Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

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2.2
 
Relations with ruling regimes 
Another important characteristic of Salafist thought pertaining to politics is 
the stance taken on relations with ruling regimes. Traditional Salafists do 
not legitimise any acts of protest or rebellion against the ruler, no matter 
how unjust he might be (i.e. ‘no denial, no boycott and no rebellion’). 
Instead, they call for full political conformism to the ruler, which is 
the defining element of their approach to politics. Change should only be 
sought through giving advice. Contrary to other Islamist movements, 
which use violence as a way to change the status quo, traditional Salafists 
have maintained what could be described as relatively stable and good 
relations with the ruling regimes. Salafists of this stripe are not perceived 
by the state as a threat to regime security or stability, as has always been 
the case with other political Islam forces.  
Salafists themselves argue that relations between any Salafist group 
and the ruling regime are governed by the political realities of each 
country. Some observers call this brand of Salafism al-Salafyia al-rasmiya or 
‘official’ Salafism. Its key feature is its subservience to the ruling regimes, at 
times working closely with them. It provides religious legitimacy to 
support the rulers’ actions and dispel any popular questioning of state 
policies under the slogan of ‘no to sedition’. The most obvious example of 
this brand of Salafism exists in Saudi Arabia. It is often referred to as al-
Gamyia or al-Madkhalyia (expressing an attribution to Sheikh Adel Gami or 
Sheikh Rabe’ al-Madkhali). This Salafist strain believes that the authorities 
should make decisions on behalf of the umma and that there should not be 
any rebellion against the ruler so long as ‘the calls to prayers can be heard 
in the streets’.  
Although some analysts like to place jihadist Salafism in a league of 
its own, it could be argued that this brand of Salafism – born during the 
Russian invasion of Afghanistan and consolidated over years to reach its 
peak and most dramatic moment on 9/11 – is the extreme form of activist 
Salafism, al-Salafyia al-harakyia. Jihadist Salafism places special emphasis on 
politics and the need to rebel against rulers.  
3.
 
Salafists’ change of heart 
3.1
 
Salafist movements in Saudi Arabia 
The confrontation that took place between the al-Qaeda organisation on the 
one hand and both US and Arab regimes on the other is among the main 

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factors that have helped shape the discourse on Salafist movements during 
recent years. This confrontation, conducted under the catchphrase ‘war on 
terror’, eventually led to dramatic changes within the Saudi Salafist 
movement. The beginnings of this transformation could be discerned when 
prominent Salafist figures, previously known as staunch opponents of the 
US and its Arab allies, reversed their positions. These included Sheikh Safar 
al-Hawali, Salaman al-Ouda and Muhammed Srour Zein al-Abdeen. These 
figures have worked hard to temper the rebellion of the Salafist youth who 
were opposed to the Saudi regime and its alliance with the US, liaising with 
al-Qaeda followers and sympathisers in Saudi Arabia.  
Some observers regard Ouda’s change of heart as a manifestation of 
the emergence of this new current within the Salafist movement in Saudi 
Arabia. 
Since its foundation, the most famous branch of Salafism – Wahhabi 
Salafism – has allied itself with the political regime of al-Saud (although the 
more radical elements have grown increasingly aggressive against the 
regime because of its alliance with the US and the West). This new stream 
also takes a pacifist approach to political and social change. Thus, the 
dilemma facing this emerging Saudi Salafism (i.e. pro-government and 
anti-violence) is whether it can articulate a vision of social change that 
would be acceptable to its followers. This process of reflection and self-
criticism has forced leading Saudi Salafist figures to dilute their radicalism. 
The Salafist movement in Yemen has undergone a similar process, as 
discussed below.  
3.2
 
Transformation of the Salafist movement in Yemen 
In one decade, the Al-Hikmah Association, a young Salafist movement in 
Yemen, has gone through massive changes regarding its discourse and 
stance on politics. Initially, it followed the path of the traditional Salafist 
school, and rejected the notion of political parties, parliamentary elections 
and democracy. It maintained good relations with the ruling regime and 
was silently hostile to the opposition. 
The association then underwent both ideological and political 
transformations that have led to the de-radicalisation of much of the basis 
of its founding vision. One of its leading figures, Sheikh Muhammed bin al-
Mahdi, has spoken openly about the need to engage in dialogue with the  
 

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Zaydis (a Shia sect in Yemen) and praised “the Islamic brotherhood” – a 
bond between the two. Such rhetoric had been unheard of from a Salafist 
organisation.  
Al-Hikmah’s political transformation has been reflected in their close 
relationship with power circles and their attempts to revise their stance on 
the issue of political parties. For example, they now accept a multi-party 
system, although they still condition their acceptance with the view that 
political parties should depart from an Islamic frame of reference.  
Even so, Al-Hikmah’s experience has proven that Salafists tend to 
have an ambiguous relationship with politics. While they have made clear 
their alliance with the state and their silent hostility to the opposition, the 
leaders of Al-Hikmah insist that they are not politically active and that 
theirs is not a political party, but rather a charitable and social movement 
that cares about the Islamic call. 
Such statements continue to reflect a vague – and at times confusing – 
relationship with the political domain, particularly given the change to 
much of the anti-political discourse. Ahmed al-Daghshi, an expert on the 
Yemeni Salafist movements, has argued that it will not be long before the 
Salafists launch their own political party.
3
 He bases his argument on the 
idea that much of the Salafists’ rigid discourse concerning democracy and 
electoral politics has reduced – after the process of revision – to an issue of 
ijtihaad.
4
 
It shows that the movement has come a long way since its early days, 
when in 1993 they launched a campaign against parliamentary elections, 
calling them illegitimate. What is more, they also used mosques to incite 
voters against participating in what they described as ‘the democratic  
 
                                                      
3
 “Interview with Ahmed al-Daghsi”, Islamonline.net, 5 June 2007 (retrieved from 
http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=ArticleA_C&cid=1180421326371
&pagename=Zone-Arabic-Daawa%2FDWALayout). 
4
 Ijtihaad refers to the effort of a qualified Islamic jurist to interpret or reinterpret 
sources of Islamic law in cases in which no clear directives exist. In the early 
Muslim community, every qualified jurist had the right to exercise such original 
thinking, mainly ra’y [personal judgment] and qiyās [analogical reasoning]. 

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