Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

10 | R
OBERT 
S
PRINGBORG
 
membership participated. It has refused to form strategic alliances with 
opposition political parties or groupings, but it has had some limited 
cooperation with them. Internally, it has signalled that it is opening up and 
becoming more transparent by referring to elections for leadership 
positions, but then has argued that the security situation is such that 
complete details must remain confidential.
12
 The draft political platform it 
released in a somewhat confused, informal fashion in early 2008 called for 
the creation of a constitutionally empowered religious committee to review 
legislation and excluded Christians or women from holding the presidency. 
The subsequent controversy led to awkward backtracking and at least 
temporary postponement of the effort to create a definite platform.  
Thus, as the political temperature has increased, the MB has appeared 
to be even more confused than the government in its reactions. One might 
explain this on the grounds that unlike the government, it has to contend 
with day-to-day repression that renders political party-like operations 
extremely difficult; and unlike popular movements that come and go, it has 
an enormous stake in preserving the durability of its cadre-based, 
historically rooted organisation. Hence, it is torn between becoming more 
cautious and calculating, or alternatively, more bold in its challenges to 
government. The drumbeat of postings on Islamist blogs and of newspaper 
articles on the travails of the MB and its offshoot organisations indicates the 
intensity of the pressure.
13
 The outcome of partial elections within the MB 
guidance council in the spring of 2008, for example, was interpreted as 
signalling a retreat from political engagement into dawah, or 
proselytisation, as a result of the regime’s crackdown. Similarly, tensions 
within the Jordanian MB were seen as causing a split between the political 
arm, the IAF, and the MB mother organisation, resulting in the election of a 
new and more radical supreme guide, Hammam Sa’id.
14
 
                                                      
12
 See for example K. Al-Anani, “The Muslim Brotherhood’s Internal Elections”, 
Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 17 June 2008 (retrieved from 
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0603_muslim_brotherhood_alanani.a
spx?p=1
). 
13
 For extensive reporting on these blogs and articles that discuss the challenges 
faced  by  MB  organisations,  see  Marc  Lynch’s  website,  Abu  Aardvark 
([e-mail]). 
14
 M. Lynch, “Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood in Tough Times”, Abu Aardvark 
(retrieved from 
[e-mail]
 or see also the article at 
http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2008/06/jordans-muslim.html); 
 

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I
S THE 
EU
 CONTRIBUTING TO RE
-
RADICALISATION
?
 
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11 
The apparent obstinacy of MB old guards in Egypt and elsewhere in 
the face of internal challenges and growing radicalism may suggest they 
are out of touch, that this kind of Islamist organisation is becoming passé. 
The MB ‘firewall’, to use Marc Lynch’s term, may be crumbling, and 
allowing elements that are more radical back into Islamist and broader 
Arab politics.
15
 Since the apparent failure of the established leaderships of 
these venerable Islamist organisations to adjust to new conditions seems so 
manifest, it raises the question of why this is so. Is it just because they are 
old, un- or anti-democratic by instinct, tradition and practice, and fearful of 
all challengers, especially youthful ones, out of petty, selfish motives? Or 
do they have an alternative vision, one that gives little weight to electoral 
politics and democracy more generally, but has seen it useful to play the 
quasi-democratic political game while in reality nurturing hopes of a rise to 
power through undemocratic means? 
At the very least, it would not be surprising if the old guard 
leadership were at best conditional, qualified democrats. The MB is rooted 
in the crossing of Egyptian Sufism with 1920s and 1930s fascist-style 
political organisation, as Brynjar Lia’s fine study of it so convincingly 
demonstrates.
16
 It has not only persisted in the face of repeated campaigns 
of extermination dating back to the monarchy, but has also survived for 
generations in Egypt and elsewhere as the largest non-governmental 
political organisation in the respective country. Most importantly, it has 
never enjoyed the luxury of operating in fully democratic systems. Its 
success has been owing to the interrelationship of its organisational 
coherence and capacity, its mass appeal and the political manoeuvring of 
its leadership. Precisely because of its comparative political weight, it has 
periodically been of substantial value to leaders in search of publics, 
including in Egypt Kings Fuad and Farouk, Abdel Nasser before 1954 and 
Sadat almost to the end of his life. It remains of value even to President 
Hosni Mubarak at present, who needs it to justify his authoritarianism, to 
                                                                                                                                       
and I. Gharaibeh, “Jordan: Rifts in the Muslim Brotherhood”, Arab Reform Bulletin, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., June 2008. 
15
 He has discussed this possibility extensively in his blog. See for example, 
“Assessing the MB Firewall”, Abu Aardvark, 13 May 2008 (retrieved from 
bounce-
[e-mail]
 on behalf of Abu Aardvark or see also 
http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2008/05/assessing-the-m.html
).  
16
 B. Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, London: Ithaca Press, 1996.  

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