Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

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nurture Hamas’s self-serving discourse. If the Intifada showed all of the 
world how Israeli occupation affects Palestinians, Hamas’s tactic of 
provoking the enemy to show massive force in order to awake sympathies 
and widespread support for its cause becomes a clear success.  
If, against all expectations, Hamas comes to compromise on its main 
goals and accepts the current reality, it might face the same lot as its 
competitor Fatah and be blamed for corrupting the struggle. New radical 
segments are then likely to take over Hamas’s present role. The interplay of 
Islam and politics can foster radicalisation as well as de-radicalisation. Yet, 
without an accommodating step by those forces that Hamas directs its 
instrumentalisation of religion and politics against, it might also become a 
source of re-radicalisation. 
 

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4.
 
T
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n much current writing it is argued that Salafist thought and doctrine is 
responsible for a good deal of the violence that the West and the Arab 
world have experienced during the past two decades. The rise of 
Salafism (the most puritanical strain of Islam) is seen as a key ingredient of 
re-radicalisation. Some of these assumptions are being challenged, 
however, by the existence of Salafist groups that do not espouse violence as 
a mechanism for social and political change.  
There are clearly diverse interpretations of Salafism today. The key 
denominator that distinguishes one Salafist group from another has to do 
with the stand each group chooses to take regarding the crucial question of 
whether there should be a separation between the religious and political 
domains in Salafist thought. Three main currents appear to be dominating 
the scene: 
a)
 
Al-Salafyia al-elmyia, or scholarly Salafism, which is concerned with 
the study of the holy text and Islamic jurisprudence;  
b)
 
Al-Salafyia al-harakyyia, or activist Salafism, which describes both 
politically active Salafist groups and those groups that are not 
politically active but occupy a place in the public sphere through 
their charity work and networks of social support and religious 
education institutes. This current also includes al-Salafyia al-Islahyyia, 
or reformist Salafism; and 
c)
 
Al-Salafyia al-jihadyia, a brand of jihadist Salafism that concerns itself 
with implementing jihad. This strand commands much media 
attention but does not have a significant powerbase.  
Following the 9/11 attacks, Islamists – and Salafists in particular 
(both activist and non-activist) – faced what one observer described as the 
“biggest crisis in their recent history”. Their scholarly and humanitarian 
I 

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institutions became the target of a state security hunt in different parts of 
the Arab world. Their activities were curtailed. Pressure was exercised that 
forced them to compromise their long-held convictions. The outcome was a 
successful policy of reigning in their most radical figures. Saudi Arabia 
provided the example. But such policies also targeted the non-activist 
current of Salafism, which had traditionally been preoccupied with the 
scholarly aspects of the holy text and had focused much of its activity on 
charity work. Most importantly, this strain of Salafism had no interests to 
pursue in the political game.  
This chapter looks at these particular Salafist movements. It attempts 
to map out the most prominent groups on the scene today and capture the 
debate that is taking place among these groups regarding three key issues: 
a) the approach to politics, b) the relations of these groups with ruling 
regimes and c) the use of violence. It takes examples from Salafist 
movements across the Arab world, but places special emphasis on those in 
Lebanon. The chapter reveals significant variation in the directions that 
different Salafist movements are taking. External actors need to be much 
more mindful of this and develop policies to embrace the fluidity of 
debates among Salafists. 
1.
 
Defining Salafism 
Some Arab scholars, such as Muhammad Abed al-Jabir and Fahmi Jedaan, 
consider every Islamist a Salafist. The assumption goes that since all 
Islamists are committed to an old founding text (the Quran and the 
Prophet’s Sunna), then it is only natural to conclude that all the variations 
of Islamist groups are Salafist (including al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (the 
Muslim Brotherhood), jihadist groups, Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Turkish Justice 
and Development Party, the Tunisian Ennahda and the Egyptian al-Wasat). 
For Islamists, however, Salafism has a more specific meaning. It 
stands for the school of thought that takes al-salaf al-salih, the righteous 
predecessors (i.e. the Prophet and his companions), as its only point of 
reference. It does not attempt to provide new interpretations or views other 
than those already existing. Its main preoccupation is with the 
fundamentals of the faith and doctrinal purity. Yassir Burhami, a leading 
Egyptian Salafist, understands Salafism to be “Islam pure” as descended 
from the Prophet. Such a definition reflects how Salafists perceive 
themselves to be the true guardians of the faith. This explains why they are 
constantly accused by their opponents of being exclusionary. Such a 

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