Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

86 | O
MAYMA 
A
BDEL
-L
ATIF
 
 
The relationship of this group with the traditional Salafists is one of 
competing for turf and influence among the young Sunnis. Traditional 
Salafists enjoy a more popular base, and Khoder explains that the more 
radical they are, the more popular they become. At times of sectarian 
tension, the traditional Salafists take over, as proven true by the obstacles 
imposed on reconciliation with Hizbullah. 
Conclusions  
The central argument of this chapter is that there is growing evidence to 
suggest that the stances and discourses of Salafist movements concerning 
politics, the use of violence and relations with other Islamists are not 
unchanging or dogmatic. Examples of Salafist movements in Yemen, Saudi 
Arabia and Lebanon show how such movements have shifted from a 
radical position on the political process – with some imposing a total ban 
on all political activity – towards embracing some of the fundamentals of 
the political process such as elections. Contrary to their rigid outlook and 
discourses, Salafist movements have proven capable of moving from the 
stricter and more radical end of the spectrum towards a more mainstream 
approach to politics. 
These movements are not static. They are operating in ever-changing 
socio-political contexts and as much as they seek to influence such contexts, 
they are undoubtedly influenced by them.  
But experience has also proven that more often than not Salafists 
have developed an ambiguous relationship with politics. This is not so 
much the result of a deliberate effort as it has to do with a lack of an 
overarching vision of politics and its role in their world vision. Being 
newcomers to a political scene that has long been dominated by other more 
seasoned forces of political Islam, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the 
political naïveté of the Salafists is hardly surprising.  
For the EU this implies that dialogue  with  Islamist  groups  of  all 
stripes is important and channels of dialogue should be kept open. But for 
it to be a fruitful one, the Europeans must abandon their habit of going to 
meetings with a list of demands to which the Islamists should adhere. A 
constructive dialogue means that both parties think of each other as equals, 
rather than one party dictating its list of ‘shoulds’ and ‘should nots’ to the 
other.  

---

| 87 
 
 
5.
 
T
URKEY
:
 
A
 SUSTAINABLE CASE 
 
OF DE
-
RADICALISATION
? 
S
ENEM 
A
YDIN 
D
ÜZGIT AND 
R
UŞEN 
Ç
AKIR
 
olitical Islam has been on the rise in Turkey in the last two decades 
owing to a variety of factors including the impacts of globalisation 
and the related popularity of identity politics, large waves of 
migration from the countryside into the cities, the poor performance of 
centrist parties in government, increasing democratisation and the rise of a 
religious middle class particularly in Anatolia.  
Daniel Brumberg’s classification of political Islamist movements is 
particularly useful in the analysis of the Turkish case. Brumberg divides 
political Islam into three main categories: “radical/militant 
fundamentalists”, “reformist fundamentalists”/”tactical modernists” and 
“strategic modernists”. He defines radical fundamentalists as those groups 
that explicitly reject democracy and aim at establishing an Islamic state, 
often with recourse to violence. Reformist fundamentalists/tactical 
modernists also pursue an Islamic state as their ultimate goal, but agree to 
make use of democratic instruments and discourses in achieving it. 
Strategic modernists differ from these two groups in terms of both goal and 
strategy. Brumberg defines those groups that fall under this category as 
Muslim liberal democrats that embrace liberal democratic values and seek 
to extend religious freedoms in a political environment where they co-exist 
among other political movements in a secular order.
1
 
                                                      
1
 D. Brumberg, “Rhetoric and Strategy: Islamic Movements in the Middle East”, in 
M. Kramer (ed.), The Islamism Debate, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and 
African Studies, Tel Aviv, 1997.  
P 

---

88 | S
ENEM 
A
YDIN 
D
ÜZGIT 
&
 
R
UŞEN 
Ç
AKIR
 
 
It can be argued that the Turkish case embodies all three kinds of 
movements. Reformist fundamentalism can be found in the Welfare Party 
and its successive incarnations (namely the Virtue Party and the Felicity 
Party), while the concept of strategic modernism could be used in assessing 
the Justice and Development Party (AKP), albeit with reservations on the 
part of some segments of Turkish society. Although radical 
fundamentalism can be claimed to have little weight in Turkey compared 
with much of the Middle East, the case of Hizbullah deserves attention, not 
only because of its strength in the 1990s, but also because of more recent 
claims that it is experiencing a revival in south-east Turkey.
2
 
1.
 
The moderate course 
1.1
 
From the Welfare Party to the AKP: A major shift in discourse 
and policy  
The Welfare Party was the first political party with an explicit Islamist 
orientation to come to power in Turkey, as a dominant partner in a 
coalition government. The party claimed 21.6% of the votes in the 1995 
general elections and formed a coalition government with the centre-right 
True Path Party, with its leader Necmettin Erbakan as the prime minister. 
Before coming to power, Erbakan had often praised sharia rule and 
advocated its implementation in Turkey.
3
  Once  in  power,  the  party 
adopted certain domestic and foreign policies in direct conflict with the 
republican constitutional order. Reactions to these policies reached their 
peak in 1997 when the National Security Council moved to oust the 
Welfare Party from government, in what has been termed as a ‘post-
modern coup’. The Welfare Party was closed down in January 1998 by the 
Constitutional Court and its key figures, including Erbakan, were banned 
from politics for five years. Upon closure, the party’s parliamentary group 
joined a short-lived Virtue Party, whose programme reflected a more 
moderate posture and placed greater emphasis on democratisation and the 
                                                      
2
 See, for example, “Kurdish Militant Group ‘Turkish Hezbollah’ Issuing Terror 
Threats”, International Herald Tribune Europe, 21 December 2006.  
3
 C. Karakas, Turkey: Islam and Laicism between the Interests of State,  Politics and 
Society, Report No. 78, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Frankfurt, 2007, p. 25. 

---