Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

12 | R
OBERT 
S
PRINGBORG
 
frighten secularists and Copts into political quiescence, to serve as a 
firewall against jihadists, to provide some Islamic legitimacy to his rule, to 
demonstrate his democratic credentials and to cause the US to temper its 
support for democratisation.  
Given this organisational character and history, combined with 
repeated tactical alliances with regimes, it would hardly be surprising if 
MB veterans believed the path to power lay directly through intra-state 
politics rather than through elections. Although the history of tactical 
alliances has not included an outcome in which the MB has gotten the 
better of its ally, this in the minds of MB leaders would not necessarily 
discredit the approach. No strategy other than revolution is truly viable in 
non-democratic, unyielding systems and the MB is not a revolutionary 
organisation. Indeed, it manifests the organic conservatism of its 
membership, which is predominantly comprised of the petit bourgeoisie 
and one that is increasingly rural and traditional.
17
 Moreover, the signs of 
regime decay are palpable, especially in aging Mubarak’s Egypt. Any new 
president there will need to connect to the street, and MB veterans no 
doubt nurture the hope that they will provide just that service and maybe, 
just maybe, while so doing, become the real power in the land. And if the 
MB were to come even close to calling the shots in Egypt, its power in the 
Arab world would be multiplied many times over. Why then, many MB 
veterans must ask, should they risk this possibility for quixotic ventures 
predicated on the assumption that regimes can be induced to liberalise? 
Better to wait, to bide one’s time until the path to state power is opened by 
the fracturing of the incumbent elite. In this calculation, elections can serve 
the purpose of demonstrating one’s popularity and organisational muscle, 
but they can never be the only key to power.  
The MB leadership’s wait and see approach, if indeed that is what it 
is, is not necessarily in conflict with the emerging trend of quietist Islam, 
whether in its Salafist, Sufi, dawah salafi or other variant. Unless they are 
mobilised by leaderships that are more radical, the MB can claim to speak 
on behalf of these quietist Muslims. Their very presence emphasises the 
Islamisation of society and consequently legitimates the basic MB message. 
                                                      
17
 On the shift of MB membership from urban to rural Egypt, see H. Tammam, 
“MB Goes Rural”, Al-Ahram Weekly, 17-24 October 2008 (retrieved from 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/print/2008/919/op13.htm
). 

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I
S THE 
EU
 CONTRIBUTING TO RE
-
RADICALISATION
?
 
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13 
So at least this component of the apparent fragmentation of Islamism does 
not pose a vital threat to the MB.  
Similarly, the younger generation of moderate Islamists who have 
adopted IT as their key political tool may ultimately not render the MB old 
guard irrelevant as some have prophesised. The Facebookiyyin Islamists 
are a captivating new force and in today’s desert of Arab politics, they 
appear particularly promising, but the odds against their inducing systemic 
reform and then filling liberated political space are long. Regimes are 
catching up technically with the IT political provocateurs and nowhere 
have governments been forced to surrender the street to them. Youth has 
energy, but probably not much staying power, so again the MB old guard 
may well ride out this challenge and indeed benefit from it as well.  
Political Islam, in sum, is in ferment because its path to power has 
been blocked. Neither ballots nor bullets have changed the status quo. The 
promise of achieving political success through democratic means has been 
dashed on the bulwarks of authoritarianism. Jihadists have alienated 
potential Islamist constituencies to say nothing of other Arab citizens. 
Hizbullah and Hamas remain locked into their national liberation 
struggles, but they are not mobilising imitators elsewhere despite the 
admiration they inspire. Islamist violence in Algeria, Lebanon and Yemen 
is worrying, but thus far not of critical importance in either those countries 
or elsewhere. The key battlegrounds remain the political institutions and 
processes of Arab nation states, and everywhere those grounds are tilted in 
favour of regimes. Hence, political despair and discontent are causing 
Islamists to innovate, to seek new ways of achieving their political goals. 
Notwithstanding the plethora of such new efforts, their prospects remain 
limited. It seems that the status quo is set to continue, which raises the 
question of why an external actor, such as the EU, should intervene directly 
or indirectly to alter it.  
One answer is that the MB old guard may well be correct. While 
Islamism is fragmenting, so too are the regimes. Having forsaken 
liberalisation in favour of the iron fist over the last decade, many Arab 
regimes have created doubts within their own ranks. The growing power of 
internal security forces and decay of civilian political institutions, including 
parliaments, legal/judicial systems, local governments, political parties, 
unions and so on, has engendered resentments and worries even among 
the beneficiaries of these systems. Nowhere on the horizon can a transition 
to democracy be perceived, while almost everywhere it is easy to see a 
further entrenchment of authoritarianism. The present global economic 

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