafism’s evolution can be seen in Lebanon. In 
mid-August 2008, Hizbullah, the Lebanese Islamic Resistance Movement, 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with a Salafist group 
based in the Lebanese city of Tripoli. The event was hailed as a major 
breakthrough – given the doctrinal complexities and enmity that has 
historically dogged relations between the Salafists and the Shia in general. 
The MOU took place against a background of sectarian-inspired violence 
between Tripoli’s Sunnis and the country’s Alawite minority of Jebel 
Mehsen. The agreement was initially rejected by a segment of Tripoli 
Salafists who are Saudi-funded, thus creating a schism among the Salafist 
rank and file. The Salafist rivals agreed to put the MOU on hold to allow 
time for more discussion. Yet the most significant outcome of this move 
was that even within the circles of those considered the most literal and 
extreme among Islamists, there are prospects for change in what could be 
viewed as a radical and dogmatic discourse on politics. 
Explaining the motives behind the agreement with Hizbullah, Safwan 
al-Zo’abi, head of the Kuwaiti-funded Endowment for Islamic Heritage 
(Waqf al-Turath al-Islami), said that “we wanted to send a clear message 
that Salafists are not terrorists and that they accept to dialogue with the 
other no matter how ideologically or politically different it is from us” 
[sic].
9
  
Another leading Salafist figure echoed the same view. Salafism, 
explained Hassan al-Shahal of the Tripoli-based Guidance and 
Proselytisation Institute, is “an intellectual rather than a militant current. 
…Salafists and terrorists are two completely different things. Those 
Salafists who embraced militancy and commit acts of violence have 
deviated from ‘nahj al-salaf al-salih’ [the approach of the righteous 
predecessors].”
10
 Analysing this development can help provide clues to 
thinking among the ‘new Salafists’.  
                                                      
9
 Derived from an interview with the author in Beirut, September 2008. The 
analysis in this chapter draws upon three interviews (two in Tripoli and one in 
Beirut) conducted in September 2008 for the purpose of this research. All the 
interviewees agreed to be quoted. 
10
 Author interview in Tripoli, September 2008. 

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5.1
 
The rise of the Salafists 
The Salafist movement is the oldest Islamist movement in Lebanon. It is 
considered a Wahhabi Salafist movement, which puts a high premium on 
teaching the Quranic text and Hadith. It embraces a conservative vision of 
politics and society. Its followers hold an ambivalent view of the Lebanese 
state: while some consider it an illegal entity, other Salafists say they can 
seek reform but only without resorting to violence. In the 1980s, the group 
attempted to form a military wing called ‘the Islamic army’, but it was 
short-lived and the group’s military ambitions ended. In 1990, the 
movement operated through the Islamic Charity and Guidance 
Association, whose goals were to reform society, build mosques, schools 
and centres for teaching the Quran, as well as to help the poor and needy.  
In 1996, the Lebanese government accused the association of inciting 
sectarian hatred in its education curricula. It was dissolved. The followers 
moved to another charity organisation called the Endowment for the 
Revival of Islam, which focused on social work. In 2006, the Salafist 
movement set up an association called the Zad al-Akhera Institute. The 
growth of the Salafist movement in Lebanon has been linked to the 
emerging role played by Saudi Arabia – which has replaced the traditional 
venue of Al-Azhar in Egypt – as a destination for Lebanese preachers to 
receive their religious education. Many have come under the influence of 
the Wahhabi school of thought and have taken home some of its ideas. 
Unlike other Islamist movements, the traditional Salafist movement is a 
social one, which shuns politics and does not involve itself in the electoral 
game.  
Leaders of the traditional Salafist movement identify it as ‘the true 
face  of  Islam’.  They  have  no  political project or vision for Lebanon, they 
say, other than spreading dawah [the call for Islam] in society. “Our dawah is 
a call to go back to the basics of Islam,” says Dai al-Islam al-Shahal, head of 
the Islamic Hidaya wa al-Ihsan Association and a leading Salafist figure.
11
 
This undertaking is primarily done through religious institutions, Quranic 
schools and charity organisations under the movement’s supervision. The 
Salafist movement enjoys an expanding social base, particularly in the 
north of the country, mainly thanks to their social services. Their method of 
                                                      
11
 Author interview in Tripoli, September 2008. 

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influence has two strands: their religious schools and a network of social 
services. This approach has enabled them to accumulate social capital, 
again especially in the north, where poverty rates are the highest in the 
country. Filling the void left by an absent Lebanese state is a classic case of 
Islamists moving in to address a vacuum left by the state.  
Although according to its leaders the Salafist movement is (in theory) 
an independent apolitical movement, it has not been immune to the deep 
political polarisation that has gripped the country during the past few 
years. In politics, they make no secret of being closer to the ‘March 14
th
 
camp’. Such a political alliance between the traditional Salafists and 
Western-backed political forces may come as a surprise to some, but it can 
be understood within a context of two factors. First has been the sectarian 
affiliation – since former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was viewed 
by the majority of Lebanon’s Sunnis as their leader. Despite disagreement 
with Hariri over a number of issues, Salafists did not seek confrontation 
with Hariri because a) the bulk of his social base was made up of Sunnis 
and b) it would have belied a sense of opportunism on the part of some 
Salafist leaders. In that sense, both could claim to be standing against a 
common enemy (politically speaking), namely Hizbullah. Yet at least in 
public, Hariri did not associate himself or his movement with Salafist 
movements. 
Alarming press reports that repeatedly spoke of a growing presence 
of al-Qaeda on Lebanese soil raised fears that religious extremists now see 
Lebanon, like other failing states, as an attractive terrain in which to 
establish a foothold. Indeed, following the end of the Lebanese army’s 
military campaign against Fatah al-Islam in September 2007, many 
questioned the fate of Salafism in Lebanon. Salafist leaders acknowledge 
that the three-month confrontation pushed jihadist Salafists into the 
margins, leaving the ground open for the more peaceful form of Salafism – 
scholastic Salafism.  
Even though the north is home to as many as 20 Salafist associations 
in the form of religious teaching institutes and a vast network of charity 
organisations, these associations do not organise themselves under a 
unified leadership. There has been a previous attempt to address the issue 
of an absence of leadership: in 2004, Hassan al-Shahal set up the Islamic 
Politburo as an umbrella under which Salafist organisations could come 
together. His goal, in his words, was to “monitor the political 
developments in Lebanon”. This reflected an unprecedented interest 

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