Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

8 | R
OBERT 
S
PRINGBORG
 
from it, largely out of the universal repugnance at the very thought of a 
reoccurrence of civil war. When jihadists seized the Nahr al Barad refugee 
camp in 2007, virtually the entirety of Lebanon supported the military’s 
sustained effort to conquer them. The upsurge of Salafist activity since that 
time hardly represents a broader embrace of violence, although it could be 
a precursor of more trouble to come in forever-troubled Lebanon. All of 
this evidence suggests that far from being enamoured with violence, the 
vast majority of Arab publics have had more than enough of it, even when 
it is justified on the grounds of being truly Islamic. So, for example, when 
MB Supreme Guide Mehdi Akef in May 2008 described Osama bin Laden 
sympathetically as a mujahid, a firestorm of controversy broke out, with 
Egyptian parliamentarians, theologians and others condemning Akef.
8
 Two 
and a half years earlier, a ‘martial arts’ demonstration by MB-allied 
students at al-Azhar was seized upon by the regime to discredit the 
organisation, something it could not have accomplished had the public not 
been apprehensive about Islamist political violence.  
Having failed to bring about new political orders through either 
bullets or ballots, Islamists may also be turning inward towards more 
spiritual, less political interpretations and practices of their religion. Sufism, 
for example, is attracting a growing number of young Egyptians, many of 
whom previously expressed support for Islamism despite the fact that most 
Islamists are critical of this quietist manifestation of Islam, even though the 
founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna, came from a Sufi 
background.
9
 Similarly, Salafism – which venerates the early practitioners 
and practices of Islam and in its dominant version is sceptical of direct 
political engagement (especially the compromising sort pursued by the 
MB) yet also has a jihadist element – has demonstrated its strength 
paradoxically at the polls in Kuwait, in the vibrant Islamist world of 
Algeria and in the shadowy underworld of Lebanese political violence. 
According to some bloggers, it is also enjoying a widespread resurgence in 
                                                      
8
 For a report on the backlash, see Asharq al-Awsat, 24 May 2008 (retrieved from 
http://www.asharqalawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=472017&issueno=1
0770
). 
9
  On  the  spread  of  Sufism  in  Egypt,  see  Al Arabiya, 29 May 2008 (retrieved from 
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2008/05/29/50656.html
). 

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 CONTRIBUTING TO RE
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RADICALISATION
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9 
the Gulf.
10
 In Egypt and elsewhere, internal debates within the MB and its 
offshoots is increasingly taken up with the question of whether these 
organisations should abandon or at least de-emphasise the unrewarding 
field of competitive politics in favour of proselytisation and long-term 
social change.
11
 
Ironically, just as moderate Islamists are contemplating various 
alternatives to direct political action and participation in electoral politics, 
those on the street in their respective countries are becoming more active. 
Again, Egypt illustrates the broader regional trend. Widespread protest 
activity against repressive political measures that characterised the 2005 
election year and which continued for about a year afterwards, gave way to 
labour strikes and protests against food shortages and inflation. These 
events were both more widespread and violent than the political protests 
that preceded them, resulting in several deaths. Regime reaction, a measure 
of the intensity of feelings on the street, was more pronounced and erratic 
as well, swinging between appeasement and intimidation.  
In reaction to this increase in popular protest activity, the MB has 
vacillated between remaining aloof and engagement. It endorsed calls for a 
general strike, for example, but then did little if anything to ensure its 
                                                      
10
 On Salafists in the Gulf, see for example, M. al Habil, “The Situation of the 
Brothers in the Gulf: A Critical Evaluation” (in Arabic), IslamOnline.net (retrieved 
from 
http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=ArticleA_C&cid=120935810 
2635&pagen
). For an account of Lebanese Salafists in the tangled and opaque 
world of Lebanese Islamism, see R. Rafei, “Terror Uprooted”, Al Ahram Weekly, 16-
23 October 2008 (retrieved from 
http://weekly.ahram.org/eg/print/2008/ 
918/re7.htm
). Algerian Salafism is described as having an apolitical core with two 
wings, one that engages in the political system and one that espouses violence, by 
A. Boubekeur, Salafism and Radical Politics in Postconflict Algeria, Carnegie Paper 
No. 11, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., 
September 2008. On Salafism in Jordan, see Q. Wiktorowicz, The Management of 
Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan, Albany, 
NY: State University of New York Press, 2001. A visiting scholar at the Brookings 
Institution entitled a recent piece on Salafism “Salafists Ascendant in the Arab 
World” – see K. Al-Anani, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 2008 (retrieved 
from 
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0612_arabconservatismalanani. 
aspx?p=1
).  
11
 A. Hamzawy, “Where now for Islamists?”, Al Ahram Weekly, 5-11 June 2008 
(retrieved from 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/print/2008/900/op2.htm
).  

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