Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

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Khawarij sectarian group, the reasons mainstream Muslims move closer to 
this discourse need to be further scrutinised.  
To understand the causes of radicalisation, one should not examine 
what radicals view as mandated by Islam, but rather “why specifically they 
choose this [radical] line of Islamist thought above all others [which is a 
product of] how they view their [social and political] contexts”.
3
 It is rather 
an attitude towards the status quo and not religious observance that 
promotes radical religious doctrine. As Esposito and Mogahed note, “the 
real difference between those who condone terrorist acts and all others is 
about politics, not piety”.
4
 Research should focus on the political and not 
the theological foundations of radicalism to be able to counteract the 
phenomenon.  
2.
 
Two trends of radicalism 
What is it specifically about ‘politics’ that provokes radicalism? Statistics 
and empirical evidence alike suggest that there are two main trends of 
radicalism, each with a different characterisation and orientation. 
2.1
 
Hostility towards Egypt’s regime 
The first trend of radicalisation is characterised by hostility towards 
Egypt’s regime. Elements of Islamist groups denounce the state for 
“disrespecting Islam”,
5
 a charge that progressed to ‘corrupting Islam’ after 
the constitutional amendments of 2007.  
But it is not only religion that matters for Muslims. Both politically 
radicalised and moderate Muslims “desire to limit the power of rulers and 
regimes they regard as authoritarian, un-Islamic and corrupt”.
6
  
Hostility and radicalisation, in the case of radical groups, differ from 
one group to another. Even so, “the starting point for most violent groups 
                                                      
3
 T. El Bishry, “Tareq El Bishy’s Reflections on ‘Islamic Anger’ Book”  (Qera’a li 
Tareq El Bishry Fi Kitab Al Ghadab Al Islamy),  IslamOnline.net, 3 January 2008 
(retrieved from http://www.islamonline.net). 
4
 Esposito & Mogahed (2007), op. cit., p. 74. 
5
 K. El Birry, World is more Beautiful than Paradise – The Biography of an Egyptian 
Fundamentalist  (El Donia Ajmal min el Janna – Seiret Usuli Masry), Beirut: Dar Al 
Nahaar, 2002, p. 22. 
6
 Esposito & Mogahed (2007), op. cit., p. 93. 

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in Egypt is that the state is infidel, the regime is infidel, and the president is 
either infidel, a sinner or (greatly) unjust, but they all agree on the necessity 
of not recognising him, not obeying him and resorting to violence 
attempting to change him”.
7
 The regime’s crackdown on non-violent 
Islamist movements attempting to engage in politics fuels this sentiment, as 
it discredits “non-violent participatory Islamists…while radicals will grow 
in power”.
8
  
Radicals exploit such clampdowns to stress the unfruitfulness of 
peaceful change, hence attracting more supporters. Commenting on 
Egypt’s 2007 constitutional amendments, Zawahiri said, “these 
amendments are a blow to everyone who took the path of elections to enact 
change in Egypt”.
9
 Most of the terrorist attacks that targeted Egyptian 
statesmen, politicians and police officers during the 1980s and 1990s stem 
from this strain of radicalism. 
2.2
 
Hostility towards the West 
The second trend of radicalism is characterised by hostility towards the 
West. The Gallup World Poll shows that “politically radicalised (Muslims) 
are consistently more negative than are moderates in their opinions of all 
Western countries”. While radicals express higher levels of criticism of 
moral decay and a spiritual vacuum in Western public life, not a single 
respondent to the poll suggested that the West should stop being immoral 
or corrupt in order to improve its relations with the Muslim world. 
Again challenging conventional wisdom, hostility is not the outcome 
of a rejection of Western values as suggested by the discourse on the theme 
of ‘why do they hate us?’. Indeed, politically radicalised and moderate 
Muslims alike express admiration for the West’s fair political systems, 
democracy, respect of human rights, freedom of speech and gender 
equality.  
                                                      
7
 A. El-Ela Mady, Egyptian Violent Movements and their Interpretation of Islam (Jama’at 
al ‘Unf al Masriyya wa Ta’wilatuha lil Islam), Cairo: Maktabet al-Shorouq el Dawliya, 
2006, pp. 41-42. 
8
 T.C. Wittes, “Three Kinds of Movements”, Journal of Democracy, July 2008, pp. 6-
12. 
9
 A. al-Zawahiri, “Ayman al Zawahiri: Video: Iraq timetable of withdrawal a 
victory”,  Northeast Intelligence Network, 6 May 2007 (retrieved from 
http://www.homelandsecurityus.com/Zawahiri050607). 

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Rather, it is foreign policies that cause hostility. The first foreign 
policy element that provokes hostility is military aggression. Two-thirds of 
al-Qaeda terrorists come from countries where the United States has a 
heavy military presence.
10
 Notably, 81% of politically radicalised Muslims – 
and 67% of moderates – describe the US as “aggressive”. Both moderates 
and radicals avoid sweeping generalisations, and clearly distinguish 
among the foreign policies of different Western countries. France and 
Germany (which outspokenly opposed the US-led invasion of Iraq) are 
scarcely viewed as aggressors, with fewer than 10% of either moderate or 
radical Muslims seeing them as such.  
This hostility is intensified by the increasing Western military 
presence in the region, and is manifest in terrorist attacks targeting Western 
interests and tourists. A good example is the series of bombings that took 
place in Cairo in 2005. Diaa Rashwan, an expert on Islamic movements, 
described the bombings as “terrorist attacks in a regional context”,
11
 
referring to the regional attacks targeting Western tourists following the 
US-led invasion of Iraq. 
Other elements that contribute to hostility include the feeling of 
cultural invasion, that ‘the West’ does not respect the cultural heritage of 
Muslims and simply wants to globalise its value system and culture. Many 
Muslim writers and intellectuals equate the contemporary wave of 
globalisation with Westernisation – some are even more specific and equate 
it with Americanisation.  
Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an Egyptian Muslim scholar and chair of the 
International Union of Muslim Scholars, argues that before Western 
occupation forces began their retreat from Muslim countries in the 1950s, 
they planned for a cultural, educational, legislative and social change that 
would change the Muslim umma from within”.
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10
 R. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, New York: Random 
House, 2005. 
11
 M.G. Arafa, “Cairo’s Bombing: A Third Generation of Jamaat Appears in the 
Horizon”  (Infijar al Qahera: Jeel Thaleth min al Jamaat Yaloohu fil Ufoq), 
IslamOnline.net, 11 April 2005 (retrieved from http://www.islamonline.net/ 
Arabic/politics/2005/04/article07.shtml). 
12
 Y. al-Qaradawi, “We and the West” (Nahnu wal Gharb), Yusuf al-Qaradawi 
Official Website, 2005 (retrieved from http://qaradawi.net/site/topics/ 
article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=4519&version=1&template_id=256&parent_id=12). 

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